UNITED STATES–CHINA RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD MAINLAND CHINA

(Executive hearing held July 21, 1971; made public December 8, 1971)

AND

HEARINGS

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ON

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST, PARTICULARLY CHINA

DECEMBER 5, 6, 7, AND 10, 1945

Y 4.F76/2:C 47/7

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67-891 WASHINGTON : 1971

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Foreword By Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman

The two sets of hearings printed in this volume—held a little over 25 years apart—form an interesting chapter in U.S.-China relations.

The 1945 hearings, which form the latter part, were held in public, but not printed by the Committee at that time for reasons which are not known. The July 21, 1971 hearing was held in executive session and largely concerns the same period as the earlier series.

The Committee is publishing both sets of hearings at this time in the belief that an understanding of the history of this period of our involvement on mainland China is important to our expectations of more normal relations with the People's Republic of China.

AUG 21 1972

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UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 1971

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room S–116, the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Church, Symington, Spong, Aiken, Case, and Javits.

The Chairman. If the committee will come to order, some of the other members, I am sure, will be along.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are pleased very much to welcome today Mr. John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, Jr., and John K. Fairbank, three men with an invaluable collection of experience and learning in an area of United States-China relations of great interest to the committee. During our recent series of public hearings on U.S. policy toward China, Prof. Allen Whiting brought to our attention some very interesting aspects of U.S. relations with the Communist movement during World War II. He pointed out an apparent interest on the part of Mao Tse-tung and his associates in increased contacts with the United States, and he sketched a picture of Communist attitudes toward the United States which is sharply at variance with the conventional wisdom.

This has raised our interest in the nature and extent of the Communist overtures, the perceptions of the Communist movement, and the Nationalist Government by our Foreign Service officers in China and by the policymaking officials in Washington, the means by which policy decisions were made and the factual basis for those decisions. Particularly interesting is the 1949 China White Paper and the picture it presents. Through our discussions today we hope to understand better how our policy evolved without apparent reference to the realistic assessments of the situation provided by our Foreign Service experts in the field.

REVIVED INTEREST IN AREA

I want to thank you three gentlemen for coming in today on such short notice. I wish to add that I need not tell you why our interest in this whole area has been revived recently, first, by the publication of the so-called Pentagon papers and, more recently, by the President's quite unexpected decision to, the way I express it, change his attitude

toward China. The hearings that we had prior to that time, and the hearings today, are extremely important to the committee in understanding the roots of our involvement. Our concern with this period is not a question of a witch hunt or an effort to embarrass anybody, but I think you probably are wondering why I, as chairman, and this committee have not known these things all along.

Since the last 2 weeks I have read some hearings of this committee on Mr. Hurley's resignation. There was a very interesting series of hearings, which I had not read before.

I also read your recent publication of various papers, most of which I had not read before. I had not thought to read Mr. Kubek's publication because I am not in the habit of reading the publications of that subcommittee.

So, with a very large degree of ignorance of the background, we have asked you gentlemen to come here and enlighten us as to how we developed the policies which finally resulted in the situation we have today.

With that brief introduction, we would like very much for you to view this as a seminar and instruct us about that period when you served in Asia.

We thought it was appropriate to have Professor Fairbank, who has been here before. He can bring his perspective as a historian to bear on the questions considered. It will be very useful to us.

Senator Aiken, do you wish to say anything before we start?

Senator AIKEN. No; I came to listen.

The CHAIRMAN. I came to listen, too. I will ask questions later. Do you wish to start, Mr. Service?

Mr. SERVICE. Professor Fairbank is the eldest, I think, in China——

The CHAIRMAN. You served first, I believe, and you are the one who has received notice in the press, at least in some ways. I thought that after we heard statements by you and Mr. Davies, who were such active participants in China, then Professor Fairbank could comment on them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We are just being Chinese, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. If that is all right then we will come back for questioning after you have finished giving us a brief background.

As you understand, we are interested particularly in the period from 1943 to the White Paper.

STATEMENT OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Mr. SERVICE. Thank you very much, Senator.

I am sure you can appreciate what it means for me to be here. It is the first Senate meeting where I have appeared without need for counsel. In fact, the last Senate hearing where I appeared was before Senator McCarthy and Roy Cohn.

1945 REQUEST TO COME TO UNITED STATES QUESTIONED

I think I should perhaps—incidentally, I have no prepared statement. I think I should start perhaps on a somewhat negative note. I have not read the transcript of Mr. Whiting's testimony, but I have received a lot of press inquiries, and the thing that seems to

have attracted most attention—in fact comment by some columnists in the New York Times and so on—is a statement that Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai made a request through General Wedemeyer to come to the United States in 1945. This may very well be true, I just do not know, and I do not want to start an argument with Mr. Whiting.

But the reason I did not include this in my own recent monograph is that I think there is some, a little, question about it. It is not absolutely certain. Our only source for this is Ambassador Hurley. Ambassador Hurley, particularly at that period, was not the most reliable source, shall we say; and I think he got this information through someone else who was not a disinterested party. It was, I think, leaked to him by the Chinese secret police chief, Tai Li, through the head of the Navy group there, Commodore Miles, both of whom had their own axes to grind. So I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. This is only the request to come to Washington you are talking about?

Mr. SERVICE. That is right. That is all I am mentioning.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. SERVICE. There are no documents. It is not mentioned in the U.S. War Department history, or by General Wedemeyer in his book "Wedemeyer Reports." Those of us who were in China at the time and just after that and in close contact with the Communists never heard of it; so I just raise a little doubt only to the story of this particular request.

The CHAIRMAN. To make it clear, you are only referring to the matter of coming to Washington.

Mr. SERVICE. Absolutely.

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTEREST IN U.S. ASSISTANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Your own report indicated they were quite receptive for assistance.

Mr. SERVICE. Quite right.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. SERVICE. It is abundantly clear that they were intensely interested in developing relations with the United States, in winning American support during the war, and I believe quite clearly in the postwar period.

Senator AIKEN. What year was that?

BACKGROUND CHRONOLOGY

The CHAIRMAN. By way of background, why don't you give us a little chronology so we can put it in context?

Mr. SERVICE. That was in 1944, 1945, Senator. I went to Yenan which was the Chinese Communist base at that time in July 1944 and stayed there for roughly 3 months until October, and I returned to Yenan for most of the month of March 1945.

Senator AIKEN. In what capacity there?

Mr. SERVICE. I was a political officer from the State Department attached to the staff of the commanding general of the China-Burma-India theater.

The CHAIRMAN. Stilwell?

Mr. SERVICE. First, it was Stilwell. The second time I went to Yenan it was Wedemeyer. General Hurley at first was the personal representative of the President in China and later on in November 1944 he became the Ambassador of the United States. I think really that is all I have to say right now.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE IN CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond that, for the record, could you give us a brief description of your experience? You had served in China prior to July 1944. When did you first start serving there?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, actually, I was born and raised in China.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

Mr. SERVICE. Born in 1909 and stayed there until I was ready for college, roughly, and went back after college.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that?

Mr. SERVICE. 1933.

The CHAIRMAN. You went back in 1933, in what capacity?

Mr. SERVICE. I had passed the examinations for the Foreign Service and took a position as clerk pending appointment. So I worked for the State Department from 1933.

The CHAIRMAN. 1933.

Mr. SERVICE. Onward.

The CHAIRMAN. Until when?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, until I was fired later on.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Mr. SERVICE. I was fired in 1951, sir, in December.

The CHAIRMAN. 1951.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From 1941, the beginning of the war and prior to that, what were you doing?

Mr. SERVICE. In 1937 when China's war with Japan started, I was in Peking. From 1938 until the spring of 1941 I was in Shanghai, and then from April——

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I was in a very large consulate general in Shanghai, in fact, one of the largest in the world at that time, and I was used—actually I was a very junior officer in those days. I was used as a relief man to rotate as men went on home leave. So actually I served in every, I sat in every, chair in the consulate general except the consul general's chair, shall we say?

The CHAIRMAN. In 1941 what did you do?

Mr. SERVICE. In 1941 I volunteered for duty in Chungking, which was then the wartime capital. Anybody who volunteered for Chungking in those days—it was not exactly the most desirable place—was accepted and I went to Chungking in April 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. SERVICE. Third secretary, but I was——

The CHAIRMAN. In the Embassy?

Mr. SERVICE. In the Embassy. But I was in charge of translations and for a while sort of office manager and later on I worked into political reporting. It was a small office in those days, and I had been

raised actually in Szechwan Province where Chungking is located; so I had some facility with the language and particularly the local dialect, as Mr. Davies does also, of course. We were both Szechwanese.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you both there at the same time?

Mr. SERVICE. We were small boys together.

The CHAIRMAN. You were.

Then I wanted to come down to when you became interested in the evaluation of the political and military forces in China. When did you become interested in this?

BACKGROUND OF CHINESE CIVIL WAR

Mr. SERVICE. Well, this had been a problem in China, although the Chinese Communists during the 1930's, before 1935, were in a relatively isolated region in Southeast China, in Kiangsi Province. They were forced out of there finally by the Nationalist forces and started the long march up to the northwest. During that long march they moved right past the city of Kunming in Yunnan Province where we were located and our families had to be evacuated hurriedly for flight down to French Indochina, and then the Communists went to the northwest. Ed Snow, whom I knew quite well, went up and wrote his famous "Red Star Over China."

The Communists were there. They were something we were all interested in. No one knew quite what to make of them as a factor in Chinese politics. But after the kidnapping of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in December 1936——

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. SERVICE. By the commander of one of the Generalissimo's armies, one of Chiang's armies, Chang Hsueh-liang. He actually was the son of the old warlord of Manchuria. It was his troops, who had been pushed out of Manchuria by the Japanese, that were being used to fight the Communists. They in effect rebelled and Chang Hsueh-liang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in December of 1936. Out of that a united front, a loose united front, was formed to stop the civil war that had been going on then for almost 10 years and China was united to oppose the Japanese.

The Japanese reacted, of course, by starting allout full-scale war against China in 1937.

When I was in Shanghai I was not engaged, or engaged only sporadically, in political reporting. But when I went to the Embassy in Chungking in 1941, the united front had broken down rather completely, as a matter of fact. The Communists had been spectacularly successful in moving in behind the Japanese in North China. As the Japanese armies came south, the Communists moved in behind them and occupied most of the countryside, and their strength had become so great that the National Government was worried and concerned.

There was an attack on one of the Communist armies, the rear guard, in January 1941, and it was obvious the situation was deteriorating as the Communists got stronger and stronger and the effects of war, inflation, and attrition weakened the Kuomintang. Almost as soon as I got to Chungking I became very much interested in the subject, and eventually became the principal Embassy man assigned to contact and report on the Communists, who had regular representatives in Chungking.

Thus in 1943 when I was assigned to General Stilwell's staff, it was with this background of being something of a specialist in Communist affairs. The Army used me—perhaps being a civilian was more convenient that using a uniformed Army officer—to be their liaison man with the Communists. We could get some information through them about the Japanese in North China, and so on. It became obvious to me that we really needed to find out something about what was happening in North China. They occupied perhaps a third or fourth of the country. They were blockaded completely. No Americans or foreigners were allowed to travel there. We had no reliable information about them or their program, military strength, popular support, or anything else. Mr. Davies and I, who were both working for the Army at that time, proposed that American observers be sent up to visit their area.

Eventually after quite a long effort and several rebuffs by the Generalissimo, permission was given during Vice President Wallace's visit to China in June 1944. I am sorry I have given such a long speech.

1944 ASSIGNMENT TO YENAN

The CHAIRMAN. No, it is not long. We have to have this background because none of us is familar with it. So, in June 1944 you were assigned to go to Yenan to become acquainted with the operations of the Communists. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. The Army headquarters organized what was called an American Army observer group. We included specialists from different categories. One man, for instance, was concerned with order of battle, another one was a meteorologist, another man was concerned with rescuing air crews.

The CHAIRMAN. These were all Americans?

Mr. SERVICE. Another man was interested in interrogation of Japanese prisoners, psychological warfare. Another man would be communications. We had a whole assortment of experts in different fields.

The CHAIRMAN. This is at Chungking?

Mr. SERVICE. They were selected from all over the theater. There were people from the various components in the theater. They were not all from the Chungking headquarters, but the group was organized and dispatched by the Chungking headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of you were sent to Yenan?

Mr. SERVICE. Altogether, 16 in the original group.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you go with that group?

Mr. DAVIES. Later.

Mr. SERVICE. There were 16 in that group which went in two contingents. I was sent at the suggestion of the State Department with the concurrence of the Embassy, as a political observer, political liaison officer. The rest of the people, except for one other officer who was in a similar capacity to Davies and myself, were all regular Army personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be interesting if you would give us a little feeling of the very simple facts of what it was like in Yenan and what you found there. Give us a little chronological description of your 3 months while you were there and what your impression of the Chinese Communists was.

Mr. SERVICE. I do not want to do all the talking here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come to the others. We want a little background, and then Mr. Davies will fill in. He will not have to repeat all of this, and Mr. Fairbank will comment on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you will yield for just a moment. I unfortunately have to leave shortly, but I wanted to pay my respects to these two gentlemen.

Mr. SERVICE. Thank you, Senator.

CORRECTNESS OF TUCHMAN BOOK

Senator SYMINGTON. I would ask one question, if I may. If you have read the Tuchman book, is it in general correct?

Mr. SERVICE. That is the way it was, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. That answers it all right there.

Mr. SERVICE. John agrees.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I think it is a great book.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. It is a privilege to meet two great Americans.

Mr. DAVIES. Thank you.

Mr. SERVICE. Thank you, Senator.

Well, it was a dramatic experience really, in many ways.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE IN YENAN

The CHAIRMAN. How did you get there and what happened? Give us a feel of what it was like going there.

Mr. SERVICE. We flew by DC–3 from Chungking with fighter escort over the last part of the trip. It is hilly country and the Japanese area was not very far away so we had to fly quite low, in among the hills, and finally we came in and we found an identifying pagoda, at the junction of two rivers, and a dusty little landing strip. I was surprised at first because I thought we would see a town. But the town was bombed by the Japanese early in the war; so they abandoned it and simply moved into caves dug in these loess hills of fine silt. Of course, in the air you do not see them, and there seemed to be nothing hardly there.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of them were there?

Mr. SERVICE. Caves, miles of them along the sides of the valleys.

The CHAIRMAN. How many people, I mean.

Mr. SERVICE. I suppose 30,000 in Yenan, maybe 30,000 or 40,000.

We had a little accident when we landed because one wheel of the plane fell into a grave which had only been covered very shallowly when they built the landing strip, but fortunately no one was hurt. I think that both the Chinese and American sides were equally curious in a way. The Communists had been isolated for years there, blockaded from the world. Actually they had been fighting in the boondocks for years before that. We were the first Americans many of them had seen. Suddenly our arrival put them in contact with the outside world. The whole idea of working with the Americans was rather unusual since they had been taught for years to hate the imperialists, and so on, in the 1920's and 1930's; so they had been just as vehemently against us as in recent years. Similarly we had been almost as violent about the Chinese Communists as we have been in recent years. So there was a sudden reversal of the accustomed roles.

ATMOSPHERE IN YENAN AND CHUNGKING

One thing about Yenan. North China has a dry sparkling climate. The sky is blue, the hills are like California—a little more green than California. Chungking, of course, had been hot, humid, overcast. The atmosphere in Chungking, not only meteorological but also the moral and morale atmosphere, was oppressive. Here everybody seemed to be open, optimistic, cheerful. In Chungking they were waiting for the war to be over so they could get back to downriver homes in Shanghai. These people in Yenan had long ago given up their homes. There was this tremendous feeling of confidence. They felt sure they were on a rising wave. We were just bowled over by this feeling of confidence. These people, we had assumed would be poverty stricken, poor, isolated. They did not seem to feel that way. At least it did not depress them. We found them very easy to work with, extremely cooperative, cordial, friendly. They wanted to make a good impression, Whatever we asked for, if it was physically possible they produced it very quickly. There was never any question of terms or quid pro quo. We wanted to get publications, Japanese publications, which were very hard to get through Chungking. In 10 days they started to arrive by courier right straight out of Peking or other occupied cities.

We wanted to interrogate Japanese prisoners. The Kuomintang had very few and they were very shopworn by the time we ever saw them. Suddenly we found the Communists had a hundred or more just outside of Yenan. In every way they were very friendly and cooperative.

We wanted to travel. The Communists let our people go out in the field. Some of our group traveled for 4 months in their areas. They started picking up our downed flyers all over North China and bringing them in. We had something like 70 flyers, air crews, rescued by them. It just seemed like a different country. They were simple, unassuming. They seemed to talk the kind of language we talked. And they really wanted the United States to recognize them as a participant, a partner in the war against Japan.

Of course, they had motives. Their enemy was Chiang Kai-shek and they certainly hoped for our support. But it was very surprising in my first long talk with Mao to realize that he was obviously thinking of more than just the war. He was thinking of the future and he was thinking of a China which was not going to be a Russian satellite. Mao himself was not particularly willing to talk about internal party history, but as I talked with some of the junior members, more my age and so on, I got a good deal of the party history, much of which has come to light since then in much more detail, and I realized more clearly that Mao had won dominance in the party over Russian-trained and Russian-nominated candidates, and was just then in 1944 at the culmination of a long campaign to Sinicize the party, or Sinofy the party perhaps, to make it Chinese. He had consolidated his leadership on the basis that Marxism is no good unless it is applied to actual Chinese conditions and circumstances which in those days, he insisted, meant a united front program—moderation, pragmatism, and a united front.

MAO'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IN 1944

The CHAIRMAN. What were his relations with Russia at that time?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I think they were very tenuous. Of course, it is very hard to say. They received no help, no arms from Russia during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not?

Mr. SERVICE. Did not. There was one Russian doctor in Yenan, and he was an army doctor, who was replaced every 2 years or so. There was a Tass representative—two Tass representatives, I think actually—but there were no other Russian representatives. Travel to the Soviet Union could be made only through Chungking, as far as we could find out.

The planes came in with Chungking's approval, very infrequently, and, of course, there was radio communication. They picked up Moscow radio and Moscow could presumably read their radio. They were certainly following the Soviet line, shall we say, in foreign affairs, but that did not cost them anything, and the Soviet line was fairly unobjectionable in 1944—after all, the Soviets were our allies at that time. We were all together.

COMMUNIST CHINESE EQUIPMENT

The CHAIRMAN. You say they got no equipment from Russia. Where did they get equipment? What kind of equipment did they have and where did it come from?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, most of the equipment they had was captured from the Japanese. They had also captured a good deal of equipment during the earlier civil war in the 1930's from the Kuomintang armies when sometimes whole units or divisions would surrender or go over. Furthermore, at this time there had been three decades or more of warlords and banditry in China. There was a huge reservoir of old muskets and guns scattered all through China, as relics of the civil wars, abandoned by defeated troops, collected by bandits, and so on. Many of these were saved by the farmers, all sorts of old guns. Finally some guns were made by local blacksmiths.

The CHAIRMAN. Any modern equipment?

Mr. SERVICE. None at all. Well, not really modern equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they have trucks or communications equipment?

Mr. SERVICE. No; they had a few very small radios. They had an awful time keeping radios going because they had to smuggle tubes out from Japanese-occupied towns. They had a few machineguns made in Chinese arsenals, things like that. Of course, as I say, they captured some stuff from the Japanese, but there were practically no motor roads. The real transportation network in all of north China, the main roads, the railways, were all held by the Japanese and the Communists held all the other territories, and communication was by mule, donkey cart, or by foot.

RUSSIAN SUPPORT OF CHIANG GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. At that time, had Russia officially recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the government?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes; from the midthirties Russia was very strongly behind the Chiang government, because, they wanted a strong China on Japan's flank to give Russia more protection, to divert Japan, shall we say, from any intention of attacking Siberia. The Russians undoubtedly were promoting the united front in 1935 and 1936.

The Russians, for instance, have taken credit for instructing the Chinese Communists to urge this Chinese general who kidnaped the Generalissimo to release him. There is some disagreement as to how definite those instructions were. But from the midthirties on, the Russians certainly gave their support only to the Nationalist Government and wanted to support the Nationalist Government against Japan. In the early years of the Sino-Japanese war; that is, 1937, 1938, and 1939, the major part of the foreign support that the Nationalist Government received was from the Soviet Union, including units of air force, and so on. Actually, Russian pilots fought in China for the Chinese Nationalists.

The CHAIRMAN. Against the Communists?

Mr. SERVICE. Against the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. Just against the Japanese.

Mr. SERVICE. And a lot of artillery and supplies were trucked in through central Asia. A lot of the equipment that was captured from the Poles was shipped into China to the Chungking government. After the German attack in 1941, of course, it stopped. From that time on there was practically no help from the Soviet Union.

REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

The CHAIRMAN. You were there 3 months. When did you write the famous article, or report I should say, in which you related conversations, I believe, with Mao?

Mr. SERVICE. That is all late August 1944. I think you may be referring to my report of a long interview with Mao Tse-tung.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you describe that a little bit and then we will move on to Mr. Davies. That was what departed from Ambassador Hurley's views and was reported in these hearings to which I referred.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

Well, I first arrived in Yenan on the 22d of July. Actually on the day we arrived, I think that evening we had a dinner given for us by the Communist leaders. Either at that dinner or very soon thereafter, Mao Tse-tung made some comment to me that he assumed that I would like to have a talk with him, and he also would like to have a talk with me, but that we really should delay our exchange of views—to put it in the Chinese way—until I had had a chance to look around a bit and get acquainted.

Well, his idea of the proper time to get my feet on the ground apparently was a month, because on the 22d of August, just 1 month after my arrival, I was asked if I would be free to see the Chairman, as they called Mao Tse-tung, the next afternoon at 2 o'clock. I, of course, said yes, and I arrived.

We had some general conversation. Mao Tse-tung, for the first time, had an interpreter. We normally did not have an interpreter. We normally talked in Chinese, but he had an interpreter, and there

was no one else there except the interpreter and the two of us. Mao then went into an obviously prepared presentation of the Communist views, and an interrogation of my ideas of American policy and views. It was quite surprising. I was really almost taken off my feet by the warmth and fervor and earnestness with which he was arguing for American sympathy and support, for the compatibility of their views with American intentions in China, for the desire for American military participation in China. He wanted more American troops in China. In Kuomintang China that was not the case. He wanted American understanding. He spoke of America as being an example of democracy, and it was a very convincing and to me surprisingly fervid presentation of this desire for American understanding and cooperation. Finally, he wanted me to go immediately to Chungking to report it.

I said that I would write a report immediately and it would reach Chungking—there was no need for me to go down.

The talk went on for 8 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Eight hours.

Mr. SERVICE. We talked until 10 o'clock at night with a break for supper, but more or less talking all the way through supper.

I wrote the thing up at great length because it was my first talk, and the first time he had expressed himself so clearly and thoroughly on these points. He came back to this same theme many times, generally in the same tenor, but I never reported again as fully because I had already reported them once. I referred back to this earlier talk. I think if you read it, it is striking, but I think I perhaps even toned down my report a little bit because it seemed almost exaggerated when he was saying it. What I set down is a rather cool version, I would say, of the actual statements.

I took notes at the time, as was customary. They liked to have people take notes. The talker, I think perhaps, believes it an indication that you regard what he is saying as important.

AMBASSADOR HURLEY'S ALLEGATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't Ambassador Hurley allege later on that you were undermining his policy and that you represented to the Communists that Hurley really did not represent the true policy of the United States?

Mr. SERVICE. Oh, absolutely, Hurley charged this.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. Now, there is a certain problem in this. I said—I will not speak for anyone else—I said that U.S. policy was one of noninterference, and not to support any particular faction or party in China. I never made any statement that Hurley did not represent it. I simply stated the American policy which had been made public in many public statements: that we were not politically involved in China and believed that Chinese internal political affairs were a Chinese concern. We were not committed to any one group, but hoped for Chinese unity. Of course, Hurley interpreted that as my saying that he was not representing American policy, but I never characterized his policy. I never spoke of "his policy." I simply spoke of what American policy was as I knew it from my seniors in the State Department and the U.S. Government.

The CHAIRMAN. His view was that he was committed to Chiang Kai-shek as such; was it not?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, he interpreted his instructions that way.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Mr. SERVICE. More and more as time went on, but I believe that he misinterpreted U.S. policy, that U.S. policy was not a commitment personally to Chiang Kai-shek. We certainly had a commitment to the support of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. But we were not politically involved in China to the extent, to supporting any particular group or faction.

The CHAIRMAN. The main objective, as I recall it, in the war was to strengthen China in its fight against Japan.

Mr. SERVICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the logical conclusion, as I understand you, was to support a united front, if possible, or anybody with strength to fight Japan. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. That is quite correct. And we believe, I believe, that this was also President Roosevelt's intention and policy, as he indicated in various statements and conversations right up to near the time of his death.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the main report upon which Mr. Hurley based the idea that you were not supporting our policy?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, sir, I think actually it was a report, my report No. 40 of October 10th, which does not appear in my recent monograph. I mention it or refer to it there, but I do not think I cite it there. But that is the one that really made him climb the wall.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this one that is reprinted in these papers reprinted in full?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, sir; it is substantially in full.

REPORT NO. 40 OF OCTOBER 10, 1944

The CHAIRMAN. Is the October 10 report also reprinted there?

Mr. SERVICE. It is not in there; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us about that. Then I will go on to Mr. Davies.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, the report of October 10 was simply an independent spontaneous memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, was that report to General Stilwell?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, sir. On October 10, I was in Yenan and we knew very little about what was happening in Chungking.

The CHAIRMAN. This is still 1944?

Mr. SERVICE. October 1944. We knew very little up there about what was happening in Chungking. General Hurley had been there for about a month and had been trying to negotiate.

The CHAIRMAN. Been where, in Yenan?

Mr. SERVICE. In Chungking. Hurley had been in Chungking for about a month and had been negotiating or trying to negotiate President Roosevelt's request that General Stilwell be put in command of all the Chinese armies, which would include the Communist armies.

Chiang Kai-shek temporized. He had agreed in principle but asked that a special representative, competent in military matters, be sent

out to discuss the details. General Hurley was selected by President Roosevelt and sent out for that purpose.

About October 10, or maybe the day before, there arrived in Yenan an officer whom I had known quite well, who was an aide to General Hurley. He astounded us with the news that the question being discussed in Chungking had become, not whether Stilwell would become commander of all the Chinese armies, but whether Stilwell's job could be saved or whether he would be fired—relieved. This was the first intimation we had had of this. I was perhaps understandably partisan, shall we say, about Stilwell—I was a young officer on his staff—and I sat down and wrote a very intemperate memorandum saying that I thought that we should not be discussing firing him, we should be supporting him and, if necessary, we could get along without Chiang Kai-shek. China was more than Chiang Kai-shek. And if Chiang Kai-shek threw in the sponge or left the picture, we would still have a China willing, or more willing, to fight with us and cooperate with us and work with us. I sent this off to General Stilwell.

Well, copies of it eventually reached Mr. Hurley, and he always characterized it as a memorandum on how to let fall Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was not that at all, and I think if anyone reads it they are not apt to get that impression of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that document not in this book?

Mr. SERVICE. I am sorry, I do not think it is in there. I do not think it is one of my more significant papers, so did not include it in my monograph.

The CHAIRMAN. You were excited because of your allegiance to General Stilwell.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I was excited that he could be sacrificed.

REMOVAL OF GENERAL STILWELL

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, they did remove him, did they not?

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. When did they remove him?

Mr. SERVICE. Just about a week after that.

The CHAIRMAN. Put Wedemeyer in his place.

Mr. SERVICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Stilwell was returned home.

Mr. SERVICE. He was returned home and became, I think, commander of ground forces and then later on was commander of the 10th Army in Okinawa just at the end of the war for a very brief period.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is very interesting, but we have to go on.

Mr. Davies, in light of this, would you add whatever occurs to you as being appropriate.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE

First, before you do, tell a little for the record about your experience, which is very similar to Mr. Service's, and what you did because a lot of people do not know of it. Then go on to these same essential questions.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PATON DAVIES, JR.

Mr. DAVIES. I, too, was born in the same part of China that Service was, and grew up in China, went to college in the United States, took 1 year of college at Yenching University in Peking, joined the Foreign Service in 1931, served in Yunnanfu which is Kunming. I took language courses in Peking, in the then legation, served in Manchuria, in Hankow during the Japanese invasion of the Yangtze and the occupation of Hankow, was in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State at the time of Pearl Harbor, following which General Stilwell came to Washington for his assignment, and took me on as a political officer on his staff.

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in 1942. Actually, I talked to him shortly after Pearl Harbor when he came to Washington. I had known General Stilwell in Peking when he was a military attaché.

He took me out to China with him. Actually, I followed on several planes later. I was in Burma during the early part of the campaign. Then in India, and back and forth among Burma, India, and China, which was Stilwell's theater of war.

The Observer Group in Yenan came out of memorandums that both Service and I had written, and it was on a decision from Roosevelt himself that the mission was asked for. We had been unable to move the Chinese Government to permit such a mission. Roosevelt directed Leahy to ask Marshall to put the request through and it was finally gotten through at the time of the Wallace visit.

RELIEF OF GENERAL STILWELL

I followed Service to Yenan right after the relief of General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. Put the date in the record.

Mr. DAVIES. General Stilwell's relief was, I believe, October 20; was it?

Mr. SERVICE. Nineteenth.

Mr. DAVIES. Nineteenth. When Stilwell left.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 1944?

Mr. DAVIES. 1944.

WITNESS' REQUEST FOR TRANSFER TO MOSCOW

When Stilwell was relieved I decided that I would like to have a transfer to the Embassy in Moscow and wrote to Chip Bohlen, who was then head of Eastern European affairs asking if he could arrange for my transfer to Moscow. I thought the China situation was beyond repair and there was not much that I could do.

WITNESS' TRIP TO YENAN

Before going to Moscow I wanted to go up to Yenan and see the Communists in their lair.

I arrived there about the 21st or 22d of October 1944. Service left the next day. My first evening there, Service, John Emerson, and I had a meeting with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, the commander in chief of the Communist forces, regarding their military capabilities.

I had been much impressed by what Service had reported about their desire to work with us. I was very concerned about what would happen when the Russians came into the Pacific war, as I assumed that they would. I was afraid that with the Soviet entry into the Pacific war they would capture the Chinese Communists to a degree that they did not then have them. I assumed the Chinese Communists had a degree of independence of Moscow, which was not a popular view amongst the Kremlinologists in the U.S. Government at that time. I, therefore, wanted to test Mao in this relationship, whether they would cooperate with us should we land on the China coast.

I did not know, naturally, the military plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but through my several military contacts the impression that I had was there was no intention to land on the China coast because the war was going very well in the Pacific; that through naval action and naval air and the B–29 action the war could be brought to a close, especially if, as we assumed, the Russians would come in. This we did not know either, at our level.

HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING UNITED STATES-CHINESE MILITARY COLLABORATION

Now, I was really very anxious to find out if the Chinese Communists would play with us on military terms in China proper. So I gave them a hypothesis. We three discussed this with Mao and Chou En-lai, and asked for a hypothetical statement, or a statement of their hypothetical capabilities were there to be an American landing. This we did in late October.

Service left the next day. Then I had several meetings with Chu Teh, the commander in chief, and Yeh Chien-ying, who was the Chief of Staff and who was the man who met Kissinger along with Hwang Hua, the Ambassador, the other day in Peking. Colonel Barrett, who was the American commander of the observer group, participated. Barrett and I gave them the hypothesis of an American landing near the Shantung promontory on the coast. What could they do to meet that and how could we collaborate?

They took a long time to come up with an answer. We had a number of meetings, but they finally did. About November 2 or 3, Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying and Chou En-lai gave us, presented us a statement of what they could do. It was highly cooperative, that is to the extent of mobilizing the whole area. They had troops in behind the Japanese lines throughout this zone with two of their armies, the 8th Route Army and the new 4th Army. There is not much point in going into the details of what they could do and what we might do unless you want that, but there was a definite indication of willingness and desire for military collaboration with us.

I wrote a memorandum on this and it was sent in to the theater commander, with copies to the naval attaché and to the State Department. I heard nothing about it afterwards.

So, just as there was really no response that I know of to Service's report of Mao Tse-tung's overture to us, likewise there was no response, so far as I recall, to their offer of military collaboration. This would have been very important, because had that worked out it would have conceivably taken us into North China with them in a position where

we would have found ourselves working actively in a collaborative relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. What were they expecting for such collaboration?

Mr. DAVIES. They were expecting, naturally, arms.

The CHAIRMAN. Arms?

Mr. DAVIES. They were very interested that a port should be opened for supply to them. They wanted used Japanese arms. Their request for arms was very modest compared to those of the rest of our allies.

The CHAIRMAN. What port did they have in mind bringing arms through?

Mr. DAVIES. The hypothetical port that we mentioned to them was Lienyunkang, the terminus of the Lunghai Railroad that runs east-west.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that report to Wedemeyer at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. That was to Wedemeyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that contained in these documents?

Mr. DAVIES. That is an unpublished report. So far as I know it has not been published.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you identify it?

Mr. DAVIES. I would identify it as a report that would come under my name relating to Chinese Communist support of a hypothetical American landing on the China coast.

The CHAIRMAN. On about October 21, 1944?

Mr. DAVIES. That would be about November 2 or 3.

ATCHESON REPORT

The CHAIRMAN. November 3, 1944. Before I go on, and then I want to ask my colleagues to ask questions if they will, which of you can tell us about Atcheson's report which upset Mr. Hurley so much? Were either of you familiar with that report and its background?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Service is.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you, Mr. Service? Could you tell us about that because that seemed to upset Mr. Hurley very much.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, that is putting it mildly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. SERVICE. That is putting it very mildly.

The CHAIRMAN. He was plenty upset in the committee hearing, I know.

Mr. SERVICE. I returned to China in early 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. From where?

Mr. SERVICE. From the United States. In October I had come back to the States at the time of General Stilwel's recall. But, by December the State Department decided to recall Davies from Chungking because he had become "persona non grata" so far as Hurley was concerned. So I was sent out to replace John as Political Officer on Wedemeyer's staff.

In February Wedemeyer and Hurley came back to the United States for consultation. The Army, various people in the Army, including Wedemeyer himself, actually—and the Chief of Staff and so on, were interested in this whole question of military cooperation with the Communists. The Embassy—American Ambassador Hurley had taken over in late November—had not been able to make what they

felt were full and complete objective reports on the deteriorating situation in China. The two parties were both of them girding for civil war. Civil war was becoming daily more apparent, more imminent. George Atcheson was the second man in the Embassy. He was Counselor of the Embassy, and took over as Charge d'Affaires in the absence of the Ambassador.

Within a few days after he took over he suggested to some of us in Chungking—his staff and myself, who, although not a member of the staff was in close contact—that something should be done to give the Department a more full, complete and objective picture of the situation in China—an alarming, a deteriorating situation. Actually, we were rather surprised. This is no criticism of George Atcheson, but he was a mature, careful, long-experienced, very capable Foreign Service Officer, generally of rather conservative bent. What he was suggesting was something rather startling: that we, in effect tell the State Department that the Ambassador has not been giving the complete picture.

DRAFTING OF ATCHESON REPORT

We all agreed; we all agreed to the need and we sat down and drafted——

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you mean when you say "all"?

Mr. SERVICE. I think there were five of us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. I think five in the political section, four or five; I am not sure. I took quite an active role in drafting the telegram, in preparing the original drafts. I had prepared a somewhat similar recommendation with Mr. Ludden, who was another officer attached to the Army in the same capacity as Davies and myself, only a few days earlier. So I already had the material organized more or less. I wrote the first draft. We went over it among the group. Atcheson gave some comments and suggestions and we found that all of us had really no disagreement on the situation. We all saw it in the same light. This has been true of the situation in China during that period. One's own political views about the United States made no difference. Conservative, liberal, Republican or Democrat—one thing, surprisingly, was that almost everyone saw the situation—everyone who was there and had some background—saw the situation in China in pretty much the same way. Wherever we were stationed in China, whatever our experience we found little disagreement in reporting the actual situation, and the trends.

Our embassy group agreed that we should recommend that the United States tell the Generalissimo—up to this point we had been asking the Generalissimo—to allow us to send arms or to enter into some cooperation with the Communist armies. We decided the time had come to simply do something, that we should tell the Generalissimo that the situation was so grave for China, for the war, that we were going to move into beginning—it would be a very small scale because of the geography and so on—military cooperation with Communists.

Atcheson, as I say, made some suggestions. He made one very good suggestion which showed his experience. He put in the line: "The presence of General Wedemeyer and General Hurley in Washing-

ton,"—they had just reached Washington at the time—"the presence of these gentlemen in Washington will give the Department a chance to get their views and ample consultation."

As soon as this message reached the State Department, it was, of course, shown to Ambassador Hurley, and he hit the roof.

Actually, as I say, we were recommending something which at that time was supported by a very large part of the American Army establishment in China. We were actually recommending something which the officers in the State Department had already, just before they got our message, independently decided was the thing to do. This was before they actually got our message. The head of the Office of Chinese Affairs had drafted a memorandum recommending almost the exact thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Mr. SERVICE. That was John Carter Vincent. Furthermore, our recommendation, which was more complete and more fully developed than the Department's memorandum at that time, was more or less adopted then as the Department's position.

It was sent to the Secretary of State and to the White House with strong recommendations from the people in the far eastern section for its adoption.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Secretary at that time?

Mr. SERVICE. Mr. Stettinius, Ed Stettinius.

THRUST OF ATCHESON REPORT'S RECOMMENDATION

The CHAIRMAN. May I just try to understand it. The thrust of it was that, in view of the seriousness of the situation, arms should be given to the Communists to help fight the Japanese?

Mr. SERVICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the thrust of it. Go ahead.

Mr. SERVICE. Guerrilla type arms, sabotage of Japanese railways, communications, demolition equipment, small arms—they never expected to get heavy equipment—and so on. We would, of course, send in people to train them, people to work with them, guerrilla type operatives, people who were available through the OSS from the partisan operations that were being wound down in Europe and so on. OSS was very anxious to get in there and we had the people available at that time.

SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION IN CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. To be sure I understand, may I ask precisely what you mean when you say the situation was so serious? Do you mean that Chiang Kai-shek's forces were unwilling or unable to press an offensive against the Japanese? Do you mean that the Japanese themselves were threatening to consume more of China? Just what do you mean in view of the way the war was going in the Pacific against Japan?

Mr. SERVICE. I mean partly that the war in China was coming to a standstill—the Kuomintang forces not only unwilling but also really unable to make any important war effort.

But what I mean primarily, even more importantly, is the long run significance of the fact that the situation in China was moving toward civil war. Neither side was interested in fighting the Japanese. They

were jockeying for position in the struggle for mastery in China which would immediately break out, we were sure, as soon as the Japanese were defeated. In that civil war, we were convinced from what we had seen by this time of the Communists, and our very extensive observations and experience with the Kuomintang, that the Kuomintang—the Nationalists—were certain to lose and the Communists to win.

But in a civil war, the middle people would all be eliminated and it would be the extremists who would win. Also the Communists would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union and would be put into an intimate reliance and dependence on the Soviet Union in the course of winning that civil war. So I felt—of course, I was not alone but I will speak for myself—that the critical issue was not really the war against Japan but rather the critical issue was trying to avoid a civil war in China in which we would be locked into support of a losing side that had been rejected, shall we say, by most of the people of China, had lost its popular support, and where the winning side would inevitably turn toward dependence on the Soviet Union.

EFFECT OF GIVING ARMS TO COMMUNIST CHINESE

Senator CHURCH. I was a lowly lieutenant in China at that time and was witness to the recalcitrance of Chinese forces and share completely your view concerning them. But why was it that you thought that giving arms to the Communists would somehow contribute to averting civil war or in some way change what seemed to you to be the ultimate outcome of such a civil war?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, we thought—I thought—that the primary effect would be a political one inside China. The Generalissimo was trading and had been trading on American support. The Communists had no American support. By even the slightest measure of cooperation over the Generalissimo's refusal to allow it, we would be demonstrating that we were in fact what we said we were—in other words, impartial. Once this fact became known—as it would have to become known in China—the Generalissimo, in order to maintain his own position, could not go on insisting on his party's complete monopolistic control of the government. He would have to broaden the base of the government; he would have to have some sort of an agreement with the Communists; he would have to admit them to some share in the government. There would have to be some form of a broader based government, whether one called it a coalition government or something else. Coalition government may not be the most descriptive term, but there would be an agreement between the parties which could probably provide some kind of an umbrella group which would avert an outbreak, full outbreak, of civil war.

Furthermore, since we would actually be in the field with the Communists, we could police things and be in position to check movements toward civil war by either party. And it would not be necessary for us to order the Japanese to surrender only to the Nationalist government forces because the other group, the Communists, would also by this time be National government forces. They already were nominally, but if we were working with them they would certainly have to be part of the National forces, part of the allied forces. The surrender of north China would be made to their forces; and we

wouldn't have had to fly in the Nationalist forces and tell the Japanese to go on fighting the Communists until we could get the Nationalists up there in north China to accept the surrender.

The CHAIRMAN. Furthermore, I would suppose that more even-handed treatment on our part of the two factions would have meant we would not have burned our bridges and had the Communists emerged victorious in the end we would have been in position to establish good relations with them.

Mr. SERVICE. Precisely, exactly.

MR. HURLEY'S ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT COALITION GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. At one time Mr. Hurley undertook to bring about a coalition government; didn't he?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, he worked at it very hard for many months, but he got his fingers burned at first because he simply didn't have the background and didn't understand the situation. To put it bluntly, he went up to Yenan in November 1944, with some terms he had worked out which were agreeable to the Nationalist Government. But when he got to Yenan, the Communists convinced him those terms were quite unreasonable and that there needed to be a really broad-based government in which the Communists would have a voice, some share, and if such a government were set up then they would turn over control of their armies to that government.

Hurley bought this completely and threw in a great deal of language of his own—government of the people, by the people, for the people, writ of habeas corpus, four freedoms, and so on—came back to Chungking and was astounded to find that the Generalissimo would not buy it. T. V. Soong said: "You have been sold a bill of goods." Hurley continued to believe that the Communists were quite reasonable, but by that time he had convinced himself that he had to support Chiang Kai-shek and he was never able to get Chiang Kai-shek to be reasonable. Quite understandably, Chiang Kai-shek thought he could not afford to be reasonable because if he let the Communists in that would, he believed, be the end of him. So we have Roosevelt talking to Stalin at Yalta, complaining, quoting Hurley, to the effect that it is too bad that Chiang Kai-shek will not accept the very reasonable terms that Hurley has helped to work out.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is going on. I wonder if we can move on.

Dr. Fairbank spent a year or two in 1942, 1943, before these incidents, in Chungking. Would you tell us a little bit about this, your experiences and any comments you want to make about this situation.

Senator JAVITS. I have to go to a conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to ask a question?

Senator JAVITS. No, because I must leave. Just let me say I have found this session most interesting and useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will have questions later. Go ahead.

STATEMENT OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in Chungking in the late part of 1942 and early part of 1943. I was a member of the Embassy and I had known these men earlier. I had nothing to do with policy and really have

nothing to offer on this whole business except as an historian, which I think might be worth offering.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it is.

Mr. FAIRBANK. You know how conservative historians are. Historians come after and look at the droppings of history and figure out what happened, and they are always conservatives. They say this is why it happened and don't spend a lot of time speculating on alternatives.

VASTNESS AND INEVITABILITY OF CHINESE REVOLUTION

The history of China has developed a great deal in the last 20 years, with a lot of people working on it and good work being done. The picture that emerges is that the Chinese revolution is a very vast and in many ways inevitable process of updating a backward country, which was bound to occur in some form of revolution, not just reform. In other words, I think we are forced to the conclusion that it would not have been possible for China to go on very long on a purely reforming basis, even with the best government in the world trying its hardest and with aid from abroad for reform.

I say this because the changes that had to be made, as you look back in retrospect, to bring the peasant out of being a peasant, illiterate, never consulted, just taxed, and so on, into a modern kind of activity and into politics where he participates a little more, and becomes literate, if possible, and so on—this process was so vast and was going to crack so many heads and get to so many vested interests in the ruling class, which was a very strong ruling class for 2,000 years, that it could not have been done by a series of reform efforts. In other words, I think there is a historical premise here that the Chinese revolution was going to be some kind of a revolution, a violent effort, using force as well as other means.

U.S. ABILITY TO WORK WITH CHINESE REVOLUTION UNCERTAIN

So the question arises, could the Americans have worked with that revolution? Of course, that in retrospect, in fact, looks a little uncertain.

The Americans believed very much in gradual reform, and we had led the way in many changes in China. We got started many things that the Communists picked up and pushed further; missionaries were their predecessors in many lines like literacy, public health, digging wells, all kinds of things, but it was only the revolutionary Peoples Republic that came in with sufficient autocratic power, that was able to spread this kind of change into all the villages. It has taken them 20 years to get to the point where they are today, which is a very primitive state even now.

I think, looking back, therefore—and this is the conclusion I would offer—that the Americans, with their treaty privileges, were part of an old order which tended toward reform and not revolution. We had these treaty privileges and treaty ports and we were getting rid of them, to be sure, but we had our special wealth as foreigners coming in; we had our vested interests like Yenching University, a great center for training many students, many Communists as it turned

out; we had all these good works going on in China and yet it was always on a reformist basis. We were not there for tearing anything up. We were there for gradual amelioration, for helping, for changing individuals, but not for changing governments. So I think that sooner or later we would have had great trouble in coming to terms with the Chinese revolution.

This is a pessimistic view, and looking back from 20 years where we now have turned a corner, and are moving toward a kind of contact again, it seems to me it would have been pretty hard for the American people with all their background of good works and helping missionary education, with all kinds of good things for China (United China Relief was a big thing in the 1940's)—it would have been very difficult for the American people to be so understanding and so ready to accept rapid and vast changes that we could have gone along with the revolutionary program which I think was inevitable in the Chinese scene.

Maoism or something like it was in the cards to such a degree, on a basis that had been accumulating for centuries, at least for the last century, that the American way of trying to help China was out of date. For example, if Stilwell had been appointed to command, my information is that far from being a source of gratification to us we would look back and say, that is where we got stuck, because General Stilwell and his American aides of all kinds would have been up against the question, if you are going to fight a war against Japan, if you are going to maintain an army, you have got to have law and order. Their chances of running into loggerheads with the revolutionary movement, whether or not it was the Communists or somebody else, would have been very great. I don't think that Stilwell's command would necessarily have put us on the side of the Communists; if we had to take over certain areas and police them, we might have found that the revolutionary movement was not in our corner.

So I look back with some pessimism on what might have been other than it was. That doesn't mean that things couldn't have been a lot better along the way, because I think that the whole trick in meeting historical events is to try to ameliorate the basic, long term changes.

HANDS-OFF POLICY DURING REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD SUGGESTED

The CHAIRMAN. With that premise, wouldn't the wisest thing have been to keep hands off and let it take its course?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It would have called for a lot of back-tracking on our whole approach to China, to help the Chinese people, which we wanted to do.

The CHAIRMAN. In these papers I read there is this constant reiteration of a proposal to Chiang Kai-shek to reform his government, I understand you gentlemen didn't think he would reform or he never did reform—the kinds of reforms you thought might make a difference. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is quite consistent with what you say, that this was not in the cards?

Senator CASE. He had to reform himself out of existence which is too much to ask any man to do.

The CHAIRMAN. The amount of reform would require him to reform himself out of existence.

What occurs to me, and it has occurred to me in some other instances, is that our best role was no role at all during this revolutionary period. Would you say that is true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It would have been better for us, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When the war was over, if we had absented ourselves and not supported anybody, the revolution would have come to its conclusion and it would have progressed better than it did.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course, we tried that. We did a lot better than we did in Vietnam. We got our Marines out of China. We had our finger in the door and we got our Marines out.

The CHAIRMAN. We got stuck with this Formosa thing. We had our participation in the civil war and we are still in it today, which is embarrassing to us.

Senator Case, do you have a question?

Senator CASE. I would like to ask about the historical implications of the Chinese civil war and the implications in regard to other developing nations. There seems to be no chance for development of Asia and Africa and even Latin America except under dictatorships apparently too revolutionary for us to countenance. Perhaps we are wasting our time with our present development policies. Some political scientists, such as Falk and others, have said there will only be progress through complete dictatorship. If this is so, how can we keep the effects beneficient?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think we can stay completely out of these things. I don't think we could have stayed completely out of Taiwan and I am not sure we should completely wash our hands of Taiwan now. After all, we are confronted with a situation now, and I favor our not deciding on a solution for the Chinese (which they are not going to take from us) but rather just contemplating the thought in our own minds; and maybe they can get the idea that Taiwan could be an independent, in a sense autonomous, part of one China for a while, for a generation, as long as it is not a military bastion. Once the military threat of Taiwan is removed, the mainland might be able, in spite of everything they have said in the last analysis, to tolerate an autonomous regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church, go ahead.

POSSIBILITY OF NORMAL RELATIONS WHEN COMMUNISTS TOOK CHARGE

Senator CHURCH. Going back to that period, I think you are right in observing that we did bring our troops out after Japan's surrender. After disengaging, Chiang Kai-shek was rapidly defeated and the Communists took charge. At that time, I should have thought that we might have undertaken to establish relations with the new government and that that government might well have been amenable to establishing relations with us.

Then Korea occurred and when we converted the Korean war into a counterinvasion of the north and approached the Chinese frontiers and the Chinese intervened, we found ourselves at war with Chinese forces. Wasn't that really the birth of the policy of containment of China? But for Korea, do you think it might have proved possible to

have established normal relations with the new Communist government of China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In retrospect, we might have welcomed them into the U.N. and then we might have had contact and perhaps could have worked out some business, but that is a retrospect that I don't think takes account of the Alger Hiss case and the nuclear spy problem and all this excitement we had at that time.

Mr. SERVICE. And the cold war in Europe.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

U.S. INABILITY TO ACCEPT REVOLUTION IN REVOLUTIONARY AGE

Senator CHURCH. What troubles me is our inability to accept revolution in a revolutionary age. We were unable to accept it in the Soviet Union. We followed a policy of isolation and nonrecognition until it finally collapsed of its own weight. We followed the same policy with regard to China. Even with tiny Cuba, we have adopted the same pattern. The futility is written large in our experience. For years we attempted to reform the regime that we propped up in Saigon with the same dismal results. Have we no capacity to learn from this experience? Are we foredoomed to repeat this mistake again and again until we are exhausted and bankrupt, and our young people are in revolt against the Government?

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer that. I would like to hear his answer to that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say, unfortunately we also respond to the idea of individual freedom, which we cherish here and keep working on, but some of these other countries don't particularly cherish it, under revolutionary dictatorships, so we feel ourselves emotionally involved abroad. For instance, in Czechoslovakia today—there are professors in Czechoslovakia being destroyed.

Senator CHURCH. I cannot accept that as an answer. We don't feel much concern about the individual freedom that is being similarly denied the people of Pakistan, Spain, Greece, Brazil, South Africa, and other dictatorships that we not only subsidize, but support.

When I talk to young people, they think their chief disagreement with American policy is that it isn't founded upon any concern for fundamental principles, anything having to do with what they think this country is all about. They cannot reconcile our support of dictatorships in Latin America and all over the world with their concept of individual freedom; and they don't think that the only form of tyranny is communism.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I subscribe to that. I don't want to be the devil's advocate here, but we do have the American tendency to attach emotional concern to foreign situations and say, "those people need help."

The CHAIRMAN. But only under certain circumstances apparently. We are very concerned about the people in Czechoslovakia and not a bit concerned about the people in Greece, for example.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Where?

The CHAIRMAN. Greece.

Mr. DAVIES. Or Pakistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Or Pakistan. Very little. If the government doing the dirt, doing the persecution, is a military dictatorship, we don't

seem to be concerned. If it is the preservation of the status quo we don't seem to be concerned. We are only concerned where it is of a certain character. Isn't that really a kind of a pattern we follow?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we are prone to ideological hangups and to simplified ideological attitudes which are not realistic—emotions which result in ideological hangups.

RESISTANCE TO ATHEISTIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNISM SUGGESTED

Senator CASE. I don't think this has anything to do with the fact that a government happens to be military. There is the Communist factor and how deep this goes I have no knowledge. It isn't strange that with our western civilization and Christian traditions we get annoyed about people who embrace atheism. Take that out if you can and I don't think we have any predilection for brutality over compassion. The reverse I think is true. I just throw it out.

The CHAIRMAN. All I am trying to examine here is what is the element that causes this hangup, if you like, that we become concerned only under certain circumstances?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If I may borrow a phrase.

The CHAIRMAN. We very much want your observation.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, this is old stuff, but I would say arrogance is part of our problem. We do feel we have a message and we understand it, and we want to push it on other people.

Mr. SERVICE. John, if I could throw in a word, anti-communism has been the essence, the core of our policy and our emotional bete noire.

Senator CASE. Can that not be defined in part as resistance to a Communist takeover?

Mr. FAIRBANK. For the young it is "anti-imperialism" in these days, but for most others it is still anti-communism.

The CHAIRMAN. What Senator Case is suggesting is that the essence is really kind of a religious fervor. I mean the atheistic aspects of communism are perhaps more persuasive than the political in inspiring us to resist any change in that direction. Is that true?

Senator CASE. I think it is true, but it isn't strange that, after many centuries of evolution of man with a strong base in religious belief, there should be some violence in resistance to a movement which tries to make a religion out of no religion, and which has come comparatively recently on the world scene. You know more about this in secular thought than I do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. For operating purposes the Chinese have a sort of religion and I would put communism down as a sort of religion. In many cases it may be a poor substitute, but we have to pursue, I think, a program of toleration.

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And procedures.

Senator CHURCH. I would like to add a different element to this.

Senator CASE. I didn't mean to get off on a tangent.

Senator CHURCH. It is an interesting subject. Atheism might have played a part in our feeling of fervor, although China was never a Christian nation; it was a nation of other religious beliefs.

Senator CASE. I suppose you could put it that way.

ALLIANCE BETWEEN U.S. POLICY AND U.S. BUSINESS

Senator CHURCH. Russia was a Christian nation. That is an element, but I also think economics, although I am not an economic determinist, but I think economics plays a very large part.

It is no accident that our embrace of the junta in Brazil, the fervor with which we have supported it since 1964, and the $2 billion which we have poured into its sustenance has produced only one conspicuous result for us—opening up Brazil once again to American investment. The dramatic expansion of American business enterprise in Brazil has been exceedingly profitable. This close alliance between American diplomacy and American business interests is something that I think we just cannot blind ourselves to, being too obviously the case in Brazil.

Communism, representing an end to American business investments and frequently a confiscation of American holdings, has a profound effect upon American policy.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, the coming generation that will soon be with us in my field are thoroughly convinced of this factor of American expansion, call it capitalist investment or imperialism, whatever the motive, profit or otherwise; American expansion is a very marked phenomenon in the whole situation.

YOUNG PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MEANS OF CHOOSING LEADERSHIP

Senator CASE. What are they going to say about how you choose your leadership?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In this country?

Senator CASE. No, anywhere. What are these young people going to say? This is a basic problem unless you accept pluralism as a desirable thing.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think many of them recognize that different peoples in different cultures will have different ways of choosing leaders, sometimes a party, sometimes dictatorship, sometimes elections.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, there is a vote. Would you mind our recessing for, say, 5 minutes and then we will come back. I would like to pursue these speculations a little. To me it is extremely interesting because we are examining some of the roots of one of our major problems and I think it does have relevance to other areas, too, with regard to our attitudes toward some of these Latin American countries. We are running into it every day. We will have the foreign aid bill up again.

This raises some of these same questions you are talking about. We continue to be influenced by these same attitudes that influenced us before although they are in different contexts. If you will excuse me, I will be back. (Recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. There are a few specific questions that I would like to ask for the record and then we can resume a more general discussion because I am thinking primarily of this record for our own information in the future.

REASON FOR RESISTANCE TO MILITARY COOPERATION WITH COMMUNISTS

I am trying to develop a little more fully the attitudes that existed among both you gentlemen and your colleagues during this period. We have made reference to the October 9, I believe, 1944 Report No. 39 of Mr. Service in which he said the Communists were actively and successfully opposing the Japanese in North China.

In view of the U.S. emphasis on mobilizing resistance to Japan, why was not more thought given to military cooperation with the Communists? What was the resistance, because we were then allies with Russia and the Communists? Was it still a feeling about communism as such?

Mr. SERVICE. At that time, if I understand the question correctly, sir, General Hurley argued very strongly, and there were many other people who felt the same way, that the Government of China, the recognized Government of China, was Chiang Kai-shek's government and that we could not, should not, have any dealings or relations with any other army or party or group in China except through the government, through the recognized government.

It was my contention at the time that this was a little unrealistic, that it was depriving us of a chance to use important forces in very strategic positions. Also, the Communist armies were a part of the national armies and, since it was our equipment and our supplies we had a right to indicate that both sides or both groups should be able to have some share of them. For us to insist that they go only to one side, or to agree that the controlling group should not allow them to go to any other army or general was, in effect, American intervention in China. Both sides in the argument, General Hurley and the side that I was on, insisted that what we really hoped for, or were carrying out, was non-intervention. But in our case, we said non-intervention means an even-handed policy of working with both groups. General Hurley interpreted it in a very strong legalistic sense which unrealistically considered China as one unified modern state and insisted we could only have dealings with the recognized government.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say you simply thought it was impractical. That is, it would not work and there were no ideological factors involved. It was not the ideology that was determinative, was it, in the case of you or of Mr. Hurley?

Mr. SERVICE. Are we speaking of my ideology or——

BASIS OF GENERAL HURLEY'S POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. We have raised these questions about the ideological factors at work. In other words, was there an anti-communism, do you think, influencing General Hurley or was it simply the traditional view that we should proceed only by way of reform and not by encouragement of any revolutionary forces?

Mr. SERVICE. It is very hard for me to say what was in General Hurley's mind. Certainly, he was friendly with the Russians, and he certainly believed that we should support the Soviet Union. I do not think that it was really anti-communism. He insisted actually, that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists; but, at the same time,

he based his policy on the idea that they would accept dictation from Stalin as to the course they followed in China.

He was very contradictory there. I think that he simply became convinced that the solution to the problem of China could be reached through support only of the Generalissimo; and that the Generalissimo with our support would be able to defeat the Communists.

He did not believe our estimate of the strength and popular support of the Communists and he thought if the Soviet Union told them to lie down, to submit, to accept the nationalist terms, that they would do so; and if we backed the Generalissimo and gave him support, the Communists could be defeated fairly promptly and easily by military means, if they did not accept Chiang's terms.

He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he was in the United States on consultation in March 1945, that the Generalissimo with a very small amount of help from us would have no trouble at all in putting down the "rebellion." There was no rebellion in China, but he obviously meant the Chinese Communists. This was a completely unrealistic estimate of the strength of the Chinese Communists. That strength was based not on their firepower but on their popular support and their mobilization of the people in the countryside, the peasants.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS NOT CONTROLLING

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have answered it. The ideological factors were not controlling. It was a purely practical matter you felt the strengths of the Communists——

Mr. SERVICE. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). They were the strong party and if we wished to avoid civil war and be successful in fighting the Japanese that they had to be brought into the government.

Mr. SERVICE. Not only for fighting the Japanese, but also for the future stability in the Far East. I think you are right, sir, that is my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess it is fair to say the ideological factor was not a controlling one either in your mind or General Hurley's. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. Correct.

Mr. DAVIES. Might I add, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, any of you.

Mr. DAVIES (continuing). That Stilwell was for using the Communists, I would say, even though they were not incorporated with the national forces. I would think that he was prepared to go ahead and use them independently, so the ideological factor did not work with him either. It was not conspicuous in the Pentagon. That is to say, the JCS in the fall of 1944, when the question of Stilwell being put in command arose, accepted the idea that the Communist troops were going to be used. So, on into the military also there was no strong ideological coloration one way or another.

REASON FOR REMOVAL OF GENERAL STILWELL

The CHAIRMAN. Could either of you say very quickly, since you have mentioned it, why you believe Stilwell was removed from the effort to make him the commander?

Mr. DAVIES. He was removed because Chiang could not accept a foreigner taking command of all Chinese forces. It was inevitable. He could not have taken command of the Chinese forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Could not. It was an unrealistic proposal.

Mr. DAVIES. It was an entirely unrealistic concept.

Mr. SERVICE. I agree.

EVIDENCE OF NOT WANTING SOLE RELIANCE ON SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. How much evidence was there that the Communists did not want to rely solely on the Soviet Union after the war? Would either of you comment on it?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, the evidence is primarily, of course, in the history of the party, the history of the relationship of the two parties, in the statements that party leaders repeatedly made to us, primarily, of course, Mao Tse-tung himself in repeated lengthy statements and conversations, but also seconded by the other leaders, and the fact that he had just concluded a long campaign called a rectification campaign which eliminated the effective influence in the party of the Russian-trained leaders, and established the party doctrine on the thought of Mao Tse-tung, which really was an answer, a rejection of Russian leadership.

STALIN'S SUPPORT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that in Cairo, and I think at Yalta, that Stalin recognized, at least verbally, and supported Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. SERVICE. At Teheran.

The CHAIRMAN. At Teheran.

Mr. SERVICE. And at Yalta, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Teheran and Yalta.

Mr. SERVICE. I think it is quite likely, and evidence that one reads seems to substantiate it, that Stalin really would have preferred to have a weak China. In other words, a Nationalist Kuomintang China, than a strong, unified, effective China under the Communist Party led by Mao Tse-tung, whom he did not trust and whom he knew did not trust him. I mean——

The CHAIRMAN. At that time did you have this feeling?

Mr. SERVICE. By the time I was in Yenan, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have the same feeling?

Mr. DAVIES. When I was in Moscow, yes, I had that feeling. I had that feeling also in Yenan. There was a basic hostility between the two, power rivalry.

DEAN ACHESON'S ASSERTIONS CONCERNING COMMUNIST CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Then, how do you explain that not long after this Dean Acheson in his letter of transmittal asserted so aggressively and affirmatively that Mao Tse-tung, that is Communist China, was subservient to Moscow and later on Dean Rusk used to call them, I think, puppets of Moscow? How do you reconcile this with that view? Is it correct that Acheson did take that position?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes; there are such statements in the letter of transmittal.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what is your explanation of this? What transpired to cause this?

Mr. DAVIES. Shall I answer this?

The CHAIRMAN. You both comment on this, if you would like.

Mr. DAVIES. I was in the Department at the time, and I did not write the white paper, but I knew the people who did. Mao had made his statement that he would lean to one side by this time; had he not?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. Mao had been left to his resources with the Russians by us. He had no alternative; he did lean to one side. Furthermore, I think there was an undertone, almost probably a psychological or subconscious feeling, on the part of the people in the Department who were dealing with this thing of resentment of the Chinese for having turned this way and I think this was an attempt to put Mao in a bad light with his own people. I think there was almost a piece of psychological warfare, calling him names in this situation, to put him in bad with the Chinese publicly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comment, Mr. Service?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I should mention that although I was still in the Department at the time in 1949, in the summer of 1949, I had had no connection at all with policy matters or China affairs. From 1945 on I was removed from any connection there. So, I cannot speak from any experience.

But I think one has to remember the political background at the time in which the China white paper was written. I think that the white paper itself, the body of the white paper, is quite objective in presenting the picture and record of what happened in China. I do not think they pulled any punches there. But I think that it is somewhat deficient in that the picture is not complete on American policy during the years of the war. I point out, for instance, in my monograph here, that some policy papers were left out, which would indicate that our policy really was a flexible one. But I think that the letter of transmittal was quite different from the body of the white paper itself. It was a politically oriented document which reflected the psychological effect in the United States of the fall of China, the loss of China to the Communists, and the terribly vehement attacks that the administration was under as a result of that, and I think it is a slanted paper in many ways.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the transmittal——

Mr. SERVICE. Not the white paper itself, but the transmittal letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the white paper?

Mr. SERVICE. I think it is a politically oriented letter, yes.

WERE WITNESSES' VIEWS SHARED BY OTHER FSO'S IN CHINA?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the other Foreign Service officers in China shared your view that it was not an appendage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DAVIES. There were some who did and some who did not.

The CHAIRMAN. They were divided?

Mr. DAVIES. They were divided.

Mr. SERVICE. It is hard at this late date to retroactively conduct a census. A good many, I think, felt as I did that the Communists were able to and wished to act independently, that they were not necessarily an appendage of the Soviet Union. Everyone knew they had been in the early days. In the early days of the history of the Communist Party, they had accepted help and direction from the Comintern. But I think a good many people, by the 1945 period on up through the civil war, believed that they were more independent.

The CHAIRMAN. Independent.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF WHITE PAPER'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The CHAIRMAN. So, to reiterate a bit, you think the letter of transmittal was politically oriented and, in a sense, was psychological warfare against the Mao movement.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

"OBVIOUS REASONS" FOR CONTINUED AID TO NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. In the letter of transmittal of the white paper Secretary Acheson said that despite the apparent problems with the Nationalists, "We continued for obvious reasons to direct all our aid to the National Government." What do you think he meant by the "obvious reasons"?

Mr. SERVICE. Can I hear the first part of it again, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote:

> We continued for obvious reasons to direct all our aid to the National Government.

This is Acheson's letter of transmittal.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I suppose the "obvious reason" that he is referring to here is that it was a recognized government, one with which we had diplomatic dealings. I cannot think of any other obvious reasons.

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. PULL-OUT

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Acheson outlines three alternative courses of action available. This is also in the letter of transmittal: (1) Pull out lock, stock, and barrel; (2) massive intervention to destroy the Communists; and (3) limited aid to the Nationalists endeavoring to prevent a civil war.

The first he dismissed as an abandonment of our responsibility. That is, the first would be an abandonment of our responsibility and our traditional friendship with China.

Do you think there was any other consideration against pulling out?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, during the war we certainly were fighting a war against Japan. We could not pull out at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean subsequent to that.

Mr. SERVICE. No; I think we would have been wiser actually to have pulled out, as General Stilwell suggested, immediately after the defeat of Japan. General Stilwell said we should "pull out now."

The CHAIRMAN. He did?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, sir; within a few days after the Japanese surrender. I think he was right. I think we would have been better off.

The CHAIRMAN. In retrospect. I take it, all three of you think we would have been better off. Do you agree, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think history would have been a lot better than it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But could we have worked it out? The historians' mind, unfortunately, does not go very far in believing that there are alternatives.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize these are speculative questions and they may not prove to be of any particular value other than in the consideration in other contexts, if there are any sufficiently analogous to be of value. In retrospect we are all being quarterbacks. In retrospect it would have been better to have allowed it to work itself out.

DEVELOPMENT OF COLD WAR ATTITUDE

Mr. FAIRBANK. As we look back, we have to recognize that the atmosphere of the postwar period, and the cold war concerns, were not limited to the right, to the people who were most vocal about the menace of communism. They were not the only people who were concerned that we must do something, we must not abdicate. In other words, I think the cold war attitude cannot be just dumped on the right, on the cold war types. It was a general attitude that prevailed in this country. As so often happens after wars, we were excited and worried. So I sensed in the late forties in China and in the Chinese people in this country, a great feeling that we must do something. The China Aid Act was that kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, I raise these questions purely for examination, but I have the feeling that taking a position, as we did in the white paper and so on, in itself creates the attitude with which later we say we could not have done otherwise.

I was struck by the fact that, and one of the reasons I came to be very interested in this subject is that, I certainly did not know, and I do not think the country knew, of the conversations that you have reported with Mao.

Supposing it had been fully reported that Mao Tse-tung had these conversations and had expressed a desire for assistance and association, both during the war and, I believe in your report, subsequent to the war and that he did not want to become completely dependent upon Russia. If I misspeak this, please correct me, because I am only trying to develop a thought here. If this had been fully on the record at the time, would this attitude of antagonism ever have developed to the point it did? I feel that by not having the full record and only being given the official version then you create a psychological atmosphere in the country that itself creates obstacles to any change. I mean, it is a self-perpetuating kind of process when a mistake in judgment perpetuates itself, assuming for the moment it was a mistake. I am inclined to think it was, but others have a different view.

This was a period, I think, in which we had not become committed, but once you are told the position and you get the letter of transmittal to the white paper which instills these attitudes that they

were completely subservient or subservient to Russia, then this gives the basis for the growth of what is called the international monolothic conspiracy of Communists to control the world. This view was shared by many people, and I am not sure but it was induced by these statements. Many of my colleagues and others for years were constantly repeating that this was an international conspiracy directed from Moscow, and everything that happened, whether it was in the international field or a riot of blacks in Forest City, Ark., was attributed to the Communists, as being directed by the Communists from Moscow to stir up trouble.

You see, this feeds on itself, and we get to the point there you are quite right, we could not have done otherwise. But surely there was some point at which we might have done otherwise.

Mr. SERVICE. I think the time would have had to have been quite early. I am not sure Dr. Fairbank is thinking about 1945 when the war ended, when surely the cold war was not really very well established, or whether he is thinking of the late forties, 1948 or 1949 when certainly it was a very strong influence on the thinking of many groups in this country, right or left.

FOURTH U.S. ALTERNATIVE

But I think that Secretary Acheson's formulation there really is incomplete. He talks about only three alternatives. There was a fourth alternative, which is the one that I had proposed. That is, to work with both sides and to keep ourselves in a flexible position so we could adapt to developments in China and work with whichever side proved dominant.

NO WAY OF MAKING SITUATION IN CHINA BETTER KNOWN

Now, how could we have gotten these views or the situation in China better known? The Foreign Service officer, of course, is helpless, the State Department itself actually was helpless. We came up against one factor in our system—the complete and almost unchecked power of the President. President Roosevelt had little contact with the State Department. There was no way the State Department could effectively make its views known to him during this policy argument in April 1945. Stettinius was not presenting the views, and the President, for reasons which are still mysterious to me, decided that he could work with the Soviet Union in the Far East as well as in Europe. Therefore, he started on the chain of events that led to the Yalta agreement about the Far East, and the commitments he made there, because he apparently believed that the Generalissimo, the Nationalist Government, was not going to be an important factor, and that the principal force in the Far East was going to be the Soviet Union. If he believed that the Chinese Communists would take Soviet dictation, then Yalta perhaps made sense.

There was no way for us to get through this barrier, for the State Department to get through that barrier. The State Department was kept in complete ignorance of the agreements on Yalta. The head of the Far Eastern Branch of the State Department did not even learn about the Yalta agreement on China until about 5 months later. All

of us were operating completely in the dark on this, in this whole period.

EFFECTS OF YALTA AGREEMENT

It was the Yalta agreement, I am sure, that was a determining factor, that dictated keeping Hurley in his position in China, that was responsible for President Truman keeping him on—because Hurley had been privy to the fact of Yalta and was to brief the Generalissimo on the terms and so on, to obtain the Generalissimo's approval.

Senator CHURCH. They have the same problem that we have.

IMPORTANCE OF RECONSTRUCTING 1946 ATTITUDES AND POSSIBILITIES

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say, the reason it seems somewhat important to me to try to reconstruct the attitudes and possibilities of 1946 is that I do not think it is unrelated to the options and policies which still arise from time to time, and which may even still be arising now as to what is the proper course of the country as a whole in China and elsewhere. I do not want to get into the Middle East, but we have a very difficult problem in the Middle East and there is a tendency because of emotional and historical or other political reasons, to line up with one side and not to be impartial, maintain our flexibility and whichever side became the dominent one to at least have good relations with it.

I do not consider this opportunism. This is part of what I call genuine statemanship in the interests of our country, but we tend to become very emotional about these things and become allies to someone who professes our faith or says he is for private enterprise and that seems to make all the difference. Chiang Kai-shek's greatest asset was, I suppose, that he and his wife professed to be Methodists and this just bowled over everybody. We could identify with a Methodist even though there were very few other similarities.

POSSIBILITY OF TAKING DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW—1942–44

But I think today that it is helpful to reconstruct this even though as a historian you say certain things were inevitable. They become inevitable as a consequence of certain developments and as of 1949 or 1950 maybe they were but, as you say, and as it seems to me, in 1942, 1943, or 1944 they were not at that time inevitable.

Mr. SERVICE. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a possibility of taking a different point of view from what we did. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. SERVICE. I agree with you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that is true, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would accept it. The unfortunate corollary is we should have recognized by 1940, before all of this government activity in China had started, that China was in for a violent change, that any government was bound to have trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. As a historian you would agree that they were entitled to violent change because they had had a period of chaos going back almost to the Opium War and we, as a member of the western community, bore the principal burden for our allies, the British, opening them up back in 1839–40. Did we not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The dilemma of whether to help the government in power would still be with us throughout this period, and we were lukewarm about it. Many Americans felt it was better for the Chinese people if that government were to go out. But it was better for the American policy for them to stay in.

U.S. INTERVENTION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. This is a digression, but I have very much this feeling on the Dominican invasion. After we got into a study of that, it seemed to me such a shame that we did not allow this little country to work out its own internal problems without interfering with a massive military means to establish our own boy there. I do not think that matter is yet resolved. The conditions down there are still extremely difficult. They are still slaughtering their own people with kind of a quiet restrained internal civil war going on to this day, and I remember——

Mr. FAIRBANK. Guatemala, too.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember discussing this question with the late former Governor of Puerto Rico, who was a very bright man, Muñoz-Marín. He was very much against intervention. He said this thing has to be solved by them and it will very likely mean a degree of violence. If you interfere you only put off its being solved.

So, in principle, these things are very similar situations. We probably would have been further along if we had kept hands off. The thing would have been solved by itself in the Dominican Republic, I think.

This was one of the reasons I fell out with President Johnson.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRUMAN DOCTRINE

What about President Truman and his advisers? Truman, of course, came in and was very receptive to the influence of Mr. Acheson and others. Do you have any comment about that particular period? There was the development of the Truman Doctrine, which I have always attributed to Mr. Acheson. Do you have any comment on that? Is it related to this?

Mr. SERVICE. I was nowhere around at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not.

Were you, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. I think it is related because this was a decision during that period to contain communism. But there was an inclination also to separate the two. I think Europe and the Mediterranean, Turkey, Greece were one problem, and the China situation another. It had so far deteriorated by the period of 1947–48 that Acheson threw his hands up on China, but was very aggressive on the European and Mediterranean

Mr. SERVICE. Let the dust settle in the Far East.

Mr. DAVIES. That was the consensus.

FINAL POLICY IN VIEW OF DIFFERENCE OF VIEW QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. But I am very puzzled why we, in view of this difference of view within the Department, finally settled on a policy of all-out and continued support of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. DAVIES. Until when?

The CHAIRMAN. Until now.

Mr. DAVIES. Continuing.

The CHAIRMAN. All the way we have persisted in this and there developed this tremendous, what they call, China lobby, and it has been a political issue here. So it is a mystery to me why we became——

Mr. DAVIES. I think the State Department was terrified, of the China lobby and what could be done to anyone who would not—who would suggest there was any alternative to Chiang. He had become a monkey on our back. We had a fixation, so that we had no liberty of choice.

Mr. SERVICE. At least, we thought we did not.

Mr. DAVIES. No, this is a reality when you believe something like this.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose it is fair to say by the time it became so involved in our domestic political situation the opportunities for choice had been lost.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some of us have seen the operation of the Embassy in Taiwan, which has been under the threat constantly that the junior officers, if they reported unfavorably, would be damaged and if the Ambassador did not find their reports sympathetic, nothing could be done to stand up against him. In other words, you have a "me, too," situation there, a "yes" situation. The Nationalist Government has known how to use its prerogatives in our official relations.

The CHAIRMAN. That persists, of course, up to the present time.

ROLE OF MILITARY IN FORMULATIVE PERIOD

What would be your comment about the involvement of the military in these early days in these political questions? I mean, there was Stilwell and Hurley. There was Chennault. Nobody has mentioned Chennault or Marshall. Do you think they played a dominant role in this formative period beginning in the middle forties or early forties, 1942, 1943, on up.

Mr. DAVIES. No one more than Marshall, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you tell us your views on that?

Mr. DAVIES. As a Chief of Staff, I think he was a tremendously powerful force in China policy. He was, I think, more influential, certainly, than the Secretary of State. Stimson had great confidence in him. Stilwell was his choice. He knew quite a bit about China, having served in the 15th Infantry and during a tour in the Philippines having made trips to Manchuria and China. He was interested in China. And he very much guided the course of policy, that is certainly military policy, which was about the only policy toward China during the war period.

And then, he went from that to be Truman's special representative to Chiang Kai-shek, and finally to being Secretary of State. No other American of that period had the influence that Marshall did.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He kept us out of trouble.

Mr. DAVIES. I think he made the very sound basic decision that we should disengage in China.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Marshall?

Mr. DAVIES. That is Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did we not?

Mr. DAVIES. We disengaged part way.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did we not disengage altogether? That has been what our trouble was.

Mr. DAVIES. Political pressures in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. But Marshall's view, in your opinion, was to disengage all the way. It just was not carried out.

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I am not sure how far Marshall wanted to disengage.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Korean war brought us back into relations to China.

Mr. SERVICE. But in the later stages of the civil war in China General Marshall wanted us disengaged. I would say the role of the military in China during the years of our involvement from 1941 onward was really quite nonpolitical.

The CHAIRMAN. Nonpolitical?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, in that Marshall, and Stilwell who followed him, had the same ideas. They really wanted to adopt consistently a pretty hard-boiled quid pro quo policy toward Chiang Kai-shek without complete commitment. This policy was followed intermittently. It was abandoned for a while under the influence of General Chennault and the Generalissimo, who really wanted to fight an easy war in China and thought that the 14th Air Force would make that possible.

From late in the summer of 1943 until roughly the summer of 1944, the main support was given to the air effort, against the advice of all of Roosevelt's advisers. The main emphasis was put on building up the 14th Air Force, giving it the supplies that Chennault said would enable him to defeat the Japanese.

This proved completely unsuccessful. The President then took the advice, which I think was unrealistic advice, of Marshall—through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Marshall was the prime mover—to try to make Stilwell the commander in chief of all Chinese forces. This was something that was unrealistic because it would not, could not be accepted by Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. That was because of the political situation?

Mr. SERVICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And they just would not accept it?

Mr. SERVICE. I do not think the Generalissimo could keep power if he turned over his armies to the complete control of an American. His control was a tenuous one based on personal relationships with all sorts of generals, his ability to favor certain provincial groups against others, his own clique and so on, and he simply could not turn over to an American general the power to punish, remove, cashier and so forth.

MILITARY'S ADVICE OF NEED FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE

Then, of course, I think there was another way in which military advice was very important, and I think quite wrong. That was the insistence that we needed the Soviet Union's help in a land war against the Japanese. Marshall apparently held to this view past Yalta right into the late spring of 1945, that we needed Russian assistance and, therefore, the President was led to pay a very heavy price at Yalta.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not know about the atomic bomb at that time; did they?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, certainly General Marshall knew it was coming along.

Mr. DAVIES. He did not know it was going to work.

The CHAIRMAN. He knew it was in the works, but did not know it would work.

Mr. SERVICE. But the bombing of Japan at this time was progressing apace. The fire bombs killed many more people than the atomic bombs did, and I think there is a real argument by 1945 of whether we needed to pay or should have paid any price at all for Russian entrance. Presumably, the Russians would have come in simply to have a seat at the peace table. There was no need for us to have paid the price that we paid at Yalta and this colored the whole thing, the Yalta agreement.

BENEFITS OR HAZARDS OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING

The CHAIRMAN. Coming down to the present, and this is the part that may be very sensitive, where do we go from here? Do you foresee any genuine new relationships between the U.S. and China in view of recent developments and in view of our history? I wonder if any of you or all of you would want to comment on it. If you would want to speculate about the benefits or hazards of the President's going to Peking, I would like to know, in light of all of your experience, what you are thinking of this situation. Any of you start.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it presents an extreme danger and a danger that should be faced, and he should go, of course. It is a great move. If it achieves a breakthrough, it has great potentialities, but it also has great dangers.

DANGER OF SEMANTIC PROBLEM

One of the dangers to my mind is that you can exchange documents, you can translate them back and forth, you can have hour-long discussions, and yet you still may not agree on what you are talking about, what you mean, what the implications are. The phraseology the Chinese use is in their own words, not only in the Chinese language but in a China context as well as a Communist one. So a semantic problem is added to all of the other problems of the situation.

It is possible to get together and sign something and to go away and then find that somehow you did not agree. Both sides may charge bad faith to the other as a result.

The CHAIRMAN. For my own information, could you give me an illustration because it is hard for me to follow this. What is the type of thing that occurs to you that inspires this thought?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, one of the most famous cases of terminology where our key words, golden words, were put into Chinese, was Mr. Acheson's letter of transmittal in which he talked about the "individualism" of the Chinese (ko-jen chui). This term means to the Chinese "each man for himself," "selfishness." "Individualism" is not a concept they have in the same terms that we have, and the term they use is not a desirable term when you make a literal trans-

lation of "individualism." It is a good word in the letter of transmittal. We support individualism. But for Mao when reading it and his own people reading it, it means the Americans support selfishness of the individual. It is a garbage word.

In the same way, "freedom" is a term that we set much store by. It has many meanings, but in Chinese (tzu-yu) it means sort of being "out of control."

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Being out of control, doing as you wish, not following your responsible duties.

Mr. DAVIES. Licentiousness.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Licentiousness. In other words, a golden word with us turns out to be a garbage word with them, no matter how you translate it, because behind the semantic problem is a different set of values. Where we believe that the individual is not guilty until proved guilty—innocent until proved guilty—they have a different approach.

The CHAIRMAN. What is their approach?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That if the individual is going against the group, he is in the wrong, and if the group condemns him, why, that is it.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not seem to me that is so different. Mr. Service went against the group here in town and they condemned him.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sure; we can work out understandings, we are all agreed, but it is a tough job.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The CHAIRMAN. What can we do about it? I am sure there ought to be an answer to this. What do you suggest?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, it calls for a lot of hard work with a lot of people and also, in the public domain, public education. If people could read Chinese more, they could understand it better.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, nobody is going to learn Chinese overnight. I am not sure very many do learn Chinese. But as long as this is in the works, any contribution or suggestion, I think, ought to be made.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have an idea of self-determination that we have lived by in our political life and we apply it to Taiwan very easily. There are constant resolutions in this body and elsewhere for self-determination of Taiwan. That does not ring a bell in China. It means nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the alternative? What would ring a bell? What would inspire a similar thought?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, they do not want to use that idea of self-determination. They believe the Chinese realm is a great thing. It embodies all Chinese, the whole Chinese culture area, all the Chinese-speaking people; they should all be one unit. They always have been and if they are unified they can have peace and be happy. If they are not unified, then they have war and trouble. So they are against any self-determination of some little part of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Would this apply to the people on Taiwan, also?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is where it applies. We Americans would like to see self-determination in Taiwan as a solution.

The CHAIRMAN. What do the people on Taiwan think? Do they share this feeling that they are part of China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not believe we know what they think.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think they are probably more subject to nationalism than they are to a nostalgia for Japanese rule or even for independence. I would be afraid if we tried to support Taiwan's independence in a formal way, in any overt way, we would get a nationalistic backlash, but that is just supposition.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you comment on this same problem, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I think most of the problems that we have had with China were because we became too emotional about it one way or another. It was an infatuation, a violent reaction. It seems to me that the key for Mr. Nixon in this trip, if he does make it, is a certain reserve and certainly an emotional detachment. I think most of our problems in East Asia are emotional involvement in one way or another. With the Japanese it was that. With the Philippines it was that. See what is happening with us emotionally with the Indochina problem. So, a certain reserve and an emotional detachment are advisable. I assume that the Chinese are very interested in working us against the Russians. So, I think, go easy is the motto. This balance of power among the three of us—and really it is among the four, with the Japanese, too—does not require a lot of action on our part. I think we should take it very coolly, and we will find that we can help redress the relationships among the four of us, the Russians, the Chinese, the Japanese and ourselves and will be in a better state of affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, this is going to be very difficult for Americans.

Mr. DAVIES. I know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not only in that area. We are very emotionally involved in the Middle East, which is one of the great handicaps there.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We are deeply emotionally involved.

PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT

How would you comment on this question of even understanding what we are talking about, Mr. Service? You were born there and you know the language. Is this an insuperable problem?

Mr. SERVICE. No; I do not think it is an insuperable problem. But I think we have to be very careful not to oversell these things in the United States. We tend to rush to one extreme or another, or oversell policies. I think that if the President's trip is going to be more than just a sort of demonstration or gesture, I think it really should follow a great deal of careful, patient talking with the Chinese by well-qualified, highly experienced people.

Mr. DAVIES. What do you talk to them about?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, we talk to them about all the issues involved.

SUGGESTED POLICY TOWARD CHINESE

The CHAIRMAN. Give a demonstration. If I were the President and you were giving me some advice, what would we be talking about? Just let your mind free.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I think we have to really convince the Chinese by some actions and by a lot of talking that we are not aggressively trying to contain them. I think that our nuclear armaments, our nuclear bombs, for instance, should perhaps be moved away from Okinawa, moved further back—certainly not to Taiwan, obviously.

Mr. DAVIES. Do you think they are worried about us now?

Mr. SERVICE. I think to some extent, yes. But I think if we demonstrate by actions—by moving the bombs, shall we say, back to Guam or even further or if we remove our forces from Taiwan, if we take certain specific actions like that, if we do something more active, move faster in getting out of Indochina—I think then there is a basis for normalization of relations. I think it is going to take some demonstration and actions and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. You think their actions are more significant than what they say?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I would say with the Chinese Communists, yes. I think they are pretty realistic, pretty hard boiled. I would say we can reach an understanding with them. I agree with John Fairbank that certainly democracy and freedom and all these things have different meanings and connotations to them than they do to us. But I think they will respond. They want normal relations with us partly against the Soviet Union, of course. One of our big problems, I think, is not to overdo things and convince the Russians we are leaping into the arms of the Chinese. Otherwise it will drive the Russians into a feeling that they are being isolated.

HAZARDS AND BENEFITS OF PRESENT POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you agree it contains many hazards?

Mr. SERVICE. I certainly do, sir; many hazards. And if nothing happens then there is going to be a reaction perhaps on both sides.

Mr. DAVIES. They are the ones who benefit most on this, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure about that. If it has any effect, and I do not know that it will, upon Indochina and our engagement there, we would benefit very greatly. I do not know whether it will or not. It may have. The Chinese and the Australians said they were willing to participate in a renewed Geneva discussion. How do any of you interpret that? What is the significance of it?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I think that they would agree to some sort of a neutralization of the countries of Indochina which I think would be advantageous to everyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be advantageous to us?

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly, if there is neutralization.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there would be no advantage to us. It seems to me there may not be any advantage greatly to China, but if we can disassociate ourselves from some of our commitments around the world as a result of this, it would be of great advantage to us regardless of what we do directly with China.

Mr. DAVIES. That is to both of us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. It is very hard to weigh these, I agree.

CONSTANTLY GIVING CHINESE FACE IN SMALL THINGS RECOMMENDED

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think there is a point here that ought to be pushed with Mr. Nixon. The more face you can give the Chinese, the better.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Face. I think the best rule in negotiating with them is constantly to give them face in small things. The main point about this visit is, Mr. Nixon is going to see them. We might say it matters little whether Chou comes here and is on our TV, which would be a great thing. But, no, I think it is very important that Mr. Nixon is going there. We can afford to do that first while they could not possibly afford politically to send somebody here. We can accept the cultural difference between ourselves and them as regards this matter of face—as to who goes where and other such things, and use it to our advantage. We can do a thing that "loses face," because it does not lose face for us here, it gains face for them over there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one thing that is a plus.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, yes. Whether or not the Nixon trip works now, it has got to be tried later, whoever is President. It is essential that these things be tried.

DANGER OF CHINESE AGGRESSION IF CONTAINMENT ABANDONED

The CHAIRMAN. Do any of you feel that if we should have a relaxation, and we abandon this containment of China policy, there is any danger of Chinese physical aggression upon her neighbors, for example, Indochina? Do any of you feel there is this incipient danger if we should withdraw, say, our nuclear weapons from Okinawa and pull back and have a period of disengagement? What do you think about it? You know it has constantly been asserted she is so aggressive. It is in many of the official papers. What is your feeling about that, all of you? You start and we will go down the line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we face a prospect of possible revolutionary movements in a place like Thailand, which may be more ripe for it than the Thais like to think. If such a movement should get started, Chinese would be connected with it and we would blame it on the Chinese, perhaps. I think we have got to be very cool minded about this and not feel that it is a Peking plot necessarily, even if the Chinese are helping them. The Chinese philosophy in these matters is that the world will be having revolutions and they will give them a distant aid and set the model for them, and so on. If this happens, as it has not yet happened outside of the Chinese culture area, namely the countries which have been culturally close to China, then we have to not get too excited. In other words, we cannot be against all revolutionary changes. If the Thais are not able to handle insurgency in the countryside, we need to give them aid, perhaps, at a central point but not beyond a certain level, in moderation.

UNITED STATES AND CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD REVOLUTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. That is going to be a very great difficulty for us, because our policy is almost uniformly to oppose revolutions, in Latin America and everywhere else.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Many people certainly feel the Philippines is a country that deserves to have some kind of revolutionary movement.

The CHAIRMAN. This move, as reported recently, of the Thais, apparently establishing bases in Laos, would indicate they have ambitions to annex part of Laos. The Chinese are not going to look favorably upon that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not think the Chinese are going to move massively across their frontier.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any of you think they will, do you, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I think we cannot exclude that possibility. But I agree, I think it is unlikely.

The CHAIRMAN. But they will, as you say, help if a revolution gets going, and we will blame them for it, I suppose.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How are we going to educate the American people and the Government, including the Congress, to take a cool attitude toward this, and let them work out differences among themselves?

Mr. SERVICE. It has got to be done. I do not think the Chinese are aggressive in the normal sense of the word. In fact their record, I think, has been quite clear. Their support to subversive movements in other countries has been really quite small in terms of actual material help.

The CHAIRMAN. Strong in words but weak in material.

Mr. SERVICE. Strong in words and theory and in ideology. I think Mao is very anxious to have China be, in the old Chinese sense, a kind of moral leader, the center of the universe, the country that is looked up to as the source of proper doctrine, proper thought, proper ideology. But he does not feel that being the center obligates him to go out and actually carry out the revolutions. I think the gist or substance of Lin Piao's speech in September of 1966 was to tell the Vietnamese: "This is the way to do it, but you have got to do it on your own, with your own strength." In general terms, they are certainly going to be sympathetic to similar movements in underdeveloped countries. But I do not think that necessarily implies that they are going to use their military force to carry them out. One can say that what they do is not really too different from what we do. We give support and sympathy to groups and forces in underdeveloped countries; they give support to theirs.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We send arms around the world, which the Chinese have never succeeded in doing. We arm all kinds of people. It is our policy to give arms.

The CHAIRMAN. In a very big way, and that still is our policy.

MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI

Was Mao Tse-tung a very impressive man to you?

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly, very impressive.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told Chou En-lai is a very impresssive, dignified and very strong character. Is Mao more so?

Mr. SERVICE. The two are quite different.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they?

Mr. SERVICE. It is rather hard to compare them. Mao is a rather large, almost ponderous person when you meet him, rather soft spoken, somewhat slow and thoughtful in speech, calm and deliberate, a sense of breadth and gravity, pleasant but not pompous. But you do not have the sort of sharp qualities you get with Chou En-Lai. Chou En-lai is very quick. His mind is extremely agile and active. I do not mean that Mao is not also very intelligent; but you do not get this sharp, quick rapid-fire exchange with him that you do with Chou En-lai, for instance. Chou En-lai picks up the weaknesses in your arguments and loses no time in pressing them. He is a very effective advocate and a highly skilled negotiator. Mao is much more relaxed; thoughtful, perhaps, is the right word.

The CHAIRMAN. He is the philosopher of the team.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Chou En-lai is the activist. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, with a mind like a rapier. His is a very, very, sharp quick mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have to rush off? Do you want to talk a few minutes longer? I will come back. I am very interested in this. We do not have an opportunity to see gentlemen with your experience.

Mr. SERVICE. We are at your disposal, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very hard to get people here. I will be back in just a minute.

(A recess was taken.)

CHINESE LEADERS' KNOWLEDGE OF UNITED STATES

Mr. DAVIES. I think these people, Chou at any rate and the people around him, who are the ones, I suppose, the President and the White House are concerned about, are really much more sophisticated about us than the people realize.

The CHAIRMAN. They are.

Mr. DAVIES. After all, they dealt with Hurley. They dealt with other Americans, and followed Americans very closely. When I was in Yenan, Chou spent a whole luncheon once with me asking me about the electoral college. They know a lot more about us, much more than given credit for.

The CHAIRMAN. In Yenan?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in Yenan way back in 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. 1944.

MR. HURLEY'S ATTITUDE DURING 1954 HEARINGS

Speaking of that, you remind me of Hurley. During these hearings I read which were held in 1945, he appeared to be absolutely impossible. Even the committee could scarcely get along with him.

Mr. SERVICE. Senator Connally had a hard time with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Have you read those hearings?

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly, sir. They are rather a collector's item.

The CHAIRMAN. I got our copy of the hearings. These were public hearings.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, but so far as I know, they were never printed up. I have only seen them in the mimeographed transcript. They are very funny to read.

But on the point of Hurley, if you read my monograph, you know I am not exactly kind to Hurley, but——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see any reason why you should be.

Mr. SERVICE. But most of the commenting letters I have received from former Foreign Service officers, particularly those who served in China, are all telling me I should have said more about him. I mean, I should have been harsher on him. Almost everyone has got episodes, anecdotes, and so on that would really indicate some doubt as to the man's balance, shall we say?

MR. HURLEY'S PERFORMANCE UPON ARRIVING IN YENAN

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody asked me to ask you how Hurley performed when he first arrived in Yenan. What did he do?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, he drew himself up and gave a monster Choctaw war whoop that scared the life out of the Chinese. They did not know what in the world was going on.

Mr. DAVIES. I was there.

The CHAIRMAN. You were there? What were the circumstances?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, he appeared in the door of the plane, and stood there. He was a great poseur, you know. He was in the full Army uniform of a major general, a handsome man, those great mustaches.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. And he then stalked down and emitted this Choctaw war whoop, and the whole valley echoed with the screech of it. The Chinese were just flabbergasted. They did not know but what the man had gone out of his mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he then give an explanation of what he did?

Mr. DAVIES. No, he never gave reasons for those performances of his. Then he went about, moving in great style amongst the assembled Marxists.

Mr. FAIRBANK. They explained he had grown up on an Indian reservation.

Mr. DAVIES. I turned him over to Barrett, who had never met him——

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Barrett?

Mr. DAVIES. He was the commanding officer of the American Army observer group.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he still around?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, he is living in San Francisco, but is quite elderly now, and if you are thinking of him as a witness he would be a colorful one. He wrote a monograph recently which we published at our center before we did this one of mine, which is amusing and interesting. I will be very glad to see that the committee gets a couple of copies.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you send us a copy of it?

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to see it.

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BOOK ENTITLED "FOREIGN MUD"

The first book I read, Dr. Fairbank, what really caught my attention some years ago, was "Foreign Mud." Do you remember that book?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; on the opium war.

The CHAIRMAN. That was, I thought, one of the most fascinating books. I wish everybody on the committee would read that book. The only place I know you can get one is in the Library of Congress. Was it Collis who wrote that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Collis.

The CHAIRMAN. C-o-l-l-i-s?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, an Englishman.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could get some copies of it I would present them to a few of my colleagues. I think it is very revealing. Do you think it is?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. It is accurate; is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Oh, yes; fairly so. We now have a better book or two on the opium question.

The CHAIRMAN. It is short.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But it gives the atmosphere.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so readable. It is so easy to read and it is very short. I think it gives such a good background of the beginning of our troubles. Do you not think it does?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not where the intrusions into China started?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. The contact at Canton before that, of course, was in the Chinese way, and we objected to it strenuously. We wanted it more our way.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been very restricted.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We had not really penetrated into China and then only on our terms.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We wanted an opportunity to proselytize as well as to trade.

The CHAIRMAN. We still want it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We still want it. I do not know what we are going to do about it.

Are there any other things that occur to you, any thoughts that might be useful, because we do not get you here very often. I know it is an awful burden on you to come. Do you have anything at all?

Mr. SERVICE. I have appreciated being here. Thank you very much, sir.

CORRECTNESS AND PERSECUTION OF WITNESSES

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, looking back on it it is no news to you. When I look back I am ashamed not to have known more about all of this than I have previously. It is a very strange turn of fate that you gentlemen who reported honestly about the conditions there were so persecuted because you were honest about it. This is a strange thing to occur in what is called a civilized country.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, it is rather interesting, you have got this particular group here because it has sometimes been said that the people responsible for the "fall of China" are four John's—John Paton Davies, John King Fairbank, John Stewart Service, and John Kai-shek. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That is true. But when you look back on it, in spite of all the hardships that you have suffered, I would think you would be very proud that your reports have stood up well in the light of history.

Mr. SERVICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, what you said about it then certainly proved to be correct as to the facts as seen at this time.

MAO AND CHOU'S SUGGESTION OF COMING TO SEE ROOSEVELT

There is one thing you mentioned right in the beginning that still puzzles me. You raised a question about the fact that Mao and Chou suggested they come and see Roosevelt. You are very dubious about that. Did it not occur in your presence?

Mr. SERVICE. I had no knowledge of it at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no knowledge of it. You are not certain about it. But you are quite clear about their desire at that time, as you reported, that they wanted to have relations with us and trade. They thought we were a complementary society.

Mr. SERVICE. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no doubt about it?

Mr. SERVICE. That they wanted to come to the United States certainly is consistent with their attitude. I simply do not know of any solid evidence of this particular incident.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be a rather extreme thing to suggest coming here because neither one of them had ever been outside of China, at that time. Had they?

Mr. DAVIES. Chou had.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Chou had been trained in France.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he?

Mr. SERVICE. It would have been very extreme at that time for them to have insisted it be kept secret from Hurley because at this time the actual breach with Hurley had not yet come about. It was not until July of 1945 that they really were convinced that Hurley was not their friend and they had come to consider him their enemy. In January when this episode supposedly occurred of wanting to come to the United States but wishing it to be kept secret from Hurley, they still had hopes that Hurley was going to adopt a middle position. They were experienced enough for it to be rather surprising that they would have adopted this rather strange method of conniving through Wedemeyer, who was only a military man in China.

Mr. DAVIES. On his trip to Washington, I asked Whiting where he got this about Mao and Chou. He said he got it from U.S. Foreign Relations, China, the volume 1945. I had checked on it because I had doubts, too. There are in the 1945 volume two footnotes on that particular page that refer to it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this that he got it from?

Mr. DAVIES. This is the trip to Washington of Mao and Chou.

Mr. SERVICE. The projected trip.

Mr. DAVIES. The projected trip, the request for it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the footnotes.

Mr. DAVIES. There are two footnotes in the documentation referred to by Whiting.

Mr. SERVICE. It is in U.S. Foreign Relations series.

Mr. DAVIES. Now, those two footnotes refer to the original message that Hurley said was sent by Mao and Chou to General Wedemeyer to pass to Washington without Hurley knowing about it. The footnotes refer to two specific messages that were not printed. They may exist, and I think possibly that the Mao-Chou request was genuine.

MAO'S AND CHOU'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITED STATES: 1944–45

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that at that time at least Mao and Chou were not ideologically offended by the United States, that they, in a way, felt that between our approach to community and to the way society should be run there was a common interest. Is that a fair statement or overstatement? I am trying to get what your feeling was about their attitude toward the United States at the time.

Mr. SERVICE. It is a fair statement.

Mr. DAVIES. That we could coexist.

The CHAIRMAN. And could do business together.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you said they anticipated that we could invest there.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes; they were talking about economic cooperation, business investment, developments of resources in very positive and definite specific terms. Not in terms of projects but in terms of actual economic support.

MAO'S AND CHOU'S CONFIDENCE IN WINNING

The CHAIRMAN. I take it this evidenced a great confidence on their part that they were going to win. They had no doubt at that time.

Mr. SERVICE. This was one of the things that surprised me because it did indicate precisely that, and that if they did win they could exist in a status other than being a Russian satellite. That they would have free choice in their conduct of foreign relations.

The CHAIRMAN. They were so confident that they were going to win they were making plans about what they were going to do when they took over the government. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. SERVICE. This was one of the things that surprised me when I had that talk.

Mr. DAVIES. Or they were part of a coalition which they would then expect to dominate.

Mr. SERVICE. Dominate.

The CHAIRMAN. What they were really angling for was a coalition which they expected to dominate?

Mr. SERVICE. Which they expected in a relatively short time to dominate.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they felt they had the support of the people.

Mr. DAVIES. It was a cheap way of coming to power. It was cheaper than fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. So they were for a coalition?

Mr. DAVIES. On their terms.

The CHAIRMAN. On their terms.

Mr. SERVICE. But it would have to be a genuine coalition which did not permit a continuation of the monopoly of power by the Kuomintang.

RESULT IF THERE HAD BEEN COMMUNIST DOMINATED COALITION

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting. Is it fair to ask you what would have happened if that coalition had taken place and they had become dominant? What would you say would have happened?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is where I think the revolution would have come along and supervened whatever had happened at that one moment. Sooner or later there would have been this enormous kind of remaking of Chinese lives.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes, but we would already have been in relations with that government.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We would have been in a better relationship with it.

Mr. SERVICE. There would have been no need for a complete break because we would have been in contact and presumably we would have continued in contact, barring perhaps cold war considerations.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Instead of our claiming they could not take over Yenching University, and that kind of thing, if we had held off and made our peace, which would have been human, we could have stayed out of the revolution.

Mr. DAVIES. But a revolutionary power which comes to power without fighting.

Mr. SERVICE. It is not so revolutionary.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The revolution begins after it comes to power. That is the point.

Mr. DAVIES. It is not as militant because it is not blooded.

Mr. SERVICE. Our argument was that it would not be so militant but would be somewhat tempered.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then you would have had a Chiang Kai-shek regime which stopped short of revolution. You falter along and revolution is never carried through.

The CHAIRMAN. The cultural revolution would have never taken place.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It would never have got to it. It would be still to come.

PRESENT POSITION OF MAO IN CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say Mao has now really established power and there is no longer important dissidence in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think they have laid off the dissidence but I think Mao is not necessarily in a dictatorial or dominant position. He has had his cultural revolution and made his great effort to change the human nature of the Chinese people, and the people are exhausted from the effort and they have stopped fighting about it.

Mr. DAVIES. But his question is whether he has failed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He has tried and failed.

Mr. SERVICE. I think Mao established his power between 1942 and 1944, and by 1945 there was no question but what he was the top man in fairly complete control. But in the years after perhaps, 1957, 1958, he began to lose control, to lose power, to a more pragmatically minded, bureaucratically minded group in the party. The cultural revolution was brought about partly as an effort by him to regain this complete power and also to retain ideological mastery and to establish the sort of ideological dominance he had before.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he succeed in doing that?

Mr. SERVICE. In the cultural revolution?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. It is a question now because the party has been shattered, and it is unclear now how much he has to depend on the army. I mean, the army is——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read the revolutionary process as trying to knock out the old ruling class, which was made up of a literate landlord type of people who ran everything. This old Chinese ruling class of 2,000 years knew how to stay on top. Knocking that out and putting the peasant on top and making him literate and active was a tremendous revolutionary act. This was carried out in the early fifties. China was more or less organized. But then Mao felt that his colleagues, many of them, were slipping into bureaucratism, which was going to be a new ruling class. And so the cultural revolution was somewhat on that theme, trying to knock out this new bureaucratism.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it succeed?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Like every effort against sin, it succeeds for a time, but sin somehow never quite leaves the scene. In other words, I am afraid they are in for bureaucratism of some kind sooner or later again.

Mr. DAVIES. Or they will have anarchy which they had a spell of during the cultural revolution.

MR. GALSTON'S STORIES OF OPERATIONS AND ACUPUNCTURE

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about these stories of Galston, for example, telling about these operations? He says the American Medical Society poohpoohed it and nobody takes it seriously. How do you evaluate that kind of eyewitness story? Are you familiar with it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe the man. He is a good man.

Mr. SERVICE. Ask Reston.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered whether his operation was with the use of acupuncture.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Many medical people give credit to acupuncture not on the ground it is mysterious but rather it gets you to transfer pain, like hypnotism.

The CHAIRMAN. Galston said they rather ridiculed his account. Do you remember what he said before the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some of the medical people were, I think, too conservative for him. Of course, he is not too happy about a lot of the AMA in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the staff says acupuncture was used on Reston after the operation.

Mr. SERVICE. That is right, to alleviate some of the operative pain.

Mr. DAVIS. Post-operative pain.

The CHAIRMAN. According to Galston it was used during the operation that he witnessed.

Mr. DAVIES. What we are talking about was an open heart operation. The heart held in the hand, with acupuncture as the anesthesia.

The CHAIRMAN. This woman saw it. She said the same thing as Galston did.

CLEANLINESS OF CITIES, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD VISITORS

How do you evaluate the stories of the remarkable cleanliness of the cities and attitudes toward visitors? Is this all true and is it widespread or is it just in one place or what?

Mr. SERVICE. I think it is true. It is one result of the tremendous effectiveness of their mass mobilization, indoctrination and education.

Mr. DAVIES. Killing all the sparrows in Peking.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A sense of morale.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this general or only in Peking?

Mr. SERVICE. It is general.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is this not a good thing?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Fine, great.

The CHAIRMAN. What is wrong with it then? What do you feel is the weakness of it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, for us we could not live under it because you cannot get out of line. The individual has got to go right along in that proper channel. The deviations that we have around here, people dressing in different ways and behaving in different ways, just would not go down, so that we would have——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it would not work with us, but what about China? How do you evaluate this as to the future of China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a great help to them because they have got tremendous problems of backwardness to overcome in their material economy and their organization. They are doing it, and we should be as benevolent as we can toward this thing, without trying to get too close to it. We should not demand that we have access to it. The minute we get correspondents there who want to go around and ask people how they really feel we are asking for trouble. We cannot expect them to have media like our media; we cannot expect them to do it our way. They are not going to have automobiles, or all the troubles that come with private automobiles in the foreseeable future. It is going to be a different world, so different that it can be a tourist attraction but for a limited number of people. They simply cannot afford to let thousands of Americans roam over the land.

CHINESE SOLUTION TO POLLUTION PROBLEMS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you hear Galston's statement about their solution to the pollution problems? It is very impressive. There is a major problem here. What do you think about that one? The way he expressed it, it sounded like a great thing.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But at a very low level of usage of material goods.

The flow of matter through the single household in China is infinitesimal compared to our flow of matter that goes out the back door in garbage cans.

APPLICABILITY OF CHINESE EXAMPLE TO UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is an application to us, if possible, of what they know and what they do. Do you think it is inapplicable, so different we cannot learn from them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We can get stimulus from any example. They set us a great example in having less delinquency. They do not have handguns among the population as we do—lots of things.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they eradicated the drug problem?

Mr. FAIRBANK. So far as we know.

Mr. SERVICE. As far as we know, they have.

The CHAIRMAN. They have transferred it here. We have transferred it here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. They are in a state of morale which makes this one of the great periods. Inevitably such a state of morale will decline and troubles will come. We have got to be ready to sympathize and also to hold off and not try to meddle in their affairs too much. They have troubles. I mean, this high state of morale is a very high pitch to stay in. I am not sure so many millions of people are going to stay at that pitch for a long time. Already there is talk of delinquency in cities and such things showing their heads. They sent a figure of 25 million, maybe it is only 10 million people from the cities down to the farms just by fiat. "You go to the farms, stay there and feed the pigs." Well, this is very autocratic. This is dictatorial, and there is a lot of suffering as a result. But it is part of a design which is trying to solve their problem.

CHINESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND TRANSPORTATION

The CHAIRMAN. How do you evaluate their educational system. Apparently they are capable of achieving considerable technological advances.

Mr. FAIRBANK. They are trying to avoid the pitfalls of overeducating their hundreds of millions of people, trying not to make lots of unemployed dissatisfied intellectuals. So they are training people to do specifically what they can do best and let it go at that. Everybody in the society rises together, yet the level of everybody is much lower than it was before for the upper class.

There is no private transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. Bicycles.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, no automobiles and no roads to speak of, compared with ours.

The CHAIRMAN. But no pollution, either.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We do pay a price for all this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a sort of primitive situation, as when we look back at our earlier century.

COMPARISON OF CHINESE AND RUSSIAN PROSPECTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ever try to compare them in your own mind with the Russians as to the prospects in the next few decades?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They are far behind the Russians, materially speaking. The Russians can do a consumer goods job that the Chinese cannot get to for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not important. Would you judge they are going to develop as a strong unified society? Are you optimistic about their developing as a very strong society?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Oh, yes, yes.

Mr. SERVICE. I think relatively speaking, they are going to make faster progress. Of course, they are starting from a much lower base.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SERVICE. Because as you suggest, Mao works by exhortation and morale and mass mobilization, intensive indoctrination, education. It is a very unified society. The Russians work more by force and compulsion than the Chinese. I have not lived in Russia—John Davies has—but I do not think the Russians have got their people so mobilized. They do not have such active support of the regime. Do they?

Mr. DAVIES. I differ there, because I think the Chinese weakness, or maybe it is a strength, is this tendency toward regionalism which still exists, I am told. That is to say, Chinese Central Asia and Tibet and the western parts of China are fairly autonomous from Peking and the fiat of the government in Peking does not always run there. China has always united to disunite and come together and go apart. The Soviet Union is a much more cohesive political entity.

Mr. SERVICE. I was thinking of things like absenteeism and crime and hooliganism.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, the Soviet society is more industrialized. And down this road of perdition that we are all going it is further along than the Chinese. It is politically a more stable society in terms of being more centralized. But the degenerations in the Soviet society of the intellectuals and so forth is much more acute, I gather.

The CHAIRMAN. Than in China?

Mr. DAVIES. Than in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Chinese going to allow their intellectuals to speculate about unthinkable things?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We still do not know, but it does not seem likely.

Mr. SERVICE. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think so?

Mr. SERVICE. I do not.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a remarkable thing that they closed all the universities for 2 or 3 years and no academic journals have been published in 5 years. Where the historians are we do not know. They were last seen down on the farm somewhere out there among those hundreds of millions of people. The intellectual life of the type we are accustomed to in this country just ceased for the time being. Maybe they will come back.

Mr. DAVIES. But there is a thoroughgoing decentralization occurring.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. And whether it is simply because of ideological reasons is a question. It also happens to be a very sound strategic thing to do for a country that is in China's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In a war, the Chinese consider they will survive because they are dispersed and they have dispersed their industry, they have dispersed their intellectuals, they have tried to create a self-sufficiency all through the country at every level.

POSSIBILITY OF SINO-SOVIET WAR

Mr. FAIRBANK. We may be confronted with a terrible crisis of how to fend off a Sino-Soviet war.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that? Are you anticipating it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not anticipate it, but I do not think it is impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it would be as a result of the Chinese precipitating it? I do not quite see why. I am open minded. I have no views about it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not see any reason for the Chinese to precipitate it, but the Chinese, on the other hand, are not going to back down and they do want to push their ideological situation. They can claim that the Russians ought to vacate certain areas they took over since the Opium War.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, the return of territory they took?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is so. It can be argued. And the fact the Soviets are so touchy toward the Chinese at present——

EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S MOVE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the President's move is going to seriously upset our relations with Russia?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any of you think so?

Mr. DAVIES. I think these people have to get used to us. It is the same question as whether or not you should talk about things because it might jeopardize the outcome of the President's visit. The Russians know us very well. They will have to get used now to a triangular relationship where they are no longer the broker between us and China, as they were for so long. This may set back a little bit the SALT talks and some of the other relations with the Soviet Union. But it is a new reality that there is a triangular relationship. They will have to adjust themselves to it, and in the end I think it will be greatly to the advantage of all of us.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a good thing?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have exhausted you. I apologize for the lack of more sophisticated questions, but I am just beginning.

Mr. DAVIES. They do not seem unsophisticated.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. DAVIES. They are very sophisticated.

Mr. SERVICE. There is nothing wrong with the questions.

The CHAIRMAN. It is late.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SERVICE. Dr. Fairbank has to catch an airplane.

The CHAIRMAN. I hoped you all would say if you had to go. I imposed upon you unmercifully, but it has been a very interesting hearing.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I appreciate very much being here

The CHAIRMAN. If any of you have any ideas—they often come to you in the middle of the night when your subconscious begins to work—if you have any suggestions that you think would be useful to us, we certainly welcome them because we are very limited, as everybody is, in the knowledge of China. The public likes the subject and for the purposes of drawing attention to it, I think new faces are very good.

Thank you very much. You have been very patient and very cordial. I still have lots of reading to do.

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

APPENDIX

INVESTIGATION OF FAR EASTERN POLICY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST, PARTICULARLY CHINA

DECEMBER 5, 6, 7, AND 10, 1945

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-891 WASHINGTON : 1971

1945

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INVESTIGATION OF FAR EASTERN POLICY

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1945

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The committee met at 10:30 o'clock, pursuant to call, in room 335, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Wagner, Thomas of Utah, Green, Guffey, Tunnell, Hill, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, Austin, Bridges, and Wiley.

The CHAIRMAN. Please come to order.

This session of the Committee on Foreign Relations was called to hear General Hurley and such other witnesses as the committee might deem proper with respect to the situation in the Far East, particularly China, in the light of General Hurley's resignation as Ambassador to China. General Hurley is present this morning at the suggestion of the committee, and the committee would be glad to have any statement the General desires to make—at the beginning of the examination, written or otherwise.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL PATRICK J. HURLEY

(General Hurley was accompanied by his secretary, Mr. Francis J. Smith.)

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I would like to state in the beginning that I did not ask for this hearing. I would also like to make it clear that I have had no meetings of any kind with the Members of Congress on the facts that I will endeavor to present. The reason for this statement is that I am convinced that this committee is beginning a hearing on the foreign policy of the United States. Such a hearing should not be partisan. I will decline to ally myself with any partisan group or with any minority.

Unquestionably I have had suggestions of the manner in which I should present the facts to the committee. I wish the committee to understand that whatever I present and the manner I present it is "on my own."

REQUEST FOR SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS

Some time ago, Mr. Chairman, I read in the papers that certain members of the Foreign Service of the State Department had presented, given, or sold secret and confidential statements in the State Department to people other than those entitled to see them. I did not make the charges on which those men were accused. I do not know

now what the accusations were, nor the exact nature of the confidential papers that were given away, transferred, or sold. I have been advised that my reports to the State Department are among them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, these transactions did not occur in China; they were here in Washington, were they not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. It is a statutory offense to deliver papers of a confidential, secret, or top-secret nature to any unauthorized persons. The documents that I will call for this morning were written by myself. I know what they contain, but I will have to ask the State Department to furnish me with paraphrases of these documents for the reason that if we should submit from the State Department the original documents they would have a tendency to give away the American secret code; and I do not want to do any irreparable damage to the foreign policy of my country.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you retain copies in your private files of those papers?

General HURLEY. I have none of the code copies. I do of course have my own notes of the preparation of the copies, not only those that were made in China but those which were made throughout the nations of the Middle East and in Russia before I became Ambassador to China.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked you that question, you know, of course, what matters are in these papers without calling for them, but you want the State Department to furnish you paraphrases; is that it? Is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I will not ask for any paper the contents of which I do not already know.

One other statement I would like to make before beginning—and the committee will observe that I have prepared no document on the presentation; I have prepared a short summary, when I finish. My purpose was to permit myself to be examined by the committee, and I want you, every member, to know that I welcome any questions that may be asked.

SECRETARY BYRNES' PRESS RELEASE, DECEMBER 5, 1945

The statement I would like to make in the beginning is in reference to the press release contained in the morning papers, attributed to the Secretary of State, Hon. James F. Byrnes; and with the permission of the Chair and the committee I would like to have that statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that? When was that?

General HURLY. It is dated today.

The CHAIRMAN. Today?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I have not seen it.

General HURLEY. The headline is [reading]:

CHINESE UNITY IS U.S. POLICY, BYRNES SAYS

Secretary of State Byrnes has informed Congress that this country seeks "by all appropriate means to pursue such policies and action as will best facilitate China's achievement of internal unity and stability."

In a letter to Representative Z. Anderson (R., Calif.), the Secretary gave this statement of American policy toward China:

"We favor the creation of a strong, united and democratic China which will contribute to peace and stability in the Far East and which will enable China effectively to support the United Nations Organization."

Anderson made the letter public yesterday and inserted it in the Congressional RECORD. He told the House he asked for the statement on Chinese policy because the recent resignation of Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley and congressional reaction have "served to focus the world spotlight on this country's policy toward China."

Hurley will appear before an open session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to elaborate on his reasons for resigning.

Byrnes' letter follows:

"I have received your letter of November 17, 1945, requesting information in regard to our policy toward China.

"In response to your inquiry, I should like to offer the following brief comment on this subject:

"We favor the creation of a strong, united and democratic China which will contribute to peace and stability in the Far East and which will enable China effectively to support the United Nations Organization.

"In line with this policy, we deem it desirable and essential that China solve her internal problems. While we recognize that this is a task which China must carry out largely through her own efforts, we seek by all appropriate and practicable means to pursue such policies and action as will best facilitate China's achievement of internal unity and stability.

"Among the means toward this end, we propose, with due regard for the realities of the internal situation in China, to assist China to rehabilitate her devastated economy and to develop a higher standard of living for her masses.

"NECESSARY TO PEACE

"We seek to enhance China's international status, as evidenced by the recognition accorded to China in connection with the San Francisco Conference. We feel that collaboration among China, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union is essential to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and that such collaboration among these and other peace-loving nations should extend to all legitimate fields of economic and other endeavor on the basis of equality of opportunity and respect for national sovereignty. We hope that China, for her part, will further such collaboration by instituting and carrying out reasonable policies that lie before her.

"During the course of the war it was our policy to assist our Chinese allies to the greatest possible extent . . . in the joint prosecution of hostilities against Japan. Such assistance took the form of credits, the grant of civilian and military lend-lease supplies, the training and equipping of a limited number of Chinese military units, the utilization in China of our air forces, and other related activities. Since the capitulation of Japan we have been assisting our Chinese allies in effecting the surrender, disarmament and repatriation of the very substantial Japanese armed forces who are now in China.

"I trust that the foregoing brief comment will indicate to you the broad lines of our policy, with respect to China and will enable you to reply to inquiries which you may have received from your constituents."

GENERAL HURLEY'S APPROVAL OF THE RELEASE

Mr. Chairman, if that public announcement of American policy had been issued by the State Department before I returned from China, I would not have returned. If that public statement had been made by the State Department before I tendered my resignation I would not have resigned.

Now I would like to read to the committee the statement I made on November 15, recently. This statement was made at Santa Fe, N. Mex. Understand, Mr. Chairman, there had been no announcement, official announcement, up to this time, of the policy of my country toward China.

OUTLINING OF CHINA POLICY BY THE SECRETARY FOR GENERAL HURLEY

The CHAIRMAN. You had had information from the State Department though, had you not, through directives and letters from the Secretary of State, outlining the policy toward China, while you were Ambassador?

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to call for a letter in which I told the Secretary of State on December 24, last, in response to an inquiry from him, my directive and the outline of American policy in China, with a full report of the bases.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know, but I am not talking about your letter, I am talking about the Secretary of State. Did he not communicate with you from time to time, and did you not understand the policy of the State Department, General?

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me to present it in my own way, I will show you that no public statement was ever made by the Secretary of State upholding the American policy in China since Cordell Hull made it on the 26th day of November, 1941, before we got into the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all right, you decline to answer, then, as to that?

General HURLEY. No, I do not decline to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if the Secretary of State had not communicated with you from time to time; and did you not state publicly a few days ago that you were in entire agreement and support of the Secretary of State's policy and that of the President toward China?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I did; but those statements were made privately to me, sir, and were not announced as a public policy, and if they had been I would not have been defeated in China by the gentlemen of the State Department who claim that I was not upholding the policy of my country, that it was a policy evolved by me and not by the United States; and that is the issue, sir. That is the trouble we have been having.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will get to that.

General HURLEY. I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. We will get around to that.

General HURLEY. Yes, I think we will.

GENERAL HURLEY'S SANTA FE, N. MEX. STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this is a statement that you are going to read, that you gave out in Santa Fe, N. Mex., prior to your negotiations here and your final resignation, is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY (reading):

A free, united, independent China has been for many years a strong and consistent tenet of U.S. foreign policy.

The policy was emphasized by Secretary of State Hull in his communication to the Japanese emissaries at Washington on November 26, 1941 in the following words:

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

In the same proposed agreement we found the following additional requirement:

"The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations and

"the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

This policy was the basis of many of President Roosevelt's decisions on Far Eastern Affairs. The United States followed this policy in the Mutual Aid Pact (i.e., the Lend-Lease Agreement) with China in 1942. So far as I know that was the last public announcement of America's policy in China.

Japan had established another government in China and was seeking to impose imperialistic control over all of China as well as other nations of the Far East. The American policy stated by Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt was the immediate cause of our war with Japan. The American policy stated above also guided me on my various missions to China. We cannot emphasize too clearly the fact that it was the challenge to this policy on the part of Japan that brought about the war in the Pacific. Now that once clear policy has become confused by emotional and partisan thinking. We are asked the questions, 'Why are our soldiers and marines still in China?' 'Are we taking sides in a civil war?' Questions like these perplex and worry the American people. What are the facts? Our soldiers and marines are in China to keep our share of a solemn commitment made with an ally when Japan forced a war upon us rather than recognize the American policy in the Pacific.

The only Government of China which is recognized by the United States or by any other of the United Nations is the Government of the Republic of China headed by President Chiang Kai-shek. General Order No. 1 of the United Nations Supreme Commander required the Japanese Army in China to surrender to the Chinese Army represented by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his American Chief of Staff, General Albert Wedemeyer. The Japanese attempted to change this procedure and to surrender part of its arms to the Chinese Communist armed party. Japan's purpose then being to give her equipment and munitions to the Chinese Communist armed party who in turn would attempt to destroy the Government of the Republic of China.

The American military in China today is assisting the Chinese Army carry out the terms of the surrender order by disarming our enemy and China's enemy, the Japanese Army, and taking over its equipment for the Republic of China. This job is definitely a concluding phase of our war against Japan and placing our ally, the Chinese army, in control of the territory that up to the date of surrender was occupied by the troops of our enemy, the Japanese Empire.

The urgency of peace in China is one great reason which has made us her ally for many years. Our policy and the Russian Chinese policy are in accord. Russia, I believe, is adhering to the policy which she agreed to in the Sino-Soviet Treaty in August 1945. Let us have the hardihood to stick to our own policy, at least long enough to complete the victory by accepting the surrender of Japan and placing China in the position that we demanded Japan give her in the world. If we are not going to conclude the war, there was not much point in the beginning in involving ourselves in war with Japan.

Japan is defeated. Chinese independence for which we fought Japan has not yet been achieved. Until it is, our victory, the victory of the United States, cannot be real. America has no imperialistic designs in China. We endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a strong, united, democratic government. The United States will neither ask nor accept any special privileges in China. The people of China and their leaders are free to choose their own form of Government, furnish their own leadership, make their own decisions, and be responsible for their own policies.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement was given to the press, out in New Mexico?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it has been published all over the country?

GENERAL HURLEY'S DESIRE FOR A STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY PRONOUNCEMENT ON CHINA

General HURLEY. And it has appeared in various forms since.

Now, the point I would like to make is that I had asked for such a public statement for quite a long time. I had wired for it before I came back from China, and such a public statement had not been made by the State Department until today; and, as you will see, there is no conflict between the policy which I followed in China and that announced by Secretary Byrnes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, notwithstanding that, though, you stated in the press, did you not, that you were in entire agreement with the Secretary's policy and the President's policy with regard to China?

General HURLEY. I did not understand what the chairman said.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not that include all of their acts with regard to China?

General HURLEY. I did not understand what the chairman said.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, notwithstanding your feeling that there ought to have been a public statement, and your disagreement with the policies of the State Department in not making a public statement, you said, on November 27, did you not—

Inasmuch as I am in agreement with the President and the Secretary of State on our foreign policy, I think I owe it to them as well as to the country to point out the reasons for the failure of the American foreign policy in reaching the objectives for which we were fighting the war?

General HURLEY. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You further said that in all the assignments, during the war, you had the support?

It was a source of gratification to me that in all my missions I had the support of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, President Truman, and Secretary Byrnes.

You said that, did you not?

General Hurley. That is correct. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how could you approve the entire policy, when you say now that you did not approve their not making a public statement, and that if they had made a public statement you would not have retired, you would not have resigned?

DEFEAT OF CHINA POLICY BY CAREER MEN IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

General HURLEY. I have said that I approved the policy of the higher echelon of the policymaking power of this nation. I said in the statement from which the Senator has just read that that policy had been defeated by career men in the State Department, and they were able to say, in China, that the policy that I was supporting in China was not the policy of the U.S. Government, but my own policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you charge, then, that notwithstanding the President's policy, and notwithstanding the Secretary of State's policy, there are some men in the State Department that overruled the President and overruled the Secretary of State, and that they carry on negotiations with foreign countries without the knowledge of the Secretary and the President; and is that what you charge?

General HURLEY. Of course the Senator has made the charge very broad.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am not making the charge; I am asking you a question.

General HURLEY. Well, I did not make that charge. I have made the statement that the policy of the United States in China was defeated to some extent—oh, it was not quite defeated, because my directive was to prevent the collapse of China during the war, and we did; my directive was to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek—we did; my directive was to harmonize the relations between the military establishment of the United States and of China—we did; my directive was to keep the Chinese Army in the field and contain as many Japanese as possible, to protect our men on the beaches and in the jungles—and we did; our directive was to harmonize diplomatic relations between our Embassy in Chungking and the Government of the Republic of China—and we did, during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to that time, these subordinates in the State Department, with all their endeavors, were not able to defeat your policy, because you succeeded; and so you say in all these enterprises, is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was only after the war?

JOHN S. SERVICE AND REPORT NO. 40

General HURLEY. No, sir—during the war, during the war. On the 30th day of October, 1944, a Mr. John S. Service, of the State Department, wrote to the State Department, and I believe it is his Report No. 40, a general statement of how to let the Government that I was sent over there to sustain fall; and that report was circulated among the Communists whose support I was seeking for our policy; and that was during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Mr. Service serving under you in China at that time?

General HURLEY. Well, that is disputed, sir. He was in the State Department, and I was Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, where was he?

General HURLEY. He was in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was he not under you?

General HURLEY. No, sir. If he had been, I would have taken him out immediately. I could not control him. He said he was serving the Commander of American forces in China—anything to oppose the American policy of sustaining the Government of the Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was his status? I do not know him. I never heard of him until you brought him up; but what was his status out there? Was he attached to the Embassy, or was he the adviser to the American general, or what was he?

General HURLEY. He was a foreign-service diplomat, who had been assigned as political adviser to the American general.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then he was not directly under your organization?

General HURLEY. Well, eventually he was; and eventually I recommended.

GENERAL STILWELL AND HIS CONNECTION WITH JOHN S. SERVICE

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the General at that time in command of our forces out there?

General HURLEY. General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. He is now in Washington, I understand.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. Was he the same Mr. Service who was subsequently involved here in a scandal with the State Department, and who was either arrested or charged with very serious offenses, to your knowledge?

General HURLEY. Well, of course, I read in the papers about that, but I would like not to testify to anything that is hearsay. You gentlemen know that as well as I do. You were here, I was not, and all I know is what I read in the papers about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, you indicated a while ago that you would really prefer a line of questioning, is that true, from now on?

GENERAL HURLEY'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 27, 1945

General HURLEY. Yes, but I would like to add this, Senator, if you would permit me. The statement that I gave the press the day after I handed in my resignation I think should properly be a part. You have read from it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have that. You may offer it for the record, or we can get for the record your statement, the day before you resigned.

General HURLEY. No, it is the day after I resigned, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. I resigned on the 26th; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let it go into the record.

General HURLEY. This is a statement of the 27th:

For Release 12:30 p.m., November 27, 1945.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

In tendering his resignation as Ambassador to China, General Patrick J. Hurley today attributed failure of American foreign policy in Asia to the weakness and opposition of the United States Foreign Service.

Hurley issued a statement endorsing President Truman's outline of American foreign policy as contained in his recent Navy Day address, but charging that professional diplomats in the lower echelons were frustrating attainment of announced policy aims.

The statement follows:

"I am grateful to both the President and the Secretary of State for the support they have given me and for their kind offer in requesting me to return to China as Ambassador.

"In one capacity or another I have been on the perimeter of America's influence since the beginning of the war. During the war I have served in Java, Australia, New Zealand, and generally in the southwest Pacific, in Egypt, Palestine, The Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Burma and China. Of all of the assignments China was the most intricate and the most difficult. It is a source of gratification to me that in all my missions I had the support of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, President Truman and Secretary Byrnes.

"In the higher echelon of our policy-making officials American objectives were

nearly always clearly defined. The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct of international relations. For instance, we began the war with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and democracy as our goal. Our associates in the war at that time gave eloquent lip service to the principles of democracy. We finished the war in the Far East furnishing lend-lease supplies and using all our reputation to undermine democracy and bolster imperialism and Communism. Inasmuch as I am in agreement with the President and the Secretary of State on our foreign policy I think I owe it to them as well as to the country to point out the reasons for the failure of the American foreign policy in reaching the objectives for which we said we were fighting the war. I will confine my remarks in this statement to Asia, although I wish to assure both the President and the Secretary of State that I will be at their service in discussing frankly other phases of our international relations.

"I was assigned to China at a time when statesmen were openly predicting the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China and the disintegration of the Chinese Army. I was directed by President Roosevelt to prevent the collapse of the Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. From both a strategical and diplomatic viewpoint the foregoing constituted our chief objective. The next in importance was the directive to harmonize the relations between the Chinese and American military establishments and between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government. It will readily appear that the former objective could not be accomplished without the accomplishment of the secondary objective as a condition precedent. Both of these objectives were accomplished.

"While these objectives had the support of the President and the Secretary of State it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

"Despite these handicaps we did make progress toward unification of the armed forces of China. We did prevent civil war between the rival factions, at least until after I had left China. We did bring the leaders of the rival parties together for peaceful discussions. Throughout this period the chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from the American career diplomats in the Embassy at Chungking and in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department.

"I requested the relief of the career men who were opposing the American policy in the Chinese Theater of war. These professional diplomats were returned to Washington and placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department as my supervisors. Some of these same career men whom I relieved have been assigned as advisors to the Supreme Commander in Asia. In such positions most of them have continued to side with the Communist armed party and at times with the imperialist bloc against American policy. This is an outline of one of the reasons why American foreign policy announced by the highest authority is rendered ineffective by another section of diplomatic officials.

"The weakness of American foreign policy has backed us into two world wars. We had no part in shaping the conditions that brought about these two wars. There is a third world war in the making. In diplomacy today we are permitting ourselves to be sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism. I am opposed to both. I still favor democracy and free enterprise.

"Our announced policy in the first world war was to make the world safe for democracy. That slogan was elaborated for the second world war by a definite statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration. We won both wars but in both instances we failed to establish the principles for which we alleged we were fighting. America's foreign policy officials have always been divided against themselves. Consequently, we have always

been a prey to the nations that give lip service to our ideals and principles in order to obtain our material support. The war that is now in the making is not even intended to defend or establish democratic ideals. Instead of putting our weight behind the Charter of the United Nations we have been definitely supporting the imperialistic bloc. At the same time a considerable section of our State Department is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China.

"The Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our Foreign policy in Washington during the late war is chargeable to the weakness of our Foreign Service. If our Foreign Service had been capable of understanding and sympathetic effectuation of our announced war aims it would not have failed so completely to couple our logistical strength with our foreign policy to obtain commitments to the principles for which we claimed to be fighting from the nations to which we gave the strength of our productivity and manpower.

"A democracy must live on its intelligence and its integrity and its courage. The people of a democracy should be given all the facts to enable them to form correct opinions. The discrepancy between American foreign policy as announced in the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration and in the President's recent Navy Day address and as carried into effect may be attributed in large measure to the secrecy which has shrouded the actions of the State Department. All too frequently information concerning the conduct of our foreign relations 'leaks' out to the public is distorted, garbled, or partial form. The result is that the American people have too little basic information to judge the extent to which their State Department correctly interprets and administers the foreign policies of the nation.

"During the war we had to maintain secrecy to prevent giving aid to the enemy. I grant that sometimes during the war we had to be expedient. Now we should endeavor to be right. I raise this issue because I am firmly convinced that at this particular juncture in our history an informed public opinion would do much to give intelligent direction and implementation to our international objectives.

"With special reference to China and the other nations where I have served in the last four years, the blessings of factual publicity would be manifold. Now that the war is over I am willing that all my reports be made public, together with the reports made by those officials in the Foreign Service who have differed with the promulgated American policy.

"Our true position in China is misunderstood abroad because of this confusion of policy within our own Government. This situation suggests the need for a complete reorganization of our policy-making machinery beginning at the lower official levels. No international policy can succeed without loyal and intelligent implementation. Because of the confusion in our own international policy America has been excluded economically from every part of the world controlled by colonial imperialism and Communist imperialism. America's economic strength has been used all over the world to defeat American policies and interests. This is chargeable to a weak American Foreign Service.

"I wish to absolve from this general indictment some of our career men. Some of them are very admirable and well-equipped public servants who have fought in the State Department and in other countries against overwhelming odds to advance American ideals and interests.

"America's economic and diplomatic policies should be coordinated. America's strength should not be allied with any predatory ideology.

"America should support the amendment or revision of the San Francisco United Nations Charter to make it democratic. Our strength should be used to uphold the decisions of the United Nations rather than to support conflicting ideologies or warmaking power blocs."

General HURLEY. And in addition to that, I would like to ask permission for one more record. The day after this statement, I made an address to the National Press Club, of Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have that.

General HURLEY. And I would like to insert that at this place in the record; and I think that is the foundation.

Excerpts From an Address by Patrick Hurley Before the National Press Club at Washington, Nov. 28, 1945

America's great producing capacity and her unrivaled manpower have attracted the attention of the world. The world now knows that America has freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and right of free assembly, the right to organize labor unions to express the will of the workers, a fair administration of justice, the writ of habeas corpus, the greatest public school system in the world, and the highest standard of living enjoyed by any people at any time in the history of the world. These facts have only gradually become known to the oppressed people of the world. The rights of man enumerated in the Constitution of the United States have become the hope of the oppressed and poverty-ridden people everywhere. It has not been easy to maintain these rights. My comrades and yours have sustained Americanism on the battlefields of the world for a period of 170 years. America's productive strength and American arms have compelled aggressors to respect liberty, democracy, and American ideals. The strength of the United States is basically philosophical rather than material. The bedrock of America's greatness is in the fact that our forefathers approved and we maintained the principles of self-government, governments derived their just powers from the consent of the governed.

This is what is generally known throughout the world as democracy. Our slogan in the first world war was "to make the world safe for democracy." The Atlantic Charter defines our purposes in the second world war. That Charter provides that the nations who have approved it "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The nations which approved the Atlantic Charter not only approved the right of self-government; they asserted "they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." Continuing further in the Atlantic Charter, the people of the United States and of the world were told that it was the purpose of the United Nations to "further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

These ideals and objectives for which we were fighting received full approval of our associates in the war until America's productivity and manpower became fully committed to the cause of the United Nations. These were our objectives at the beginning of the war. At the end we found our productive strength and our reputation being used to reestablish imperialism, not democracy. They have been used to support Communism, not free enterprise. In the last few days we have been telling about the great discrepancy between our announced foreign policy and our execution of that policy.

The policy-making machinery of the United States is divided against itself. The Hydra-headed direction of foreign policy in Washington during the war has failed completely to couple American logistics with American foreign policy. Our logistics have not been used to implement our foreign policy in obtaining commitments to the ideals and objectives for which all of the United Nations in the beginning said they were fighting.

Let us become more specific with regard to China.

On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Hull asked Japan to agree that "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking." There was much more to the Hull policy but what I have quoted is sufficient to show the continuity of American policy in China. We reiterated our position in a mutual aid pact with China after Pearl Harbor. Japan had established another government in China and was seeking to impose imperialistic control over all of China as well as other nations of the Far East. In this situation the United States decided to give its full support to the National Government of the Republic of China. This policy was weakened by the fact that some of our career men in the State Department were supporting the Communist armed party. Others were supporting the imperialist bloc. Both at that time were following a policy designed to keep China divided against itself. Our diplomatic service men either did not know the American policy in China or they were deliberately opposing the policy. In 1944, American, Chinese, and other world statesmen freely predicted the collapse of the Government of the Republic

of China and the disintegration of the Chinese Army. It was at this time that I received the most intricate and most difficult assignment of my life. President Roosevelt sent me to China, first as an officer in the United States Army, as his personal representative, with a directive to

(a) prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China

(b) keep the Chinese Army in the war

(c) harmonize relations between the Chinese and American military establishments

(d) bring about closer and more harmonious relations between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government.

That part of our mission was accomplished. It was not accomplished without the relief or removal in China of some very admirable Americans, who either could not go along with the American policy or were incompatible with the officials of the Chinese Government with whom we had to deal. This was the most difficult service of my life. But if we had failed, if the Government had collapsed, if the Chinese Army had disintegrated, it would have released more than a million, and nearer to two million, Japanese soldiers to meet our soldiers, sailors, and Marines on the beaches. In this situation we felt our responsibility keenly. We did not allow personalities to enter into our conclusions. We were in a theater of war. We fought for our objectives as we would have if we had been in contact with the enemy on the battlefield. The Government did not collapse. The Chinese Army did not disintegrate. The Chinese stayed in the war and fought to a victorious finish.

We had in China a secondary objective:

(a) to unify the anti-Japanese military forces in China

(b) to prevent civil war in China

(c) to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government.

On these objectives we also had the opposition of most of the career diplomats. They sided always with the Chinese Communist armed party or with the imperialist bloc. I relieved some more career diplomats. All of these diplomats were returned to Washington, placed in the Far Eastern and Chinese Divisions as my supervisors, or assigned as advisors to the Supreme Commander in Asia. They continued to oppose the American policy in China. Notwithstanding this opposition we did succeed for the first time during China's eight years of war against Japan in reestablishnig discussions between the Communist armed party and the National Government. We did bring Mao Tze-tung, the leader of the Communists, and Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the National Government, together in conference, the first time they had met in twenty years. We did prevent civil war among the factions of China, at least as long as we remained there.

The public has never been told that very early in our negotiations I had an understanding with the Russian Government in regard to a reapproachment between China and the Soviet. Russia has said from the beginning that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all, that Russia has not supported the Chinese Communists, that Russia does support the National Government of the Republic of China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, that Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China. This attitude of Russia was finally solemnized in the Sino-Soviet Pact last summer and in an exchange of letters between the heads of the two governments. At that time our policy in China was clearly defined and could be stated roughly as follows:

1. to unify all anti-Japanese military forces in China, and

2. to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government.

I think there was no question but what this policy had the support of Russia and also had the support of Britain, but it definitely did not have the support of the imperialist civil servants of Britain in Asia. It did not have the support of the French imperialists. It did not have the support of the Netherlands imperialists. We discussed the matter with the highest officials of Britain in London and the policy which the United States had evolved in China finally had the approval of Russia, Britain, and the United States. But the imperialists' support of the policy was divided just as American support of the policy was divided, the head policy-making officials of our government approving, the career men opposing. The career men continuously told the Communist armed party and the world that America was betting on the wrong horse, that the

American policy which I was upholding in China did not have the support of the United States Government. This made my situation difficult.

Both the Communist armed party and the National Government have adopted the slogan which represents their objective—"a government of the people, by the people and for the people." Both the Communists and the National Government state that their objective is to make effective in China all the rights of man enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. All the parties of China contend that their purpose is to make democratic processes effective throughout China. There is considerable controversy between them about how this should be accomplished and who should exercise the power. I am rather astonished when some of my friends here seem to indicate that those two issues are indigenous to China.

Please understand that I am under no delusions about China's capacity to achieve democracy at once. I think it will probably take as long for China to achieve democracy as it did America. Few people in America understand the great progress toward democracy that has been made in China during the past thirty years.

China's attitude on international behavior is similar to that of the United States. China is not imperialistic. It is not communistic. It desires to be democratic.

If I read the record correctly America's war in the Pacific was to prevent the domination of China by Japanese imperialism. We have won the war but we have not freed China of Japanese soldiers nor have we put China in possession of the territory that was overrun by Japan. What General Wedemeyer is doing in China now is distinctly a closing phase of our war against Japan. The charges made so frequently that America intends to control China are not correct. America has no imperialistic designs in China. She does desire that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions, and be responsible for her own policies. In addition to this, we do endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government."

REQUEST FOR STATE DEPARTMENT PAPERS

General HURLEY. Now, the next thing I would like, sir, I would like the committee to understand that I do know the contents of every paper to which I am about to refer, and the committee is at liberty to ask me any questions in connection with them. But inasmuch as they are top-secret documents, I could not present them without authority from the State Department; and therefore, to continue this case I would like to ask the State Department to bring to this room the following documents, or paraphrases.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, if they are so top-secret, do you not think the committee had better consider those before we call on the State Department to produce them?

General HURLEY. Yes; I think I had better tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Without giving them publicity in the record at this time?

General HURLEY. Well, you know I have seen it intimated, sir, that I could not sustain the case I have made.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will look them over. I have no disposition to deny you any appropriate paper, but you say they are all such delicate matters of such high, top secrecy, that I wondered if it would be helpful to put them in the record, now, until we have looked them over to see whether it is appropriate for the State Department to furnish them. Do you think it would be?

General HURLEY. Oh, be assured, sir, I am not going to put them in the record, now.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you are making reference to them, and you are indicating what they are and creating a great deal of public

curiosity about them. I think it would be well to defer that for the moment until the committee can have an executive session on the matter, and until the State Department can be consulted.

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the State Department is involved in this matter as well as all the rest of us.

General HURLEY. I had that intimation, sir; and I assure you that I am not going to be aggressive or belligerent. I feel that the issue before us today is not a partisan issue, and I decline to make it one, and I will if you require tell the committee what I am asking for; but remember, sir, that if I read the papers correctly, most of these documents have been given out by career men in the State Department, and the only difference between what I am trying to do and what they have done, they have given them to people who were trying to defeat the policy of the United States, and I am trying to give them to the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will try to get down to the details as to what these gentlemen have been doing, and who they are, a little later.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I think at this point I will suggest—Senator Wagner, have you any questions of the General?

Senator WAGNER. I have none, now.

General HURLEY. Pardon me one moment, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HURLEY. If you are going into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Not now. We will do that at noon when we adjourn.

General HURLEY. Because, before we adjourn, I have a summary, here, and I assure you that in this I have not referred to any secret document.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will look to that at the end of your testimony.

General HURLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, have you any questions?

GENERAL HURLEY'S DIRECTIVES

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I would like to ask General Hurley, if he is willing to do so, to state for the record exactly what it is that is at issue, here.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. Senator, I will endeavor to tell you what the issue is. During the war, I went to China, as the representative of the President of the United States, with a mission in regard to China. At that time it was predicted even on the floor of the Senate, I understand, by my good friend, Senator Brewster, and Senator Chandler, of Kentucky, that nothing short of a miracle would prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China. My directive was to prevent the collapse; (2), it was publicly stated that the Chinese Army was disintegrating and was in retreat. My directive was to keep the Chinese Army in the war. (3) It was said that we were not having harmonious relations with the Government of China, and my directive was to restore harmony. Now, there were directives later,

about unification, and so forth, but that was the first line—to prevent the collapse of China, of the National Government of China, to keep a Chinese Army in the war against Japan, and to harmonize relations between our own diplomatic and military establishment and the Government of the Republic of China.

VIEWS OF SOME FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS ON CHINA POLICY

Now, to answer your question about what this hearing is about, I claim that under this policy, to be the policy of the United States, the career men opposed the policy; that they continuously advised the Chinese Communist Armed party; that they recommended in my absence that the Chinese Armed party, a belligerent whose purpose was to destroy the government that I had to sustain, be furnished lend-lease arms and equipment, and because I opposed that as destructive of the government that I had been directed to uphold, they charged me with making my own policy in China and said that it was not the policy of the United States Government.

Does that explain?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. To whom did they make that charge?

General HURLEY. Well, now, because of my respect for the distinguished chairman of this committee, I will not read the documents, or references to the documents, in which the charges have been made, nor will I recite at this point the communications of these gentlemen with the Communist Armed party which was seeking to defeat the purpose for which I was sent to China.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will you pardon me?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Go ahead.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think it would be perfectly appropriate for the General to testify from his own knowledge and information, without respect to the documents.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Yes; absolutely, that is right, if he knows it—knows who they are, and knows to whom they sent them.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I would like to ask a question.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did they succeed in getting lend-lease to the Communists?

General HURLEY. They did not.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did you know of your own knowledge they tried to?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I can prove it by their record, that they recommended that I be reversed, and that we furnish lend-lease to the belligerent enemy of the Republic that I was instructed to uphold.

The CHAIRMAN. That was during the fighting, though, was it not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The war was still going on?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was part of your instructions, was it not, also, to try to get union between the so-called Communists and the Chiang Government, so they could both fight the Japanese?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you succeed in that?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I will tell you what that directive was. That was not in the form of a directive that had to be done, because even the wisest men in our Government doubted the ability of any man within a few weeks to bring about unification of China.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked you the question was that I thought that objective might have had some relationship to your statement about lend-lease equipment.

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that in connection with trying to induce the Communists to join the Chiang Government, that they would get lend-lease if they fought the Japanese?

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, I was charged with the responsibility of handling the Chinese situation, and for a civil servant to go and undercut me with the Japanese——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about that.

General HURLEY. To try, to tell how he would do it if he were running it, and to try to compel it.

Now, let me answer your question directly. On April 2 of this year while I was in Washington, I met the press, and I think that the press release—understand, this was put out in the State Department bulletin—the press release, in there, answers what the Senator has asked. I really understand that I have not quite answered your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking more about your own activity.

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose you carried out your instructions from the State Department, whatever they were?

NO STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS

General HURLEY. No, no, no. The State Department never issued me instructions. I could not get instructions out of the State Department. I had instructions from Franklin D. Roosevelt, and I had discussed it with Secretary Hull. The first public statement by the State Department on Chinese policy—public statement—that I have seen is that in the press this morning.

Now, in this, last April, I suggested that there could be no unification of China as long as there were armed war lords, armed gangs, or armed political parties who were strong enough to challenge the authority of the Government of the Republic of China. Therefore, from the beginning I was of the opinion that lend-lease supplies, equipment, and munitions given to any organization in China other than the National Government of the Republic was weakening the Government and would bring about that which I was sent to China to prevent, namely, the collapse of the Republic of China.

Now, I would like for this to be put in the record, inasmuch as it elaborates on that theory.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Put it in the record.

General HURLEY. I would like to put it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The bulletin referred to is as follows:)

From Department of State, Radio Bulletin No. 79, April 2, 1945

Ambassador Hurley's Press Conference

Ambassador Hurley opened his press conference by saying that his over-all impression in China was that China is very friendly to the United States. He said that the Chinese were grateful to America for all the assistance that we have given them and that in his opinion China would fight on to a victorious finish.

The Ambassador continued by pointing out that the United States has endeavored to use whatever influence it possesses to point the way toward a unification of military forces that would enable China to bring her full military power to the task of defeating Japan. He said that there had been some progress along those lines and that the United States still expected more favorable results. He said that there could be no political unification in China as long as there were armed political parties and war lords still strong enough to defy the national government. The Ambassador said that in his opinion the military strength of the armed political parties and the war lords had been over-estimated in the United States, and explained that the strongest military force in China, stronger than all the war lords and armed political parties, was still the national government of China. He added that the Chinese military establishment, the American military establishment, the Chinese National Government, and the American Embassy at Chungking were now all one team with one objective—the defeat of Japan.

The Ambassador said that Chiang Kai-shek had exercised all the power available to him, but that he was not Fascist-minded; rather, that his ambition was to relinquish all the power he possessed for a government of the people, for the people, by the people. Continuing, the Ambassador said that Chiang Kai-shek was now taking steps to formulate a foundation for a government based upon democratic principles in China, and that the Chinese leader considered the establishment of a democratic government in China the real objective of his career.

Correspondent asked General Hurley whether he had observed any war lords supporting Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador answered in the affirmative, saying that he understood that the war lord who had control of the forces in the vicinity of Kunming had recently subscribed allegiance, possibly not to Chiang Kai-shek, but to the Nationalist Government of China.

Correspondent said that some weeks ago he remembered a dispatch appearing in the New York Times from China, which said that the Chinese Communists were asking the United States to let them have some of the captured arms now in American possession so that they could do a better job of fighting the Japanese. Correspondent asked the Ambassador if he could either confirm that report, or that request, or indicate the attitude of this Government toward that request, or both. Ambassador Hurley replied that he, of course, could not confirm or deny the press report, but that he did know that the Communist party had requested that the United States furnish arms to it as a political party. He said that it had been his opinion that the furnishing of arms to an armed political party would be equivalent to the recognition of a belligerent and that this nation had recognized the National Government of China as the government of China and that we had steadfastly supported economically, militarily and politically the National Government of China since Secretary Hull wrote his note of November 26, 1941, to the Japanese National representatives. He pointed out that in his opinion the policy had been upheld in our mutual aid pact with the Chinese Government and in various other expressions of policies of the State Department. He concluded his reply by declaring that the United States recognizes the National Government of China and not any armed war lords or any armed political parties in China.

Correspondent asked whether the Ambassador could say anything about his view of the role, if any, played by Moscow in that relationship to the Communist and Chungking Governments. General Hurley replied that he would prefer to let the Soviet Government speak for itself, but that he would say that in his conferences in Moscow the attitude of Russia had expressed the desire for closer and more harmonious relations with China. Ambassador went on to say that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports

the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, that is, those principles generally referred to as the three people's principles of China: government of the people, by the people, and for the people. He pointed out that all the demands that the Communist party had been making had been on a democratic basis and that they had led to the statement that the Communist party in China were not, in fact, real Communists; for the Communist party was supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and conceded to be objectives also of the National Government.

Asked if the Ambassador could describe how the Communist party differs from the National Government, General Hurley said that, as a matter of fact, the divergence between the parties in China seemed to be not in the objective desired because they both assert that they are for the establishment of a government in China that will decentralize authority and conduct itself along democratic lines, employing democratic processes, but that the divergence between them was the procedure by which those objectives could be achieved. Explaining further, he said that the Communist party would like for the National Government to inaugurate certain forms immediately and that to do this they had suggested a bipartisan coalition government. The Ambassador said that on the other hand the National Government had stated that it had a program outlined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whereby the authority of the Government of China was to be returned to the people of China under a constitution and not to any aggregation of political parties, adding that the National Government claimed that it would not be justified in turning over the authority of Government to any organizations of political parties, or any coalition of politicians, but wished rather to return the control of China to the people and let the people select their own leaders.

Correspondent asked if the Ambassador could say something of the kind of favorable development in the future which he anticipated. Ambassador Hurley answered that a number of conflicts between our military establishment and the Chinese military establishment had been eliminated as well as a number of conflicts concerning certain members of the Chinese Cabinet. He said that the results which we expect will come when the Chinese National Government recognizes all the political parties, and added that the United States believed that the armed parties in China were coming closer together and that all of them realized that there cannot emerge from this war a free, strong, united, democratic China as long as there were armed forces other than the government which were strong enough to defy the government. However, the Ambassador warned that he did not expect a Utopian China overnight.

Correspondent asked whether the Ambassador thought the appointment of a Communist Chinese delegation to San Francisco had satisfied the Government of Yunan. General Hurley said that it would in a measure, for it was the recognition of the Communist party by the National Government. He concluded by saying that this was a step in the right direction and an indication there was a possibility of unification of the armed forces of China, as well as the political unification of the armed forces of China, as well as the political unification of the objectives of China.

General Hurley pointed out that there was a time when China was praised inordinately in this nation, and that there came a time when everybody condemned China. He said that he did not think that either of these attitudes was correct but thought that the answer was somewhere between the two of them.

Asked whether the Communist delegate was really a Communist, Ambassador Hurley replied in the affirmative and explained that the delegate belonged to the Communist party and cooperated with and served the party.

ROLE OF DOCUMENTS IN GENERAL HURLEY'S CHARGES

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, do you care to question further?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. What I would like to get for us is a concise statement in the record of exactly what the issues are, and precisely who these persons are, and exactly what these persons did, from your standpoint, which was inimical to the policy of the United States as outlined in the directives which you had received as Ambassador. Now, if we cannot go into that without mentioning these documents,

I submit that we had better decide what we are going to do about these documents before we go on with the examination, because it seems to me we have got to get down to the issues in this case and try to bring out the facts. I confess that I am still somewhat confused.

(General Hurley presented to the chairman a memorandum of documents wanted.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to make any response to that?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. My point is, Mr. Chairman, if we cannot find out who these gentlemen that reference has been made to—one man's name has been mentioned, a man by the name of Service, and there are others—as I understand the Ambassador, the General's position is that these documents are essential, or a paraphrase of them, to the understanding of this committee as to what the real issues are here, and what these men did which the General contends was inimical to the policies of the United States as outlined in his directives; and if we cannot proceed without the documents I suggest the orderly manner of going ahead with this matter would be to decide whether we are going to have these documents and then go on and get down to the bedrock of this situation and see what the facts are.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, my reason for saying that we ought to look these matters over is that the General stated they were of the highest top-secret nature.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think the State Department at least ought to be consulted about these documents before we make a broadside demand on them that they send them all up here and put them all in the record.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. All I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, is that if these documents are essential to any intelligent discussion or examination of the General in connection with this matter it seems to me we ought first to decide what we are going to do about the documents before we proceed with any further examination.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, as I see the situation, the documents are the ultimate proof which the General asserts will sustain his charges. I think he ought to be allowed to make his "opening statement to the jury" as to what he intends to prove.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

General HURLEY. Is that satisfactory, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I want to know what your testimony is. We can get these documents when and if we pass on them. I am perfectly willing for you to go ahead and state who these men were, and what they did, and whether they interfered with your efforts to unify these two armies. I thought you said a while ago that as part of your instructions you were told to try to get the two armies to unite to fight against the Japanese. I was a little confused later on by your statement that there could not be any union in China as long as there was a Communist armed party.

General HURLEY. Of course, Senator, I can understand why you are confused, and I regret very much that I have not been able to make the matter clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are here, and you can still do it.

General HURLEY. I am doing the best I can under the circumstances, and I assure you that I will make it clear to you.

The Communist armed party had never been visited by an American general, or finally, by an American ambassador, until I flew to Yenan at a time when we were all still in contact with the enemy. At that time I had a rather reasonable conference with the Communist leaders. I did obtain what was thought to be a basic program for unification.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

General HURLEY. I left there, I believe, November 10, 1944. That is more than a year ago, now. At that time I got to know Mao Tze-tung, the Chairman of the Communist Party, and I found him not an altogether unreasonable individual. I found many subjects on which we could agree. I invited him at that time to go to Chungking with me to interview Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He felt that he could not go, himself, but he sent the No. 2 Communist leader, General Chou En-lai with his staff with me to Chungking. We continued the discussions. Those discussions brought out many various, different plans for unification or at least coordination of the armed forces of the Republic. At that time. Hon. E. R. Stettinius was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State, and about that time President Roosevelt appointed me Ambassador, and I think I was confirmed possibly December 10, 1944. Secretary Stettinius sent me a letter, and he sent me a wire asking me to summarize for the State Department my activities as the personal representative of the President in China. The purpose of that was to bring about what we all believed at that time essential to the proper direction of our Foreign Service, and that is, to put as much of our foreign relations, whether economical, logistical, political, or diplomatic, in our State Department. There never has been any attitude on my part that would indicate that I wished to take anything out of the State Department. The exigencies of war at some time required that the President send a personal representative to get right into a situation where possibly the State Department could not get; and, understand, I am implying no criticism of that.

Now, on December 23 or 24, I sent to Secretary of State Stettinius an outline of what we were doing in China. I not only counted, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, the objectives; I counted for him how we had proceeded. I told him in that, that I had been directed by President Roosevelt to attempt to establish a reproachement between Russia and China. Now, that reproachment—I had been in Moscow. I had ascertained that the position of Russia—and it is public, now; it has been solemnized in the treaty and exchange of letters, and I told Mr. Stettinius in this letter of December 24, and this is my own analysis and not a quotation of either Marshal Stalin or Mr. Molotov—their statement to me indicated that they do not consider the Chinese Communists as Communists at all. Oh, yes—there are some of them who are Communists, but the general rank and file of the Communist Party, the heads of the Soviet Government do not consider as Communists. Two: They advised me at that time that they were not aiding the Communist Party in China against the Government of the Republic of China. Three: That they would support the National Government of the Republic of China, and, a little further than we had agreed to go, the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Finally: That Russia desired closer and more harmonious relations with China. I reported that to the President. I reported also to Mr. Stettinius in that letter I have asked you to procure from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that after the treaty between China and Russia had been concluded, or before?

General HURLEY. No, sir; that was even before the Yalta Conference. That was the basis of discussion thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated a while ago that you thought that Russia was observing and living up to its treaty with China.

General HURLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg, any questions?

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, I am still feeling as Senator La Follette does. I would like to know who did what, that you object to; and when he did it, and what he did.

General HURLEY. Would you let me conclude on this letter that the Senator asked me about, that I sent?

Senator VANDENBERG. Surely.

General HURLEY. I realize that I ought to just jump at conclusions, but I do not get all of my exercise jumping at conclusions. I have got to lay the foundations, sir, before I get to it. The letter to Secretary Stettinius, to which I have referred, not only outlined the Communist situation, it outlined what I conceive to be the reforms essential for the National Government of the Republic of China. Now, understand, the Government that I was told to prevent collapsing was not altogether what we wanted, and after having outlined all that to the Secretary, he sent me a telegram in which he commended me very highly for the work I had done; but it was not a public endorsement of the American policy in China; it was not a public statement on the American policy in China; and the men that Senator Vandenberg is asking me about took the position that it was not an endorsement of the policy I had outlined in my letter of December 24 to the Secretary of State. Now, here comes Senator Vandenberg's answer.

Oh, about the 21st of January, maybe the 20th, I had the heads of all the American agencies in China in a meeting in my office, and I stated to them the policy of the United States, so there could be no mistake among ourselves about the policy. That statement is in the files of the State Department and it is among these papers that I have asked for. I say that so there could be no mistake about the policy of the United States so far as I understood it.

Then I came home for a conference.

The CHAIRMAN. In this meeting that you had of all these heads, was there any divergence or any criticism or anything said hostile to your views?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these subordinates that later you say were disloyal, or that did not agree with your views, present?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind saying who they were?

General HURLEY. Would you let me conclude? I am about to tell you who they were, now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

DIFFERING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EMBASSY STAFF ON LEND-LEASE TO COMMUNISTS

General HURLEY. When I left China to come to the United States for a conference, I was confronted in Washington by a report from Mr. George Atcheson, whom I had left in charge of the Embassy, addressed to the Secretary of State, in which he recited nearly all of the policies that I had upheld as the just policy, but in addition to that he recommended that instead of following my policy of not arming belligerents against the government that we were upholding that we furnish lend-lease to the Communists, and in that, Mr. Chairman, Mr. George Atcheson said that he had the support, the acquiescence, of every official member of the American Embassy in Chungking.

Senator WILEY. What is the date of that letter?

General HURLEY. That letter is dated February 28, 1945. That is again while we were still at war.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you, of course, opposed furnishing arms to a belligerent group to attack the government you were upholding. Did Mr. Atcheson point out that the purpose of furnishing arms to the Communists was to get them to unite in fighting the Japanese, or not?

General HURLEY. I see that you have read the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I have not seen it. You are quite in error. I have never seen the letter and would never have thought of it but for your appearance here. I do not know what is in the letter. I am just asking you. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that he had some argument or some reason. I am asking you, was that true? I do not know whether it is true or not. You have read the letter and I have not seen it.

General HURLEY. It is true. My purpose was the purpose stated by Secretary Byrnes in his public release this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the letter that you say Mr. Atcheson wrote, in which he expressed some disagreement with some of your views and in which he suggested that arms and munitions under lend-lease be supplied to the Communist forces.

Now, I am asking you what his reasons for that were. Were his reason that they would aid in fighting the Japanese?

General HURLEY. There were already fighting the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. What were his reasons?

ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO DESTROY CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

General HURLEY. His reasons were that that would destroy the National Government of the Republic of China, and the John Service report is for that purpose, and as soon as I left, George Atcheson and everybody attempted what they had been trying to do when the President sent me to China, and that was to destroy the Government of the Republic of China.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that in the letter?

General HURLEY. No he did not, but he did use all of my arguments for unification.

The CHAIRMAN. I was asking you about the letter, and what was in the letter.

General HURLEY. Do not tax my memory too much. I have told you the letter. You can get it, and I am willing for the American people to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; I know. The American people are going to find out about this fact, I hope.

General HURLEY. I think they are.

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee can find out, maybe the people will find out.

RELATIONS BETWEEN GENERALS HURLEY AND STILWELL

Now, General, was General Stilwell still in China at that time?

General HURLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. He had been there, had he not?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You and he did not agree on policies either, did you? Did you not have a break with General Stilwell over the policies with regard to the Communist army?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not agree with him, did you?

General HURLEY. I never agreed to arm a belligerent in China against the Government that I was seeking to sustain.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody wanted to do that.

General HURLEY. I think you are mistaken about that, Senator, and I think the record that I have asked you to get will bear out that they did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Stilwell ever tell you that his purpose in advocating the arming and unification of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's forces was to destroy the Government of China? Did he ever tell you that?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. Do not get me in conflict with General Stilwell. I would like to say this. Mr. Smith, will you hand me that release about General Stilwell and myself, while we are on that subject?

The CHAIRMAN. We have probably seen all the releases.

General HURLEY. No, you have not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought maybe I could get something that was not already released or published.

General HURLEY. This is an old one, sir, and you will give me the opportunity, I hope, to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose release is it?

General HURLEY. I think, sir, it comes from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to put it in the record, if you like.

General HURLEY. Let us see exactly what we have got. The statement is given here at Washington, and given out by the State Department in an effort to separate General Stilwell and myself, I believe. The quotation is this——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it ought to speak for itself? You say you believe that. You have put in your view that the purpose of the State Department was to try to separate the two of you.

General HURLEY. I will read it. I am quoting:

As a two-star general, I hate to report on a four-star general.

That statement is false. I never said it, and it is attributed to me here in the State Department, when I was 13,000 miles away. It is said that as I entered the State Department I said it. Now you can put that in the record. That is not a true statement and I was not in Washington, and I never made that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know of the existence of the release but I was talking about the division of opinion between General Stilwell and yourself. It was rather sharp, was it not?

General HURLEY. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not sharp?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was sharp enough to get General Stilwell out of China, was it not?

General HURLEY. That could be a division of opinion with someone else. Do you wish to examine me on the Stilwell situation? I had hoped not to do that, because I have not said anything derogatory to General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just asking you a few questions.

Senator Thomas, you can take the witness. He does not seem to want to answer me.

General HURLEY. I have no reluctance to answer your questions, sir. Let me state it positively. General Stilwell and the generalissimo were in a deadlock. In addition to that, they were incompatible temperaments. We had a nation, an ally, that was about to collapse; that is, everybody said it was. We had the Chinese armies in retreat. We had the prediction made that the Chinese army would disintegrate. I was sent to China to prevent those things.

The CHAIRMAN. And did so.

General HURLEY. And in order to bring about harmony whereby we could cooperate with the Chinese Government, a fine officer who was incompatible and who did not agree was relieved. I think that is a true statement about it.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they disagree about, if you do not mind stating—about the Communist army, or not?

General HURLEY. As I recall, at that time General Stilwell and I were not in disagreement in regard to the Chinese Communist armies. General Stilwell had had control of lend-lease in China, and he had not—he had been there 2½ years—given the Chinese Communists any lend-lease supplies, so on that we did not disagree.

I would not like to go into the controversy between the generalissimo and General Stilwell. I would like for you to get that some place else, but so far as I know, General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue, and we have never had a controversial word between us.

LEND-LEASE TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS ISSUE

Senator LA FOLLETTE. General, you had started out on something in the nature of a chronological statement of these events, and then we did not get very far with it. As I understand it, at some time after you got to China you called in the heads of all the missions in China at

your office in Chungking, and you there outlined to them the policy as outlined to you in your directives of the United States toward the situation in China. You then came back here to a conference at the State Department, and you found a communication from a Mr. Atcheson in which he took a position diametrically opposite, as I understood it, to the one which you had outlined at this meeting with all of these representatives of the various missions of the United States in Chungking.

What happened after that? Did not that essential conflict bring about some resolution, some determination here at Washington as to whether you or Mr. Atcheson had the policy of the United States correctly interpreted?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. What happened here at the State Department? If you could just give us a chronological statement of these events and what happened, so that at least I could understand what the issues are here, it would be very helpful.

General HURLEY. Very well.

As Senator Connally has indicated to you, the report of George Atcheson has a lot of the policy that I had outlined for the heads of the American services in China. In fact, I think that is the first time any career man announced that our policy was to assist in the establishment in China in proper ways without interfering in internal affairs of a strong, united, democratic China. It had been said before in my reports, but he came out for that. There are a lot of good things in the Atcheson report with which I do not disagree. In fact, a lot of them are taken from my own statement, and they are reiterated. But what Atcheson recommended to the State Department, and what he said he had concurrence in with every official in the Embassy, was that we supply lend-lease arms and munitions to the armed Communist Party, which was against the government that I was sent to China to uphold. That is in the letter.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Then what happened while you were here at the State Department? Did you not then have that issue resolved, and was there not some directive given you to settle this matter as between you and Atcheson on his point on which you were in disagreement?

RECALL AND REASSIGNMENT OF GEORGE ATCHESON

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I immediately contended that if the Atcheson letter constituted the policy of the U.S. Government, it was a departure from the purpose for which I had been sent to China, and I wished they would leave Mr. Atcheson in charge and let me stay at home. The result was, after many days of argument, that Mr. Atcheson was recalled, because he had shown that in my absence he had advocated a policy that I felt was destructive to unification.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Then ultimately the top-ranking officials in the State Department resolved the conflict between you and Mr. Atcheson as to policy in China with relation to lend-lease and the Communist faction in your favor, and he was relieved of any further activity in China.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator La Follette. What happened next? Did that not settle the thing?

General Hurley. He came to Washington and became my supervisor in the State Department.

Senator La Follette. And what was the effect of that, if any, upon your activities and your ability to carry out the policy as you understood it to be in China?

General Hurley. It was this, sir: At that point both Mr. Service and Mr. Atcheson were in supervisory capacities in the State Department at Washington, and it meant that I had over me men who disapproved of the policy that I was told to make effective in China.

Senator La Follette. In what way, if any, did they exercise the supervisory capacity or positions that they held in a manner which was inimical to the policy as you understood it and as you were attempting to carry it out?

General Hurley. Well, of course, I do not want to get into any witch-hunting controversy with individuals.

Senator La Follette. And I certainly do not. General, I am simply trying to get a statement of facts here from your statement.

General Hurley. You have it, that I made this report to Secretary Stettinius; he sent me a telegram which approved my conduct, but did not make a public statement upholding the policy, and as soon as I left China the whole crowd got together and reversed or tried to reverse that telegram. The result was that Atcheson was recalled and placed in a supervisory capacity with all the others over me in Washington, and that made untenable my position. I wanted a public statement from the State Department of our policy.

Senator La Follette. When did this occur? When were these gentlemen put in a supervisory capacity over you?

General Hurley. You would have to get the record. You see, I was 13,000 miles away, sir.

Senator La Follette. Approximately when?

General Hurley. Atcheson wrote his report from Chungking on the 28th of February.

Senator La Follette. February of what year?

General Hurley. February of this year, and I went to London from here, where I had some conferences with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Relations on the Chinese policy. I had authority to have the conferences. I then visited Moscow again, and I had conferences there.

Now, understand, the higher echelon was like it is now. I have said that I think that President Truman's Navy Day outline of foreign policies is good. I have said that the higher echelon policy of America has been good since the announcement of the Atlantic Charter. But what I have charged is that we have not made effective the principles for which we said we were fighting.

SUBSEQUENT CHANGES OF DIRECTIVES ON RUSSIAN TALKS

Senator La Follette. General, What I am trying to get at is, what, if anything, was done by these two gentlemen after this February 1945 incident which in any way was inimical to the successful discharge of your directives in China?

General HURLEY. Well, 13,000 miles away it would be very difficult for me to tell who did what in the State Department. But I will say this, that about that time—and you will see from the record there—I sent a telegram to the State Department on the subject that I had handled with Russia before I became Ambassador. I immediately received a reply from the State Department, after I had been directed to conduct the rapproachement between Russia and China; I immediately received a telegram telling me not to mediate and not to advise and only to make suggestions. That was a reversal of my directive.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Who signed that telegram?

General HURLEY. It was signed by E. R. Stettinius, but I am told since that he did not see it. It was written in the Chinese and Far Eastern Department of the State Department and dispatched to me in Chungking.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Do you know of your own knowledge who prepared the draft of that telegram?

General HURLEY. No, sir, but I have been told.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

General HURLEY. Well, I have been told by a gentleman in the Foreign Service. For instance, there are those in the Chinese and Far-Eastern Division who do not agree with those who have been fighting me.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know who wrote this telegram that purported to be signed by Mr. Stettinius. You say it was not signed by him.

General HURLEY. I did not say it was not signed by him. I said I had been told.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the man who told you that?

General HURLEY. Well, let's see. There were several of us in the room. I think it was Mr. Everett Drumright.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he tell you that?

General HURLEY. Senator, I could not fix the date.

The CHAIRMAN. On that trip when you were back here, or later on?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I think that it was later on.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. May I go back to this telegram which you got, signed by Secretary Stettinius, and which you said reversed your directive so far as mediation between the Chungking Government and the Communists? What did you do next? Did you do anything in an effort to get this directive straightened out? What happened after that?

General HURLEY. After that?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. What was the date of the Stettinius telegram?

General HURLEY. I do not have the date of the Stettinius telegram. It was the early part of January 1945, possibly January 2.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. What happened after that? I would just like to get a chronological story in the record.

General HURLEY. Understand, Senator, up to that time I had not been reporting the Russian situation to the State Department, because I was not in the State Department. So far as I know, there are no messages of mine sent to the White House which have leaked or which have been used against me or against our policy in China. There was one message in regard to the Middle East that I sent to the White

House. That is not a top secret. It is a letter. That was sent to the State Department for implementation, and it did leak, on May 20 of 1944, I believe, in a garbled form which was intended to be injurious to me and to what I had reported. But of that I made no public point, and when I first realized that I did not have the support of the career men at my Embassy I called them together. I cautiously outlined for them the American policy in China.

Senator La Follette. That was before you came back here?

General Hurley. Yes, sir.

Senator La Follette. You said that while you were here the controversy between you and Mr. Atcheson was resolved by his being relieved of his duties in China and given some position here in the State Department.

Generaly Hurley. Yes, sir.

Senator La Follette. Then you said this telegram signed by Stettinius came, reversing your directive so far as your mediation between the Chungking government and the Communists. What happened next?

General Hurley. What happened then? We were still at war, and we still had elements involved other than diplomacy. I never believed that the telegram not to mediate, not to advise, not to be helpful to China in attempting to prevent a controversy at that point between China and Russia was the policy of my Government. I thought it was an attempt of underlings to try to reverse what I knew to be the policy, therefore I continued, and not only did I continue, I came home, talked to the President and the Secretary of State, and continued the Russian policy as of before, notwithstanding this telegram that had reversed it.

Senator La Follette. About what time was it that you came back here following the Stettinius telegram?

General Hurley. The Stettinius telegram, or the telegram signed "Stettinius, Secretary of State," which reversed our Russian directive, came about February 6, as I recall, and I left Chungking the 21st of the same month.

Senator La Follette. When you came back here, did you raise this issue again, and was it resolved in any manner?

General Hurley. Yes, sir. I raised the issue again, the result of which, Senators, I have told you before. I went to London to get a top-flight statement approving the American policy in China, which I did procure and which was announced. I then went to Moscow, and again I conferred with Commisar Molitov and Generalissimo Stalin, and again they reaffirmed what they had told me a year before, the analysis of which I gave you in the beginning.

Senator La Follette. Then, as I understand it, so far as your directives were concerned, you were back in the position that you had occupied and you had the same directives in general that you had received prior to this Stettinius telegram. Did you go on, then, to China?

General Hurley. Yes, sir.

Senator La Follette. What happened next?

VERBAL SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA ONLY

General HURLEY. There is a point that I would like to make. Your very intelligent question suggests it. I did have the verbal support of both the President and the Secretary of State for the American policy in China which I had outlined in my letter of December 24. But I got no public statement of the American official position, and that left me again where they said, "This is his policy, and it is wrong."

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Who said that?

General HURLEY. Every career man who assisted Atcheson in trying to reverse the policy during my absence.

EFFECT OF APPOINTMENTS OF ATCHESON, SERVICE, AND EMERSON TO MACARTHUR STAFF

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Were these people in China, now, or in the State Department, or both?

General HURLEY. Both. I think by that time Atcheson, Service, and Emerson had been appointed as Advisers to the Supreme Commander of the Allies in Asia. By that time I was again in conference with the Communists, and we believed that we had the policy where we could make effective the U.S. policy for the unification of the Armed Forces and the endorsement of the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a strong, united, democratic government. But about that time came the announcement that Atcheson and Service and so forth had been appointed as political advisers to the Supreme Commander in Asia.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. That was General MacArthur?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; and then the papers in China, especially in Yunan, and the radio, said that Atcheson and Service and so forth had won out over me, and that I had not been representing the U.S. policy, and the papers said they were coming back to China and therefore the Communists should not unite, and these gentlemen are over there now as advisers to the Supreme Commander in Asia, and my contention is that they have not supported but have opposed the American policy in Asia.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. About what time were they appointed as political advisers to General MacArthur?

General HURLEY. Understand, I am talking from memory.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Approximately.

General HURLEY. Special Order No. 1 by General MacArthur as Supreme Commander in Asia was issued possibly 3 days after the surrender of Japan.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Were they then serving as his political advisers?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. When were they appointed?

General HURLEY. They were appointed about that time, about the time of the surrender.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Were you in China then?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. What did you do? How long did you stay in

China after they were appointed political advisers to General MacArthur?

General HURLEY. I sent a wire to the State Department, and the Chinese Government also sent a wire, I do not know whether to the State Department or to the President, and said that these gentlemen opposed the policy in China and that they had been placed in the highest position in Asia. Now, being rather generous, I have never intended to try to injure these gentlemen. What I wanted was a public statement of the American policy so that they could not continue in high official positions to say that what I upheld was not the American policy. I think that is the issue, Senator.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Is it or is it not your contention that the appointment of these two men as political advisers to General MacArthur occurred at a time when you were about to achieve an agreement or a modus vivendi between the Chungking Government and the Communists?

General HURLEY. Senator, if I would answer that question in the affirmative it would seem as though I was very egotistical I had done this.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. My question was prompted by your statement that you thought you were about to achieve this objective when these appointments were made.

EFFECT ON GENERAL HURLEY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

General HURLEY. That is true. Here is what I had done: I had continuously been in communication with Mao Tse-tung, the chairman of the Communist armed party in China. I had had many conferences with Chou En-lai, the second in command of the Communists. I had talked to General Chu Teh, the commander of the Communist Army, with whom I was on a basis of confidence and friendship. I had talked to the Communist representative in China and I had talked to Chiang Kai-shek about the necessity for generous, liberal statesmanship that would invite these Communists to do their part as a part of the unification of China and to give them recognition as a political party in the Government. All of these things had been accomplished. All the time they were saying that Mao Tse-tung did not like me, but he would not come to Chungking except on the condition that I go to Yunan and fly with him, which I did. And I brought Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai and others, and I had them sit down with the generalissimo, the President of the Republic of China, for the first time in 20 years, and I felt that we were about to achieve not unification of the Armed Forces in time of war, which I had striven for, but a unification of China with the armed political party of China becoming in fact a political party and taking a place in the Government of China for the direction of the Government of the Republic.

Now, to say that I was about to achieve that I think would be boasting, but I am telling you how far along I got, and it was Mao Tze-tung himself who told me that the appointment of George Atcheson and John Service indicated that the United States was not going to follow through on its unification program that I was trying to present.

I am not trying to say how desperate it was to be confronted with

that situation from my own Government when we had proceeded that far. I do not say that I could have unified China, but I was doing my level best to do it and was making some progress.

Senator La Follette. Now then, you said you sent a telegram following the appointment of these two men as political advisers to General MacArthur. You said you sent a telegram. Did you send it to the State Department?

General Hurley. Yes, sir.

Senator La Follette. You also said that the Chungking Government sent a communication.

General Hurley. I was advised that they did.

Senator La Follette. What happened after that?

General Hurley. I came home.

Senator La Follette. Were you ordered home?

General Hurley. No, sir. I asked permission to come home.

Senator La Follette. Did you come then to Washington?

General Hurley. Yes, I did.

Senator La Follette. And did you have conferences with persons here in the State Department?

General Hurley. Yes.

I should tell you this, Senator, before you get to that. About that time the Communists, with whom I was in conference continuously—I mean in my own house and at my own table; we were not stilted, we are in close communication, and I was trying to tell them what would be the benefit of a unified China, a stabilized government in China, and how beneficial that would be to the 450 million Chinese—about that time Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai told me that the plan of the United States and the United Nations was not to build a free, strong, democratic government in China around which to build the stabilization of Asia, but that there was a plan that had been discussed at length before to make a controlled Japanese Empire the stabilizing influence in Asia.

I was opposed to that. But it revived that statement when the men who were opposing me in China were appointed advisers to the Supreme Commander, and I said in a telegram to the State Department, a very kindly telegram, that that whole theory of building the stabilization of Asia around our enemy, Japan, was still being discussed, and with a lot of credence being given it by important people, and I asked that I be permitted to return to the United States to ascertain if the policy of our Government in regard to China had been changed. I asked to come home.

Senator La Follette. And you came home?

General Hurley. Yes, sir.

CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY SOUGHT BY GENERAL HURLEY

Senator La Follette. What did you ascertain? You say you came home to ascertain whether the policy had been changed or not. What did you ascertain?

General Hurley. With Secretary Byrnes and with President Truman I was told that both of them upheld and approved the policy originally given me by President Roosevelt and approved my service in preventing the collapse of China and sustaining the Government of China and keeping the Chinese Army in the field.

I was not well. I asked the President and Secretary Byrnes to permit me to take a rest. I wanted a public statement of policy. What Secretary Byrnes has said in the paper this morning would have satisfied me. I felt in my physical condition that I could no longer carry the foreign service in China on my neck while battling for the policies of my Government. Understand, I told the President and Secretary Byrnes that I would return temporarily, but that I had gone into the service for the period of the war only. Now that the war was over, I would like to be relieved. They were very kind and they told me that they did approve the policy which I had upheld.

About that time I went to the State Department, and Mr. Drumright showed me a letter that had been received from someone exploding the myth of Hurley, showing that it was my policy and not the policy of the United States that I had upheld in China, and the letter was addressed to President Truman. Drumright prepared a reply to the letter in which he told the gentleman who wrote it the truth, that it was not my policy, that it was the policy of the United States that I had advocated, defended and upheld in China. When the letter went out to the Far Eastern Division, in place of defending me against these charges which had been published again and again, and were rife in China and were weakening every effort that I made, the Far Eastern Division—and I am told it was Mr. John Carter Vincent—struck out all the policy and all the defense, and the letter went out, "Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated so and so addressed to the President. Yours respectfully." No position was taken in the Far Eastern Division.

Oh, there are people in there who have taken a position, but they have never been able to make themselves control the policy.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Then that same day—understand, now, I am not in very good shape—the same career man's attack on me came out not only in papers in New York and in Chicago, but on the floor of Congress. Understand, I am indulging in no subterfuge about what I told Secretary Byrnes and the President. I said that I would go back, and believe me, that was my intention. But when I was confronted by the fact that again I was left naked to my enemies and the enemies of America, I decided I would commence firing, and I did. So that is the reason why I am here this morning.

I did not invite this hearing, but I do believe that you gentlemen, you Members of the Senate, the Members of the House, do reflect the image of the American people, and I do believe that it is time for the American people to have the basic facts upon which they can form an intelligent opinion on the foreign policy of our country.

Senator VANDENBERG. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR REASSIGNMENT OF ATCHESON AND SERVICE?

Senator VANDERBERG. There is one thing I do not understand, General Hurley. Who was responsible for putting these men over you, as you put it, in the State Department, after they had been relieved at your request? Who was responsible for giving them these positions?

General HURLEY. Frankly, Senator, I do not know.

Senator VANDENBERG. Who was responsible for sending them as advisers to General MacArthur?

General HURLEY. I do not know. I just know they were given supervisory capacity over me here, and they were sent as the top advisers to the Supreme Commander of Asia.

Senator VANDENBERG. I find it difficult to put together the two propositions, that the President and the Secretary of State were standing behind you all the time, and yet within their jurisdiction things were happening to the contrary. I cannot harmonize those two things.

General HURLEY. Well, Senator, I have complete sympathy with you. Neither could I. I have thought that the high echelon of policy, as I said a while ago, from the beginning of the Atlantic Charter, from the adoption of the Teheran Declaration, from the splendid exemplification of our policy by Cordell Hull, the high echelon on American policy, has been fine. But the implementation of that policy, the hiatus between the policy and the performance, is what I am endeavoring to call to the attention of the public today.

Senator VANDENBERG. I understand that, but still I am perplexed. Running through your entire narrative, furthermore, is a challenge based upon the fact that those responsible for our public policy in the Far East were declining to make any public statement on the subject.

General HURLEY. That is true.

Senator VANDENBERG. So it seems to me that your challenge is not alone to the lower echelon, but that it very definitely is to the higher echelon, in spite of your compliments to them.

General HURLEY. I think the answer to that is, Senator, that the higher echelon would in all probability contend that, for instance, the statement of the outline of the foreign policy by the President in his Navy Day address was the last word on our policy. But that did not help me, where I had a specific situation, where I was charged with having made or manufactured a policy for the United States.

Senator GREEN. I understood you to say, General, that you were very much exercised over this telegram which was signed "Stettinius" but was not sent by him. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. That I believe was not sent by him.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General HURLEY. Because it was contrary to all my conversations with him and to a former telegram from him.

Senator GREEN. When you saw Mr. Stettinius, did you ask him whether he had sent it or not?

General HURLEY. I did not get to talk to Mr. Stettinius very much after that. He was engaged in the United Nations. I do not believe I asked him specifically about that telegram. I may have. I would not deny it if he said I did.

Senator GREEN. But you do not remember doing it?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I do not.

WHO WAS INVOLVED IN ALLEGED "SABOTAGE"?

Senator GREEN. You have in your statement many times referred to the number of career men in the State Department who were trying to sabotage your policy and the policy of this country, but you ac-

cused only two by name, Service and Atcheson. Are there any others that you would like to include?

General HURLEY. I would not know, Senator, just how many people, but Atcheson says in his telegram that he had the support of every career official in Chungking at that period, and if you could get the list of the officials of the State Department outside of myself, you would possibly find how many were involved.

Senator GREEN. Are those the only two that you can name?

General HURLEY. I could, of course, name them, but I am going to be careful not to do an injustice. You have the information that you can get on it.

Senator GREEN. Those are the only two that you will name?

General HURLEY. I will name the others.

Senator GREEN. Without admitting that there may be some defense to them, are you not willing to let the committee have the benefit of your knowledge so far as it goes as to whether these men are undermining the policy of this country?

General HURLEY. I think it is all published in the "Chicago Sun" of yesterday.

Senator GREEN. May we have your statement rather than that of the "Chicago Sun"?

General HURLEY. I have told you, sir, that I do not know of my own knowledge who they were and I would be glad to answer something of my own knowledge that I know, but I only know for some of them that George Atcheson said he had their support, which I thought was sufficient.

Senator GREEN. Then, of your own knowledge, Service and Atcheson are the only ones that you know?

General HURLEY. No; they are not the only ones who were disloyal to me. I would add to that list John Davies, Fulton Freeman, and Arthur Ringwald. There were two other men who were said to be parties to this, and I am not sure whether they were or not, and I would rather not name them, because I am not certain.

Senator GREEN. But you have asked this committee to proceed with this examination. When you are through turning it over to us we ought to have all the help we can get.

COMMITTEE'S TREATMENT OF WITNESS

General HURLEY. No doubt, and I promise you, sir, that you have all the help that I am going to give you, but you are not going to lead me into an accusation that I cannot make stand up. I am not going to be led as though I were a bootlegging witness on the stand. I have testified, and I would like to be treated in that manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Well now, General, I am speaking respectfully and I think the committee is treating you respectfully, and I do not think your inference that you are being treated like a bootlegger is quite in point.

General HURLEY. Strike it from the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No; we will not strike it from the record.

General HURLEY. I have been asked questions which I have said I cannot answer, and then I am approached as if I were being prose-

cuted by the prosecuting attorney, and I tell you that I do not like that kind of treatment.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, just a moment. Please control your emotions a little better.

General HURLEY. I am not emotional, sir. You mistake earnestness for emotionalism.

The CHAIRMAN. We will amend the word "emotion" and say "earnestness."

Senator Green is a member of this committee, and this committee is trying to find out the facts.

General HURLEY. He has found them out, sir, all that I have to give him on names.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a perfect right to answer, and the Senator was successful in getting several additional names. We are going to treat you with respect, an we expected to be treated with respect by you.

Gneral HURLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator GREEN. General, you misunderstood the purport of my questions. I want to simply get the clues which the committee can follow up.

General HURLEY. You have got the truth, sir. There is no question about the documents that I have made so that you can get them. You have the truth on this, and you have a statement made by Acheson in which he himself tells you, and you could find out, because I was not here, sir, and I was not in Chungking when it was signed, and I am not going to be led into testifying to something that I am not familiar with.

ROLE OF VINCENT AND EMERSON

Senator GREEN. No; but now, General, I am not accusing you of anything at all. I would like to remind you that you have also, in the course of your testimony, if I am not mistaken, mentioned two other names. One was Vincent. Did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And another was Emerson.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I do not know that I mentioned Emerson.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You mentioned Emerson. I wrote it down as you mentioned it.

Senator GREEN. Were they career men too?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. So far as you know, were they involved?

General HURLEY. I could not prove it. I have been told that Emerson is the author of the statement that I blanketed Chungking and would not permit his reports on the situation to come through, and that he came back to Washington and filed his reports himself, saying that I had prevented them from coming from Chungking.

The fact is, I never saw one of the Emerson reports and I never stopped any of them, or anybody else's report, from coming through. Some of the reports that came through showing that Chiang Kai-shek had made an agreement to surrender China to Japan I called a weak, clumsy fake, and I sent those reports on into the State Department,

but so far as I know, sir, there were no reports that were intended for the State Department that were not forwarded by my office. There certainly was never any order to prevent them from being forwarded.

Senator GREEN. Thank you for that statement.

Now, how about Mr. Vincent?

General HURLEY. Well, you would have to find out. I have never served with Mr. Vincent. He is head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. Mr. Vincent had been in China. I think he went to China with Vice President Wallace. I think he possibly made a report on his return, and the first I knew about Mr. Vincent, Mr. Donald Nelson told me that Mr. Vincent had asked for his (Nelson's) endorsement for Vincent as Ambassador to China.

I could not give you, I have not looked up, his background. I do not know a thing about him. He may be just a fine man who is believing that he is discharging the duties of his office to the best of his ability. But I do know that he is the man who struck out all of Drumright's letter in which Drumright attempted to have the policy stated to the defamers. He struck it all out except an acknowledgment of the letter.

Senator GREEN. Thank you very much. And let me assure you again, General, that I meant no disrespect in my questions.

General HURLEY. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead, do you care to ask a question?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Yes.

DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LACK OF CAREER SUPPORT

You mentioned some documents that the State Department has that I understand we are going to have later. You meant to infer that those documents would substantially substantiate your testimony here when these documents are found, so far as they appear in the record?

General HURLEY. I mean that the documents would show that I did not have the support of the career service and, in fact, did have its opposition in attempting to make effective the American policy in China.

May I conclude, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Not until we get through questioning you. Are there any questions, Senator Austin?

Senator AUSTIN. Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask just a few questions bearing upon the significance and importance of the difference between the policy as it was represented by these men in subordinate positions and the true policy. That is the purpose of these few questions that I want to ask you.

COMMUNIST CHINESE ARMY'S TERRITORIAL CONTROL

This Chinese armed party occupies a large area in China, does it not?

General HURLEY. It claims to.

Senator AUSTIN. As a matter of fact, are there not segments of this armed party scattered over all of northern China as far down as the Yellow River?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator AUSTIN. That is approximately one-half of the territory of China, is it not?

General HURLEY. A little less, but it is a large territory.

Senator AUSTIN. It is a significant area?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator AUSTIN. Can you tell us how many provinces are comprehended in that north China that is sporadically covered by the Chinese armed forces?

General HURLEY. They claim eight.

Senator AUSTIN. Are there military tujans in command, or overlordships, in each of those eight provinces of north China?

General HURLEY. There are what roughly correspond to the war lords in each of these provinces.

Senator AUSTIN. And are they articulated in the armed forces of which Mao Tze-tung is the Commander?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator AUSTIN. And are they unified enough so that the Army of this Chinese armed party would be a great threat to the unification of China under the Republic?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; that is true even if we do not arm them with lend-lease, and if they are successful in getting some of the Japanese arms. But without aid from Russia, aid from the United States, aid from Britain, or the acquisition of Japanese arms, they are not an insurmountable threat.

Senator AUSTIN. Is it your opinion that they are getting financial aid from any of these sources that you have just mentioned?

General HURLEY. I would have to answer that in my opinion in the negative.

Senator AUSTIN. Thank you, sir. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one or two questions, General.

Just preceding your resignation, just prior thereto, you had made this statement that was put in the record out in Santa Fe?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not indicate in that statement, though, your intention to resign?

General HURLEY. I did not intend to resign.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not intend to resign?

General HURLEY. No.

CHRONOLOGY AND CAUSE OF RESIGNATION

The CHAIRMAN. The statement that you issued in the press I believe stated that a day or 2 days, I do not recall which, before your announcing your resignation you had a conference with the President and the Secretary of State.

General HURLEY. With the Secretary of State. My conference with the President had been longer than that.

The CHAIRMAN. In that conference with the Secretary of State you told him, did you not, that you were willing to go back to China and would probably leave the following day, is that right?

General HURLEY. I told him that I would go back.

The CHAIRMAN. That you would go back?

General HURLEY. Temporarily, to help him in the situation with which he was confronted.

The CHAIRMAN. You thoroughly agreed with his policy, and you thoroughly agreed with the President's policy. All right. At the time you said that you would go back, of course you knew all that you have testified about today, did you not?

General HURLEY. I did not, sir. You have misunderstood me, Senator. I thought that I was going to have a policy of the United States recognized by the State Department. Instead of that I found myself attacked and I found a letter sent out by the State Department in which they absolutely declined to back up the policy that I had been sustaining in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that letter?

General HURLEY. No, I have not, but I have put it on the list, so that you can get it. They did not give me the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. You saw it somewhere, I assume?

General HURLEY. Let me tell you frankly what I did see. I saw the letter making the accusation that the policy I was upholding in China was not the American policy. I saw the letter that was prepared to answer that by Mr. Everett Drumright, the head of the Chinese Division, a career man.

The CHAIRMAN. You testified about that.

General HURLEY. You asked me again, Senator. Would you let me conclude?

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

General HURLEY. The letter prepared by Mr. Drumright, who by the way is a career man, was just, fair, courageous, and when it went to the head of the Far Eastern division, I am told that Mr. John Carter Vincent struck out all of the letter except, "Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of so and so. Respectfully." That was one thing I found.

The next thing I found was the outbreak on the floor of Congress, putting out the same thing that the career men had stated so often in China, and I felt it was just futile for me to try to uphold the American policy while I had such great odds against me in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question or two, please.

When you made this statement to Secretary Byrnes that you would go back to China, at that time you knew all about these two career men that you have mentioned as being instrumental in undermining you?

General HURLEY. I had told the Secretary about them.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that? Regardless of what you told the Secretary, you knew all about that?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that they had been brought back here and put in supervisory positions?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What positions were they put in? What were the names of the positions?

General HURLEY. One of them, I believe, was Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern division, and the other Assistant Chief of the Chinese division.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, however, at that time, that they had

been removed and taken away from Chungking, and sent to Japan? Did you know that or not?

General HURLEY. Certainly I knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That answers the question.

Now, what I am trying to get at is, since you told the Secretary that you would go back to China, you changed your mind, and your mind was changed, as I understand it, by a speech in the House of Representatives, very largely. Is that true?

General HURLEY. Not exactly, but in substance it is true.

The CHAIRMAN. So that this speech that somebody made—I do not know who it was—in the House of Representatives, after that speech was made, you made up your mind that you were going to resign?

General HURLEY. Yes.

NO NOTICE OF RESIGNATION TO PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF STATE

The CHAIRMAN. So you gave out, without further consultation with the Secretary of State, the printed statement that is carried in the "New York Times" dated November 27, and appearing in the "Times" of November 28, which I hold here in my hand. Is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I make no subterfuge of defending myself when I am unjustly attacked where I had been told that I would be protected.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, you had been working with Secretary Byrnes and Secretary Stettinius and Secretary Hull. You approved of their policies and those of all the Presidents under whom you served. Did you not think that it was the proper thing, before you actually handed out this public statement of resignation, to advise Mr. Byrnes that you were going to do that?

General HURLEY. I did try to communicate with him, but I could not contact him.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not find him? Was he out of town?

General HURLEY. I do not think he was.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were not able to see him, and did not see him?

General HURLEY. Do not make me guilty of any subterfuge. I decided to fight when I found that the State Department was still trying to destroy me, and I decided I would not be destroyed. I was going to fight, and I did fight.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind your fighting, but I am still trying to find out whether or not you intended and had a purpose to advise Secretary Byrnes.

General HURLEY. Oh yes, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not?

General HURLEY. And I had a purpose to advise the President, but I did not have any time to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. So then you could not. You intended to do it, but you did not have time to do it, is that right?

General HURLEY. No. The attack was on; the same attack that has been going on on me by the career men all through the thing was opened up anew, and I decided I did not have anyone to defend me except myself, and that I would undertake to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you a very simple question.

General HURLEY. And I have answered you very simply, sir, and will answer again.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you had intended to speak to the President and the Secretary of State before you handed out this statement, and you said you did not have time to do it. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. As a matter of fact, I told you in the beginning that I would be guilty of no subterfuges. I had filed my resignation the day before, and I had stated why I was resigning, and then the Secretary asked me not to do it and to help out, and I agreed to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You agreed to do it?

General HURLEY. But I sat at the corner of the Secretary's desk and I told him the kind of statement that I would like to have, outlined it for him, not dissimilar to what is in the paper this morning but the statement did not come and I was laid open to the same attacks, and I had taken them during the war. I had felt that I owed it to the service. But now that the war is over I did not feel that I should be subjected to the attack that was being made on me.

The CHAIRMAN. Be that as it may, you did not tell the Secretary and you did not tell the President. That is correct, is it not?

General HURLEY. You are correct.

OPPOSITION FROM GROUPS SIDING WITH IMPERALIST BLOC AND COMMUNIST PARTY

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General Hurley, in the statement that you handed out you referred to two groups, and I am trying to identify them. You say that some career men sided with the imperialistic bloc of nations. What group is that, the imperialistic bloc? You refer to the Communist armed party and then you refer to the imperialistic bloc of nations.

General HURLEY. The imperialistic bloc of nations, of course, is Britain, France, The Netherlands, and before the war they included Germany and Japan. There are some smaller ones, like Belgium and Portugal.

Now, what I contend there, sir, is rather a more embracing term than the Senator has found in it. I meant that they had sided with the imperialistic bloc in America lend-lease to subjugate people to whom we have promised, under the Atlantic Charter, that they might choose the form of government under which they would live, and I referred to all those who supported giving lend-lease, American supplies, for the purpose of subjugating people.

The CHAIRMAN. Did all of these career men that you have mentioned side with the imperialistic bloc?

General HURLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Which ones did?

General HURLEY. I know that John Davies, who is now in Moscow, was anti-imperialistic.

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-imperialist?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was one of those that you named as sabotaging your program.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was a nonimperialist?

General HURLEY. He was nonimperialist.

Now, during the time that I was negotiating with the Communists, a Colonel Ride of the British Army made a report of a conversation he had with Colonel Li, of the Chinese Army, in which he outlined the objections to my attempt to unify China.

The CHAIRMAN. That was Colonel who?

General HURLEY. Ride.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you himself, or was it transmitted through a third party?

General HURLEY. Mr. Arthur Ringwald, of the American Embassy in China, procured the Ride report, I think, from the British Embassy, and transmitted it to Washington, showing Britain's opposition to my activities in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the report?

General HURLEY. You bet you. I have read it, and I read it very carefully. It it a very able report, and if the State Department career men believed it, they would support imperialism and not democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. These two groups, the imperialist bloc on the one hand and the Communist armed forces on the other, were the two groups you had in mind?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. Understand, Senator, there are a lot more data. I have just given you a skeleton, but I assure you, sir, that I can prove the case that I have so clumsily made out here this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that these diplomats were interfering with your policies out there, and you referred to this letter of Acheson. As I recall, that is all the documentary proof that you have offered on that.

General HURLEY. No. You do not recall, sir, that I referred to Report No. 40, of John S. Service, dated October 10, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will try to get that.

General HURLEY. And then I referred also to the cease and desist telegram, telling me not to mediate and not to advise, when I had been directed to do both of those things by the higher echelon.

LEAKS TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you say that the professional diplomats continually advised the Communists that your efforts in preventing collapse of the national government did not represent the policy of the United States. Do you mean that they went directly to the Communists and made these representations from time to time?

General HURLEY. I mean they did more than that, Senator. I mean that when the program was prepared for President Roosevelt to go to Yalta that there is a paper dated January 29 on American policy in Asia, and one paragraph of that paper—it is listed among those I wish—provided, if the military, in landing on the coast of China, found the Communists instead of the national army, they would have the right to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the American landing force. With that I was in agreement. But imagine my consternation when I saw a general movement of Communist troops

from a territory just described by Senator Austin, all moving toward a certain port in China. Then I read that some naval officer had been arrested here, and the Communists not only knew the naval port but they knew the most secret plan of the United States, and I picked that up, not from our career men, but from the Communist armed party in China, and I have asked for that record in what I have submitted to you.

The CHAIRMAN. You say this was a statement or report made up for the use of the President at Yalta. Is that what you said?

General HURLEY. That is what I think it was. It was sent to the military.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made it?

General HURLEY. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether Atcheson wrote it or Service wrote it?

General HURLEY. I know that Atcheson did not, because he was not here at that time. But understand, Senator, please do not get me wrong on it. I have never contended that in a landing you would not use all forces available to you. I believe that that was essential. I am not quarreling with that as a policy. I am quarreling with the fact that it became known to the Communists and started a big movement from their territory in the north and northwest to the seacoast.

The CHAIRMAN. You approved the policy that was outlined in the paper, but you did not like the leak, is that it?

General HURLEY. I do not like to be leaked on.

The CHAIRMAN. Who leaked? Do you know who it was that gave the leak?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I know only that it did leak.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot base any charge, because you do not know who it was who gave it out?

General HURLEY. That is right, but I would like the Senators to read it as I have, and it might have some weight in making up your minds about this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. You approved it, you say. You approved the substance of it. You said you approved the policy in it.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

REPORTS TO AND SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Before you issued that last statement to the press stating that you were not going to go back, you had seen the President, had you?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You had seen the Secretary of State?

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You had explained to them the condition that existed in the State Department?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. And they agreed with you that it was not right, did they?

General HURLEY. As a matter of fact, I do not want to quote, but

I will tell you what I understood, that I might fire, continue to fire, anyone in China who did not agree to the American policy, and I countered that that was not sufficient. "If I fire them they come down here and become my bosses, or are sent over as supreme policymakers in Asia, and I make them stronger by firing them." I said that we ought to have an unequivocable public statement of the policy, so that I would not have to carry both loads.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. When you had that understanding, you understood and believed that these attacks upon you, and the leakage out of the Department of State, would cease, did you?

General HURLEY. That is what I believed I had understood, and then I came up against the fact that it had not stopped.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That came to you as a result of a speech made in the House of Representatives that indicated to you that information had been given to that Congressman from the State Department?

General HURLEY. And an immediate result of a letter that had gone to the State Department, and a proper answer had been prepared, and all the proper answer stricken out and just an acknowledgement, leaving all the charges that I had inaugurated and made my own policy in China.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, you made an answer to Senator Shipstead to the effect that you were told that you could fire anybody in the Embassy who interfered with your policy. You were told that by the President, or by Secretary Byrnes. Now, my question is, did Secretary Byrnes, or did President Truman, indicate to you that they would fire any of the top policy people in the State Department who had been sabotaging your efforts and undermining the policies of the United States?

General HURLEY. No, sir; they did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask them that?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I did not.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONS IN CHARGE OF U.S. CHINA POLICY

Senator BRIDGES. Another question, if you will. In answer to Senator Vandenberg here, I understood you to sort of give a clear bill of health to the top people in the State Department, and I understood Senator Vandenberg to rather question that. Now, if these men are undermining the policies of the U.S. Government and are and have been sabotaging your efforts, is it not somebody up at the top there, somebody who has the power to fire, the power to take action, where the final blame lies?

General HURLEY. Senator, that asks me for an expression of opinion, and I would rather not take a position in connection with that, because I feel that we should let the President and the Secretary of State judge what their responsibility is in these matters.

Senator BRIDGES. May I ask you this, then. You said, in answer to a question here, I think also by Senator Vandenberg or by Senator La Follette, that you did not care to injure any of these career men who were sabotaging U.S. policies. May I ask you if you do not think it is

your duty, if there are men in the State Department, either in China or here, who are sabotaging the policies of the U.S. Government or undermining the position of this country, either here or abroad, to do anything in your power to oust them from their office, prefer charges, or to take whatever action may be within your means?

General HURLEY. In answer to that question, Senator, today I am a private citizen. This Government has a Department of Justice, an FBI, a Military Intelligence Service, and I am told that all of these records are already in the hands of the Government. I do not think that I should be asked, as a private citizen, to conduct the prosecution of anyone. I think that is an official responsibility. I have put these facts before the Government, and I have a rather clear conception of my responsibility. Now, understand, I am not backing away from any fight, but I am not going to become a prosecutor.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, General, if the top people of the State Department were really behind you, as they told you privately and refrained from stating publicly, and they knew that representatives of the State Department had been sabotaging your efforts, had been undermining the policies of this country, would it not be natural to expect them to take action in removing from office or some action of discipline of a very stern nature?

General HURLEY. That, again, asks me to express an opinion rather than a fact.

Senator BRIDGES. All right.

General, let me ask you this, then: So far as you were aware, was any action of discipline, other than their removal from the scene in China, ever taken against any of these career men by anybody at the top in the State Department?

General HURLEY. Yes. I read that several of them had been arrested for giving away, selling, or conveying, top secret information to people who were supposed to be opposed to the United States, and I do not know what was done in that case, but I know that some of the gentlemen I have had to deal with were named. I am not familiar, as I say, with that. I do not know what the facts are in connection with it. All I know is what I read in the papers, and I did not make the charges on which they were arrested.

BEGINNING OF FIRST SUSPICIONS

Senator BRIDGES. One other question, General. What was the first date that your suspicions were aroused, or anything came to your notice whereby agents of the U.S. Government, either in the Embassy in China or in the State Department here in Washington, were undermining the policies of our country or sabotaging your efforts?

General HURLEY. The first that came to my attention was the report of Mr. John Service dated October 10, 1944, and numbered 40. That was the first outward evidence I had of a plan not to uphold but to cause the collapse of the Government of the Republic of China.

Senator BRIDGES. And did these reports, or this action by these various representatives of the State Department, interfere seriously with what you were attempting to do in upholding the Chinese Republic and bringing about better relations between the Chinese Republic and the Chinese Communists?

General HURLEY. They certainly did.

Senator BRIDGES. And that, in turn, was a blow against this country, was it not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Hurley, would you say that General Stilwell had aided in sabotaging your program and policies out in China?

General HURLEY. No, sir: I did not. My policy was not well underway, as I tried to tell you in the beginning. Stilwell's controversy was with Chiang Kai-shek, not with me, and the President said at the time it was basic incompatability between two men, and I would rather not try to drag him in on this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not dragging him in. If there is any dragging being done, I am doing it. I do not want to involve you in any unpleasant controversy.

General HURLEY. Do not save me from any unpleasant controversy. I have had a lot of them for 4 years, and I do not run from unpleasantness.

STILWELL'S ADVOCACY OF UNIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. General Stilwell did advocate, however, the unification of the Communists with the Central Government in fighting, making a united front against the Japanese?

General HURLEY. He had been advocating that for 2½ years and, so far as I know, had not gone to the Communists as I had done. I think that he advocated everything that I advocated in that connection. I do not know whether he ever advocated giving the Communists lease-lend supplies or not, but I think he was in favor of unification of the forces. I certainly was, and we had no controversy on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bridges asked you a question about whether, when you talked to the Secretary of State and the President, they told you you would have their full support. That was the day before you resigned?

General HURLEY. No, sir. The day the President told me that was before I went away for the rest. I do not want to confuse their conversations.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of State, though, told you that if you did go back to China you would have the wholehearted support of the President and the Secretary of State, did he not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that assurance not carry with it the implication that you are out there to represent the American policy, and that they would uphold your hands?

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF POLICY

General HURLEY. It certainly did, but I had had it for more than a year before and I had never had a public statement of policy.

The CHAIRMAN. You keep talking about a public statement. You want something in the paper?

General HURLEY. Senator, I resent that. That is not true! I want my Government to say what its policy is in China, and not be pussyfooting and running away from the truth, and holding me out and let-

ting me get beaten up about it, and will not tell what its policy is. No; don't tell me——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General.

This is not a town meeting, although it seems to have been converted into one by the enthusiastic applause of a great many people who are here, evidently trying to influence the committee.

I want to say that we do not expect any more applause or any more demonstrations. If there are any, the policemen will be instructed to remove from the chamber those who participate. I shall not invoke that harsh rule at the present moment, because I do not suppose the people who are here, and who seem to be well organized, intended any affront to the committee, but if it is repeated we will have to indulge in that.

Now, General, in reply to your outburst at the chairman and your specific exposition of your views, to which I take no umbrage, you have repeatedly stated that you wanted a public statement made by the State Department?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That it was supporting you?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask Secretary Byrnes, the day you told him you would go back to China, to make such a statement?

General HURLEY. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he agree to do it?

General HURLEY. I do not believe he categorically agreed to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, either categorically or "paragorically" or any other way, did he agree to do it? He did not agree to do it?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not agree to do it, and notwithstanding that, you said you would go back to China, did you not?

General HURLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you said it, a while ago, did you not?

General HURLEY. Well, I know, Senator; but look—I want to state the facts. I do not want to be led into some kind of little trap to show that I am guilty of subterfuge. I have been dealing with men for some time, and I did ask Secretary Byrnes for such a statement, and Secretary Byrnes did not say that he would not give it, but you asked me if he said he would give it, and I do not recall that he said he would; but I assumed that before I would go, because we were going to confer again, that he would give it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, but you did not confer again, did you?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

AGREEMENT TO GO BACK TO CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. No. You do not say that he made any such promise to you. And after that, after your asking him that, and he did not say that he would or would not, so you say, you told him that you would go back to China, did you not?

General HURLEY. No, sir; it was before that.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

General HURLEY. It was before that, that I told him, and I outlined for him——

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the same conversation?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a different date?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it was all in the same conversation, was it not?

General HURLEY. Senator, what are you trying to prove?

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to prove anything.

General HURLEY. That I did not tell the Secretary the truth?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no, no.

General HURLEY. Well, it can have no other purpose. I told him the truth, and our relations were on the highest, fairest, most kindly basis.

The CHAIRMAN. All I am trying to get at, General, are the facts. You were there; I was not, and I ask you these questions. Now, if you do not want to answer them, why——

General HURLEY. Why, of course! I will answer anything you ask, Senator!

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all right. I asked you if, in that same conversation in which you asked him to make a public statement, you did not say you would go back to China.

General HURLEY. The commitment was not that definite.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was it? You would go back, maybe?

General HURLEY. No, sir; it was not to go back, maybe.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was the commitment? Tell us what it was.

General HURLEY. Do you want me to do it, or would you like Secretary Byrnes to do it?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Secretary can do it if he likes, in his own time, but I read your statement, here. No, Byrnes' statement, it was, I believe, that said that you told them in that conversation that you would go back to China.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you testify today that you said you would go back to China?

General HURLEY. Are you trying to make me take that back?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I want you to affirm it.

General HURLEY. Yes; I said yes, that that was true.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. That I had told him that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all I want to know. I just want to be sure about that.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we can conclude with the general today. He wants to put something in the record, so what do you think about adjourning until tomorrow?

Senator AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, it may be that some members of the committee would like to interrogate the Ambassador——

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am talking about.

Senator AUSTIN (continuing). With respect to those documents.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator AUSTIN. Now, I suggest that we take such an adjournment that the committee will have a fair chance to see those documents and make up their minds whether they would like to ask further questions of the Ambassador related to those documents.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fair enough. I do not object to that, and if it is agreeable to the committee we will adjourn until tomorrow at 10:30 in this chamber; and all those people that are so anxious to applaud can either not come, or stay out in the hall, or not applaud; they can just take their choice.

All right, we will stand recessed. Will you be back, General, tomorrow?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee recessed until 10:30 a.m., Thursday, December 6, 1945.)

INVESTIGATION OF FAR EASTERN POLICY

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1945

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 335, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Thomas of Utah, Green, Guffey, Tunnell, Hill, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Austin, Bridges, and Wiley.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order please.

Senator Capper do you care to ask any questions?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Austin?

Senator AUSTIN. Not at this moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tunnell?

Senator TUNNELL. I have no questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. General Hurley, you made some reference yesterday to the statement of Secretary Byrnes, carried in the press. That statement meets with your approval, does it not?

STATEMENT BY GEN. PATRICK J. HURLEY—Resumed

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY AFTER ATCHESON LETTER

The CHAIRMAN. After the letter of Mr. Atcheson, I believe it was, was there any change by the Secretary in his policy in China?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I was in Washington when the Atcheson letter came in, and they held a hearing in the Far Eastern Division on Atcheson's letter, and I appeared in that hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no change, though, in the policy of the State Department as a result of that letter, was there?

General HURLEY. The State Department continued, in the higher echelon (that is, Mr. Stettinius), to support the policy that I was up-

holding in China, but there was no public official statement of that policy.

The CHAIRMAN. I know about that. But there was no change in the State Department's policy after that letter. It went on just as it had been going, and was in entire agreement with your conduct, was it not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. It went on just the same, but the rear men continued to try to destroy the American policy in China. There was no stoppage to what they were doing.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But I am asking you now, was there any stoppage? Were their actions successful? You say there was no change in the policy. It went on just the same after Atcheson's letter as before. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. Not exactly the same. I received a cablegram from the State Department dated May 15, setting out the military and political objectives in China that were contrary to the instructions I had received. I also had received a cable from the State Department telling me not to become a mediator or an adviser in the Chinese situation.

The CHAIRMAN. This cable, the first cable you mentioned, you say changed from what your instructions had been. In what respect did it change?

General HURLEY. President Roosevelt——

The CHAIRMAN. This was in May 1945.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I know when it was, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to be courteous to you, General. I do not care to be stormed at any more than you do.

QUESTION OF DOCUMENTS

General HURLEY. I am not storming at anybody. I have asked for a document written by Mr. Atcheson and it has not been given me, and that is the best evidence. You can examine me on that document if you wish, but I would like to see the document or I would like to have it said that it is contrary to public policy to make it public.

The CHAIRMAN. You have testified about it. Is that the one you are testifying about?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say to you, General, that we are trying to get all the documents that the State Department thinks can be properly used here. We had men working on them last night until midnight, and during the day they will afford them to us, but we cannot present them this morning because we do not have them.

General HURLEY. Then may I ask the Senator, just as one American to another, does he think it is proper to examine me on these documents when they are the best evidence, without the documents being before him? Is that fair to a servant of this Nation who has done the work that I have endeavored to do for it? Am I on trial?

The CHAIRMAN. If you are on trial, you put yourself on trial. I am not putting you on trial. I am asking you; I did not know there was such a document. I asked you if there had been any change in the policy, and then you referred to this document.

General HURLEY. And I gave you the documents that you can ask for, and you have not brought them.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to bring them.

General HURLEY. Then, Senator, let us wait until we get them. I am not obstreperous.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I did not bring up the documents. You yourself referred to it this morning for the first time, and then I asked you about it.

General HURLEY. I did not ask for this hearing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will just pass on to the next point.

General HURLEY. I did not ask for this hearing, sir, but I have asked for the documents that will prove the assertions I have made. I think it is not fair to me to continue to examine me on documents that I have asked for and I have told you what they contain.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General. I thought I was examining you and not the documents. I thought I was asking you for your views about the matter. I was asking you if there had been any change in policy. You were out there, and you ought to know.

General HURLEY. I do know, and I have told you. The documents show it.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no change in the policy, so far as you know, from the higher echelon, if I may use that word?

General HURLEY. Senator, I have testified on that quite fully. If you want to examine me on that again, I will be glad to go over it.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. You have not testified fully, though, because you just mentioned it this morning.

General HURLEY. If you will put the documents in, sir, I will testify on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can read a document. I want to find out what your views are. I want to know if you regard that there was any change in the policy after this George Atcheson letter.

General HURLEY. There was this change in the policy, that the State Department again assured me verbally that it was upholding my conduct in preventing the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China. There was no change in the attitude of the career men who were attempting to bring about a collapse of that government.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

GENERAL HURLEY'S EXPERIENCES AT OTHER POSTS

You served during the war in Java, did you not, at one time?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you interfered with there by the career men in any way?

General HURLEY. That is where the fighting was, Senator. If there were any career men there except naval and Army officers, I did not see them.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not interfered with in Java in your work by anybody, were you?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I was upheld splendidly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine.

General HURLEY. And when I finished I received public commenda-

tion. I know it is wrong to speak about that, but so far as being in Java is concerned, I had the complete support of the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, and the Army officers who were in command.

The CHAIRMAN. You also served in Australia, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes; I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not have the thorough support of the State Department throughout your service in Australia?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody vetoed or overrode your policies there, did they, in Australia?

General HURLEY. I would like to put it like this: Nobody vetoed or tried to sabotage the policies of the American Government there.

The CHAIRMAN. You were carrying those policies out, were you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir, but I was not in a diplomatic position there. I was in the U.S. Army.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That did not stop any military action.

You served in New Zealand, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did anybody from the State Department or otherwise interfere with your duties in New Zealand?

General HURLEY. No. My only trouble there was that I could not get across to the State Department the idea that Wellington was the capital of New Zealand, and they kept sending everything to Canberra. It took 5 months to change my address in New Zealand.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever able to convince the State Department that Wellington was the capital of New Zealand?

General HURLEY. Eventually I sent a nice long telegram to that great American statesman, Cordell Hull, and told him I was sorry to have to say that I had been unable to prevail on the State Department to change my address to Wellington, and suggested in several telegrams to look at the map, that Wellington, not Canberra, is the capital of New Zealand.

EXPERIENCE IN MIDDLE EAST

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is fine.

You also served in Egypt, I believe, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the State Department interfere with you in any way in Egypt?

General HURLEY. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think not? Well, you served in Palestine, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the State Department interfere with you there?

General HURLEY. On the contrary, sir, I got the complete cooperation of Mr. Pinkerton, who is the consul or minister in Palestine.

The CHAIRMAN. And you served in Lebanon?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I served in Lebanon and I had the unqualified support and cooperation of George Wadsworth, who represented the State Department there.

The CHAIRMAN. You served in Syria?

General HURLEY. Well, Syria and Lebanon, yes. Yes, I served in both of those places. That is up on the Turkish border, and I was still in the Army then, and both of those places were under one State Department administration, and George Wadsworth was in charge.

The CHAIRMAN. You received cooperation? They did not interfere with you there at all?

General HURLEY. That is a fact. I not only received cooperation but active support from Wadsworth.

The CHAIRMAN. And you served in Trans-Jordan?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I served in Trans-Jordan.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the State Department interfere with you there in any way?

General HURLEY. I do not think the State Department was in Trans-Jordan. I think that is attached to Pinkerton's district of Palestine. I did not see any State Department officials in Trans-Jordan.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they did not interfere with you there?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You also served in Iraq, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I served in Iraq. First there was a minister named Wilson, who was there and who was cooperative, and finally Loy Henderson became Ambassador there, and I had his full support and cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. The State Department did not interfere with you there? You were also in Saudi Arabia, were you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I was in Saudi Arabia.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the State Department interfere with you there in any way?

General HURLEY. No, the State Department did not interfere with me, but there were garbled or distorted leaks about my report from Saudi Arabia, and I would not be able to determine just where those things came from.

The CHAIRMAN. But they did not interfere with you while you were there?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN POLICY IN IRAN

The CHAIRMAN. You were also in Iran?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I was in Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they interfere with you there?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; most decidedly and effectively. They interfered and destroyed the American policy in Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that did that?

General HURLEY. Well, you know that is a long way from home, but I think possibly that is a record you can have, sir, if you wish it. That does not fracture any code, but if you wish to examine me on that I can show you that the American policy was absolutely defeated in Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is, who was it that did that?

General HURLEY. Well, I believe it was in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Here or out there?

General HURLEY. Here. I think that Minister Dreyfus, who was out

there, was endeavoring to cooperate, and I also believe that there is a young man named Jernegan in the State Department there who assisted me in the preparation under the direction of President Roosevelt of the so-called Iran declaration, and he was very helpful, a man of fine mind and character.

The CHAIRMAN. The State Department people, then, who were in Iran did cooperate with you?

General HURLEY. There were quite a number of people in Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. You have an idea somebody in the State Department did?

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

General HURLEY. I do not have an idea, Senator; I know. And I told you that if you want the documents, I will give them to you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will get the documents, but a moment ago you said you believed. I asked you who it was, and you said you did not know, but you believed so and so.

General HURLEY. All right, Senator, then I am wrong. You are right and I am wrong. Go ahead. Now, what do you want me to testify to? Do you want me to testify, or would you like to testify for me.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you would do well if you had somebody to testify for you.

General HURLEY. I think possibly that is right. I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to be courteous to you, and we are going to demand that you be courteous to us.

General HURLEY. I am being courteous, and I am asking you for documents that you are continuing to ask me to testify about without bringing the best evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking for any documents at all. You say you have an idea that somebody in the State Department interfered with your policy in Iran. I want to know who it was.

General HURLEY. All right: Dean Acheson.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want you to tell. I am glad to get that. Make a note of that, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Dean Acheson—what did he do?

General HURLEY. Now, Senator, I would prefer to submit the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you are testifying here. I have not seen the document. We will see it, probably, but a document, after all, is only evidence of a fact. It is a repetition of a fact. If you know, your word is just as good as the document. If you know, your testimony is just as good as the document, probably better. Do you know what he did?

General HURLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not tell us, then?

General HURLEY. All right. Give me the Iran papers.

Senator, I do not want to do this, but I cannot resist it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you do not need to do it.

General HURLEY. I will do it, and I am not bluffing. I can show you, but I think you do not want that in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think any such thing. I offered to put it in or not, as you saw fit.

General HURLEY. All right; in she goes my friend. Square yourself, because here it comes.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, General. This is a committee here trying to conduct this. I mentioned that, and wanted to know what Mr. Acheson did. You said you did not want to put it in the record. I tried to be courteous, and said "All right: don't." Then you said, "I will put it in." Now go ahead and do as you like. Put it in or leave it out.

General HURLEY. Senator, have you not insisted that I put this in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I have not.

General HURLEY. You have not?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I said you need not put it in if you do not want to. You said you did not want to do it. I said, "All right, leave it out." Then you said, "I'll put it in."

The audience will please be quiet. If there are any outbursts of approval or disapproval, either one, the policemen will put those demonstrating out of the chamber.

IRAN DECLARATION

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, the incident to which you have referred leaked from the State Department to the press in a garbled form beginning on May 20, 1944. The position which the Senator has put me in makes it essential that I show now what really transpired.

I prepared, at the direction of President Roosevelt, what is known as the Declaration of the Three Powers in regard to Iran. This is a photostatic copy of the Iran Declaration. I might say that nearly all of the elements of this declaration were submitted originally to the Moscow Conference, under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. When it came to me, I conferred with Anthony Eden, Minister of Foreign Relations for Great Britain, and he had worked also on the Declaration, and he and I agreed on a form that had been prepared by me with the assistance of Mr. Jernegan, of the Foreign Service in Iran.

Now I will put in the Declaration, which is public, and any time the Senators would like to stop me I will stop on the balance of it. I might say to Senator Connally and to the gentlemen of the committee that no one has greater respect for this body, this committee, or the Senate, than I have. My only idea is to show that I have not asked for this hearing. It was not at my solicitation, but I decline to come here as a public servant and go on trial. If I am put on the defensive, I feel that I have the capacity to defend myself. My only purpose now is to give the untarnished facts to the American people. Almost everyone else has them.

BACKGROUND OF HEARING

The CHAIRMAN. General, may I interrupt you there a moment? This hearing is being held by the Committee on Foreign Relations on a resolution introduced in the Senate by Senator Wherry of Nebraska, the Republican Whip, to have a very thorough special committee to investigate, so this hearing is being held by this committee to determine

whether we will approve such a resolution or will not, and there is no disposition to try you. I invited you here, and you came, and I do not see that there is any offense on either side about that.

General HURLEY. Well, Senator, your words make me happy. I felt, and I say publicly, that your attitude has appeared to me to be hostile and rather humorous concerning the services I have rendered, and if that is not your attitude I am sorry that I have been mistaken about it, and I would like to put the hearing on a very different basis from the one we have been on so far.

I am not trying to injure this administration. I would like to say to you frankly and without equivocation, I think possibly before I get through with this that I will be on the side of President Truman. I approve of the outline of foreign policy he has made, and it is my purpose to assist him in making it effective, and I want to assure you that my attitude is not partisan.

Now, in regard to Senator Wherry, I have no doubt but what he is an excellent man, but I have never had the pleasure of making his acquaintance. I have not organized anything. The Senator made reference to what seemed to be organized applause yesterday. There is not one person——

The CHAIRMAN. I did not connect you with it. I did not say anything about you when I said it.

General HURLEY. So I will not be connected with anyone who was involved, there is not one person in this room at my invitation except my Secretary, and I have not organized, but I am endeavoring to meet this committee on an intelligent basis of a high standard of integrity which I think our Nation should demand of every one of our citizens.

Those of us who have been out on the perimeter of America's influence, whether as soldiers or others during this war, approached our tasks not as Republicans or as Democrats, but as Americans, as I would like to approach this hearing in that same spirit.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, I congratulate you on your service, and in nowise reflected on it. I congratulate you on your service in so many different countries and so many different fields.

APPROVAL OF POLICY OF PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE

Now, you say you thoroughly approve the foreign policy of President Truman, is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You approved the policy of President Roosevelt preceding him, did you not?

General HURLEY. I approved the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration. There were some policies that I have reason to believe were not Mr. Roosevelt's that this Government pursued at that time that I disapproved vigorously, and if you get this record you will find it spelled out in rather definite language.

The CHAIRMAN. You said in your statement the other day that you had had the support of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and Secretary Stettinius and President Truman and Secretary Byrnes, did you not?

General HURLEY. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, as to those policies, your policies, theirs, or our country's policies, you do approve of Roosevelt's policies with regard to those matters, do you not?

General HURLEY. Those matters, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Affecting your activity in China?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. So, the way the record stands now, you approved the policies of President Roosevelt with regard to China, you approved the policies of Secretary Hull with regard to China, you approved the policies of President Truman with regard to China, and you approved the policies of Secretary of State Byrnes with regard to China. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they all gave you loyal support and backing in those matters, is that right?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. I might ask him one question along the line, Mr. Chairman, that you were asking.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, the chairman has asked you whether or not you approve the policies of Mr. Hull, Mr. Byrnes, and Mr. Truman and Mr. Roosevelt, and I think that you answered in the affirmative. Now I understood from your testimony yesterday that while you approved the general policies, there was one particular policy which they followed which you did not approve, which I think is the meat of this whole issue, and that is, their failure to issue a public statement setting forth American foreign policy in China. Is that right?

General HURLEY. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. I have a lot more questions when the time comes.

IRAN DECLARATION

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. If you want to read the Iran Declaration, you can read it at this time or you can put it in the record, just as you like.

General HURLEY. I think possibly I had better read it, Senator, because we do not have a copy to give to the press.

This is dated December 1, 1943. The title is:

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom and the United States recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties in Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran and such economic assistance as may be possible having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw material and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Government of the United States,

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom, are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences by international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Government of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independent sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

This instrument is signed—here is a photostatic copy—in the handwriting of Winston S. Churchill, J. V. Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Now, the observation I would make there is that there has been a lot of conversation and press and radio talk to the effect that the Atlantic Charter was never a document signed by the three nations. I, of course, am not a party to the original issuance of the document and could not testify on that, but here are the signatures of the three nations to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The CHAIRMAN. You made the original draft of that instrument?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. It was corrected, as I say, by Anthony Eden, and some by Commissar Molotov, and the handwriting, I believe, on the final correction is that of Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

The CHAIRMAN. These changes and amendments made after you prepared it were not of substantial character, were they?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I believe they were very helpful to the clarification of the instrument, and I certainly had no pride of authorship. We were trying to arrive at an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. This was signed at the conference at Teheran?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; it was signed at the conference of Teheran.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there in a diplomatic capacity or in a military capacity?

BACKGROUND OF PARTICIPATION IN IRAN DECLARATION

General HURLEY. Well, sir, Senator, the President had wired me through the State Department that he wished to promote me to the rank of major general and give me the rank of Ambassador to appear at that conference, but I was in New Delhi at the time, and when the message arrived from the State Department the New Delhi office of the State Department was unable to decode it, and they did not mention the fact to me, and I went on to China and I received no message from the President there on the subject, and while there I received a message from the Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, telling me that the President was trying to locate me through the State Department, and that he wished to know my whereabouts, and the President wished me to report back to Cairo immediately.

Within the hour I answered that telegram and got a plane and returned and went to Delhi again and inquired again whether a message was there for me, and they said there had been something in, but the

establishment could not decode it. With a million dollars' expenses a year they could not even decode a telegram!

I finally got into Cairo, Egypt, 17 days after the directive from the State Department and I was not able to get any message about what it was all about until I arrived in Cairo. Then I found this, that, unable to locate me, Mr. Dreyfus, the Minister in Iran, who had been called home, was returned to Iran, and when I arrived at Cairo I wired the State Department and told them I had no credentials. The President had arrived then, and I described the situation. He asked me to go at once to Iran, and when I arrived in Iran I found that while the State Department had asked Iran if it had any objections to my appearance as Ambassador, and the Iranian Government had replied that they welcomed me and would receive my credentials, I had not received any credentials. About 8 months later a nunc pro tunc letter was written saying that I had been appointed, but so far as the Teheran Conference was concerned Mr. Dreyfus was the minister, and not I. Therefore I did not get the place that the President endeavored to place me in—not that I felt any personal chagrin about it, because I was working and I just wanted the committee to understand that in that whole situation through which we passed we were never able to get the credentials from the State Department, and the letter saying that I had been appointed Ambassador was written in the State Department some 8 months later, when I complained of this situation to Secretary Stettinius.

The CHAIRMAN. You were present at the Teheran Conference?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. And you aided in and drew up this document?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you did become a major general and you did become Ambassador, did you not?

General HURLEY. Later. I became Ambassador a long time later, in China.

The CHAIRMAN. What I mean is, you went ahead with your work in Teheran irrespective of the formal commission and all that sort of thing. You participated in the work and drew this document.

General HURLEY. I certainly did, for President Roosevelt, but not in the official capacity that he had attempted to give me.

The CHAIRMAN. The three Premiers had to sign it after it was completed, and of course the final responsibility was with them, and if you satisfied President Roosevelt you rendered a very fine service, I would say.

General HURLEY. Well, I did satisfy President Roosevelt and I believe, sir, that I had the President's complete confidence.

INDICTMENT AND CLEARANCE OF JOHN SERVICE

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, yesterday I asked you this question: "Was he the same Mr. Service who was subsequently involved here in a scandal with the State Department and who was either arrested or charged with very serious offenses, to your knowledge?"

You answered, "Well, of course, I read in the papers about that, but I would not like to testify to anything that is hearsay. You gentle-

men know that as well as I do. You were here, I was not. All I know is what I read in the papers about it."

Now, so that there will be no question about this, I first, Mr. Chairman, would like to follow this up by asking for insertion in the record an article from the June 7 issue, 1945, of the New York Times, under the headline "FBI Seizes Six as Spies, Two in State Department" subheaded, "Secrets Stolen." Then I skip down here, and I find "Six persons, including a Naval Reserve lieutenant, two employes of the Department of State and the coeditors of the New York magazine Amerasia, have been arrested on espionage charges by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Justice Department announced tonight. The arrests were in connection with the theft of 'highly confidential documents.' "

Then there is a list of the persons arrested, and among that number it says, "John Stewart Service, Foreign Service officer of the Department of State, who, until recently, was stationed in China."

I have sent for and have copies of the official bulletin of the Department of State, and in the June 10 issue, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew made the following statement, and I quote:

> Officers of the Department of State have for some time been giving special attention to the security of secret and confidential information. A few months ago it became apparent that information of a secret character was reaching unauthorized persons not only from the Department of State but from the Department of the Navy as well. After consultation with the Department of the Navy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was requested to conduct a thorough investigation of the matter. For the past two and a half months the three departments have been working together to determine how this official secret data was obtained by unauthorized persons.
>
> The investigation has resulted in the arrest by Special Agents of the FBI of six persons who are to be taken before United States Commissioners in Washington and New York on charges of conspiring to violate Section 31, Title 50, U.S.C.A., which covers the unauthorized possession or transmittal of national-defense data. Particulars concerning these persons will be released to the press by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Two of those arrested are Emanual S. Larsen, an employee of the Department of State, and John S. Service, a Foreign Service officer.
>
> The matter is now in the hands of the Department of Justice for prosecution.

Now, Mr. Chairman, to follow this rather weird story through, I secured a copy of the Department of State bulletin on August 26, 1945, and here I was amazed to read a letter written by the current Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, on August 14, 1945, to Mr. Service, of apology, after going through this process, and I read:

> My Dear Mr. Service: I am advised that the Grand Jury, after hearing the testimony of witnesses, has found nothing to warrant an indictment against you.
>
> One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is the investigation by a Grand Jury of criminal charges. By that process you have been cleared.
>
> I am advised that at the time of your arrest you were placed on leave of absence with pay. I am happy to approve the recommendation of the personnel board that you be returned to active duty. You have now been reassigned to duty in the Department for important work in connection with Far Eastern Affairs.
>
> I congratulate you on this happy termination of your ordeal and predict for you a continuance of the splendid record I am advised you have maintained since first you entered the Foreign Service.
>
> With all good wishes,
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> James F. Byrnes.

Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as this is actually a hearing on the Wherry resolution as to whether we hold an investigation of the State Department, I contend, and I bring it up now because of the question I asked General Hurley yesterday and his answer, and the question of doubt expressed here, if that is not the most weird series of episodes in connection with John S. Service, and if that in itself, combined with the testimony of General Hurley, does not warrant a thorough and complete investigation of the State Department, I do not know what does.

Now I would like to ask some questions of General Hurley.

The CHAIRMAN. You read all the documents, so it will not be necessary to put them in again, is that right?

Senator BRIDGES. That is right. You will return them to me.

YALTA AGREEMENT

Was there any agreement made at Yalta involving China, to your knowledge?

General HURLEY. I was not at Yalta, and I would prefer, sir, that you establish that from the record, rather than from hearsay evidence from me. I do know what transpired in regard to China at Yalta, but I am not the best evidence on that subject.

Senator BRIDGES. All right.

General Hurley, who would you say would be the best authority on that?

General HURLEY. The Secretary of State.

SUCCESSORS TO SERVICE AND ATCHESON IN CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. When Mr. Service and Mr. Atcheson were removed from China and subsequently sent to Japan to advise General MacArthur on all our Eastern policy, which is the most ridiculous thing I ever heard of, who succeeded them in China?

General HURLEY. I do not believe that anyone succeeded Service directly; not in his grade. A very fine executive whose name is Ellis Briggs, who is a career man, was sent to me, and he supported the American policy in China completely.

Senator BRIDGES. I have been told that a person by the name of Ringwalt and another by the name of Freeman succeeded them.

General HURLEY. No; they were already in China in the Embassy. They may have, by reason of Service's relief, advanced in position in the Embassy, but they were there from the beginning, from the time I got to China.

Senator BRIDGES. Were they the same type of gentlemen that their predecessors were? I mean, did they have the same ideology and were they attempting to undermine the policies of the United States?

General HURLEY. That is too broad an accusation for me to make against anyone. I will say that they did not support me in the directives, that I had received to prevent the collapse of the National Government of China and to keep the Chinese Army in the field, and that they did take the side of the armed Communist party in China.

Senator BRIDGES. What was their particular work, General Hurley? Do you recall?

General HURLEY. They were my political advisers.

"HYDRA-HEADED FOREIGN POLICY"

Senator BRIDGES. Now, General Hurley, in the press you referred to the hydra-headed foreign policy of the United States in China. By hydra-headed foreign policy of the United States in China just what do you mean?

General HURLEY. I mean that we had in China a State Department office known as the Embassy. We had a much greater organization, with a greater staff, better housed and better paid, known as the O.W.I. That is the Office of War Information.

I mean that we had a large and well implemented staff of the F.E.A. That means Foreign Economic Administration.

In addition to that we had in the beginning an office of the O.S.S. That is the Office of Strategic Services.

We had in addition to that a so-called psychological warfare authority.

In addition to that we had at one time—I do not know the initials for this other one—F.I.D.A.C., I believe. That is the Federal Assembly of Information of some kind, and it showed that the United States had at one time 13 separate intelligence agencies in China.

My statement the other day was to the effect that the foreign relations of our Nation were not being conducted through the statutory department that is set up by the Government for the conduct of foreign relations. For instance, when a loan was made to China, after the loan had been made the Ambassador in China received a telegram saying that it had been approved by so and so and so and so, and asking him to now go to the Government of China and suggest how the loan could be used. I immediately wired that the Ambassador did not even know the loan was going to be made and the suggestion of using it as pressure to require conformity after it had been made did not meet with my approval, and that our economic administration in foreign nations should be coupled with our diplomatic representation, and they should not be permitted to be played one against the other. You will find in the statement I made that our logistics, our economics, while used in a foreign country, have never been used together with our diplomacy, and the result was that I immediately wired that I, of course, respected and had great faith in the power of suggestion, but in the present instance I would have relied on the power of gold: $300 million.

I believe that that was one of the glaring weaknesses of our foreign policy. One agency gave away all the economic assistance that we were giving, and another agency, the State Department, was asked, after the act, to make suggestions in connection with it.

Senator BRIDGES. And, General Hurley, with 13 agencies all working in different directions, to your knowledge was there ever any effort by the State Department in Washington or by any U.S. agencies to correlate or coordinate or center their efforts in one direction?

General HURLEY. So far as I know, no coordination was made in Washington. When President Roosevelt appointed me Ambassador to China, I did within a very short time after my appointment call meetings of the head of every American agency in China, and I did attempt to coordinate their efforts, and I think that so far as the men on the ground were concerned, they endeavored to cooperate and

bring about some unification of American policy in China. But I wired the State Department, telling them that the hydra-headed direction of all these various agencies not coming through the State Department made impossible the proper coordination of American policy abroad.

POSITION OF GENERALS WEDEMEYER AND MARSHALL

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, through the press and over the radio I notice that the same crowd who have been sabotaging your efforts in putting across U.S. policies in China are now pretty well centering their attack on Gen. Albert Wedemeyer. In your judgment—and you worked with General Wedemeyer—is General Wedemeyer carrying out his instructions there, and is he doing a good job or is he doing a poor job? Just what is your opinion?

General HURLEY. I think that Wedemeyer is among the ablest officers of the U.S. Army. There is no question about his ability, his integrity, or his patriotism.

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, your successor in China is Gen. George Marshall, whom certainly I think most everybody at this committee table holds in high esteem and with affection, and I know that you have expressed similar ideas. Now I would like to ask you whether or not you have any idea whether General Marshall is being told to carry out the policies you were being told to carry out in China or not.

General HURLEY. I think that General Marshall is being advised that those are the American policies. I could not say that, either, of my own knowledge, because I am not participating in the conversations, but I believe now that the situation is clarified to such an extent that there is a public, an announced and defined public, American policy in China, and I wish for General Marshall the success that he deserves and the success that I think he will have in fulfilling his mission in China.

CONCESSIONS TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, in view of the statement which you have made here, in view of the letter written by Secretary Byrnes to a Member of the House and published which you put in the record yesterday, would you be surprised if you were informed that a new directive, or new directions, have been given to General Mashall to the effect that he shall tell Chiang Kai-shek that certain concessions must be made to the Chinese Communists, and that our military aid and perhaps credits and so forth and so on will be held up unless that action is taken?

General HURLEY. Well, the fact is that I continuously told the Chinese Government myself that it must approach the Communist problem, the Chinese Communist problem, from a broad, generous, statesmanlike attitude, and that the Government should be willing to make the most liberal political concessions to the Chinese Communist Party. The only requirement should be that it become a political party instead of an armed belligerent looking for arms with which to fight the Government of China, which we had recognized.

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, when you went over there was your major directive, that you received privately, as I understand from your testimony yesterday, to prevent the collapse of the national government of the Republic of China, and to keep them in the war against Japan?

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. What if the efforts of Mr. Service and others in the State Department had been carried out, and their recommendations, and the Communists, which were a very effective and belligerent group in China, were armed? Would that have interfered with the major policy entrusted to you as Ambassador to China?

General HURLEY. If the Chinese Communists had been armed at that time, if they had been armed by us or by Russia or by Great Britain, it would in my opinion have made the collapse of the national government inevitable, and the documents I have asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain I think will prove that the object was to arm the belligerents and withdraw support from the Government, which in my opinion was contrary to the American policy.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. Whose objective was that, General Hurley?

General HURLEY. I have stated that it was the objective of the Communists, the Communist armed party, and please distinguish between them and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different, and all of this time Marshal, Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire period of the vicissitudes through which we passed so far as I know they have kept their word to me, that, as I stated yesterday, Russia—and this is my own analysis; it is not a quotation—does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist party as Communists at all. Russia is not suporting the Chinese Communist Party. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China.

Since these conversations with Mr. Molotov and Generalissimo Stalin, Russia has concluded with China the Sino-Soviet Pact and has exchanged letters solemnizing every one of these agreements.

I have read that the Soviet has transgressed certain matters that involve the territorial integrity and the independent sovereignty of China, but frankly I have no evidence that would convince me that that is true. I believe that the United States and Russia are still together on policy in China.

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, what would have happened to the Allied cause, which in the East was the major job of fighting the Japanese, if a civil war had broken out at that time in China, an open civil war?

General HURLEY. Frankly, we would have won the war whatever happened in China, but the collapse of the Chinese Government and the disintegration of the Chinese Army would have released anything from 30 to 60 divisions to meet our soldiers on the beaches and in the jungles and on the plains, and our purpose was to contain them by

keeping China and her army in the war. And let me say this, that insofar as Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, there was never any wavering on his part. He had already at that time fought the Japanese for 7 years, and he did fight.

Of course China was sore, bruised, bleeding; but she was fighting like a wounded tiger, and Chiang Kai-shek did stand by us to a finish and to victory.

ALLEGED OVERTURES BY CHIANG TO JAPANESE

Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, to your knowledge is it true that Chiang Kai-shek had on several occasions opportunities to make peace with the Japs, and that he turned those offers down and did loyally maintain his ties to the United States and the other Allies in carrying through and fighting the war with Japan?

General HURLEY. Well, of course, the answer to that question, Senator, involves a lot of matter in the State Department.

Senator BRIDGES. I do not want to ask you any embarrassing questions.

General HURLEY. These same gentlemen of whom I have spoken have reported at great length about communications between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese. I have asked for their reports. The Senate Committee can get that. But I reported to the State Department on that subject at the time, and in my report I said to the State Department that of course there were matters that we could criticize about Chiang Kai-shek and his conduct of the war, and we need not approve the character or quality of the men who were around him. Many of them we could not give our approval to, but that Chiang Kai-shek had fought the Japanese alone at a time when they were offering him all of the things that our career men said that Japan was now offering him.

They reported that some men from Shanghai had gone to Tokyo, to Prince Konoye and to other Japanese leaders, and had brought back to Shanghai a report on the basis on which Japan would offer peace to Chiang Kai-shek, among other things requiring the expulsion of Americans from China. When we received what was supposed to be the transcript of that plan, there was with it an official letter from General Chu Teh, the commander of the Chinese Communist armed party forces, in which he said—and I am not using his language: I am analyzing—"Now that you have evidence that Chiang Kai-shek is dealing with the enemy, you have but one friend left in China. Send me $20 million immediately—and make it in gold.

I took all of that record, and I showed that at the time that Chiang Kai-shek was fighting alone he did not have our economic assistance: he had stood alone against Japan with China; that at the time our career men were saying he was joining Japan, he had approximately a billion of exchange in the United States, he had lend-lease coming over the hump in greater quantities than ever before, he had Clair Chennault's air force, which was becoming better equipped and better supplied; he had the American Forces; he had an American Chief of Staff; he had American transportation coming on the Lido or Stilwell Road, almost completed; and for me to believe that Chiang Kai-shek,

who declined an agreement with the Japanese when they appeared to be victorious and we were not in the war, would attempt to make an agreement with the Japanese when their defeat was inevitable, and when he had received all of the support from us, to me seemed unrealistic. Someone said I never sent this evidence to the State Department. I sent every word of it, and I described it as a weak, clumsy fake. There never was any question about the loyalty of Chiang Kai-shek to the cause of the United Nations.

U.S. OBLIGATIONS TO CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. General, if it is a fact—and it is, I might say—that for years the United State supplied the munitions of war, equipment, scrap iron and steel to Japan, while Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China were fighting on against Japan, and if it is further true that Chiang Kai-shek had opportunities to settle the war with Japan on a very favorable basis, but his loyalty to the United States and to the Allies made him and the Republic of China fight on, do you or do you not think that we have a very great obligation to both himself and the Republic of China today?

General HURLEY. Well, I would say this, that when we talk about obligations to personalities, my Nation owes no obligation to me. It may owe some obligation to the principles that I espouse. While the leadership of China was discussed, it was finally decided by the higher echelon of international relations that we would support the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; and we did support it.

The answer to your second question: There never has been in my mind, in the conduct of Chiang Kai-shek, anything that would indicate that he has any idea but complete loyalty to the cause of the United Nations.

Senator BRIDGES. When I asked you, back a short time ago, what the objectives were of these groups, you meant that the objectives of certain subordinates of yours in the Embassy sort of tied in with the objectives of the Communists in China, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

NEAR EAST POLICY AND ROLE OF DEAN ACHESON

Senator BRIDGES. Now, may I ask you if there is anything further which you could tell us about the reference you made to Dean Acheson the Under Secretary of State, and the policy in Iran, that would clear up that insofar as the committee is concerned, and the need for an investigation into the State Department?

General HURLEY. Now, I would like to say to the distinguished Chairman of this committee that no doubt the record which Senator Bridges has asked for could be produced by me honorably, because it has leaked, through the State Department, not the White House, in a garbled form, in a manner that is very discreditable to me. The record itself would acquit me of all that, but still I feel such a keen interest in the foreign policy of my Nation and in upholding that policy, that I think that I will forego submitting that at this time; but be assured that I have it, and if the committee desires it I will submit it; and in my opinion I believe I can prove, and now will divert a little from

the general course of my accusation. I think you will find that the career men in the Middle East did support the American policy.

Senator WILEY. "Did" or "did not"?

General HURLEY. Did. And I think you will find that Wallace Murray, who was then head of the Near East Division in the State Department, did support the policy. I think a Mr. Paul Alling, or Alling, his deputy, did support it. The man who is now in charge of that division, Mr. Loy Henderson, and his deputy, Mr. George Allen, did unquestionably support the American policy in the Near East.

Now, let me be completely frank on this. In the defeat of a policy approved by President Roosevelt and approved by Secretary Stettinius, I believe that Mr. Dean Acheson, who is now the Under Secretary, took the leading part. I do not know how many career men, if any, assisted him in his defeat of that policy, but I do know the policy was defeated.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I have a communication in line with the question before the committee, from a Mr. Hugh G. Grant, who was the former U.S. Minister to Albania and the Minister to Thailand, in which communication he charges much the same thing against the State Department or the underlings of the State Department that General Hurley, as Ambassador to China, charges; and I have before me an article from the Atlanta Journal of Wednesday, November 28, of his comments on this, and in the lettter which he addressed to me, which I received yesterday, he says that he has formally requested from you, as chairman, an appearance before this committee, and I would like to have this article from the Atlanta Journal inserted in the record, and a note made that Mr. Grant has requested his appearance to substantiate charges similar to those General Hurley has made relative to his career in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, put it in the record.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

[From the Atlanta Journal, Nov. 28, 1945]

"FEW HAVE THE COURAGE"

HURLEY RENDERS SERVICE TO UNITED STATES, HUGH GRANT SAYS

"Whatever the issues of the American-Chinese political situation, Maj. General Patrick Hurley, who resigned Tuesday as American ambassador to China, has rendered a distinct public service in revealing the obstructionist tactics of American Foreign Service 'career' officers in the Far East and the State Department," Hugh G. Grant, of Atlanta, declared Wednesday.

Mr. Grant, former U.S. minister to Albania, minister to Thailand and member of the State Department during the period 1933–1942, was in charge of the American Legation in Albania when the Italians attacked in 1939 and in charge of the American Legation in Thailand in 1940–1941, the period of Japanese preparation for war.

"What General Hurley has revealed is not new," Mr. Grant continued. "This sort of business has been going on a long time in our Foreign Service, but few men who could speak with authority from actual experience in our missions abroad have had the courage to speak out. They have resigned their missions when they have become disgusted or else have been quietly thrown out ('recalled') and have kept their mouths shut because any other procedure usually reacts against the man who speaks out, regardless of the facts he may reveal.

"I am of the opinion that General Hurley has done a real service for President Truman and Secretary Byrnes who, I believe, are sincerely desirous of building an effective foreign service which should be capable of handling the great problems confronting this nation during the post-war era.

"General Hurley's description of his experiences with 'career' diplomats in China sounds like a chapter out of my own experiences in two missions abroad, particularly in Thailand (Siam) during the period of the Japanese preparations for the great war.

"'It is no secret,' says General Hurley, 'that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department,' and again, 'throughout this period the chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from American career diplomats in the embassy at Chungking and in the Chinese and Far Eastern divisions of the State Department.'

"That is almost exactly a parallel of what happened in Thailand in 1940–41 when I was sent out there by Secretary Hull to hold the lines against the aggressive Japs through the maintenance of the policy of the 'status quo.' Within a week of my arrival in August, 1940, after the collapse of France under the German attack, the Thailand Government called me in and announced they wanted some French territory in Indo-China. At the same time they tried to line me up behind their policy of aggression, which was a part of the Jap plot to carve up Indo-China.

"I vigorously upheld the policy of the 'status quo,' in line with Mr. Hull's policy, thereby incurring the hostility of the Thai propagandists and the Jap fifth-columnists behind the scenes, and, to my amazement, found that I did not have the support of the ranking career officer at the Legation, who actually collaborated with parties who were strongly opposed to the American policy of the status quo. A sabotaging campaign was started against me, certain members of the Legation staff participating in it, and the Thai and Jap collaborators in Bangkok and in Tokyo putting out vicious propaganda designed to embarrass me, officially as the American minister. Tokyo newspapers published these stories with a view to breaking down American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. They finally succeeded with the help of the same imperialistic forces, mentioned by Ambassador Hurley, and 'career' officers in the State Department who ignored my cabled warnings of the Thai-Jap collaboration.

"I predicted in July, 1941, that if and when the Japs crossed over into Thailand from Indo-China the Thai army would fold up and fight with the Japs against the democracies. That was exactly what happened in December, 1941. Nevertheless in late July, 1941, the 'career' officers in the State Department cabled me they were giving serious consideration to a British suggestion that the American Government make a large money loan of several millions—to Thailand—this after the Thais had played with the Japs and had marched their troops into French territory while the Jap troops were landing in the south. I felt obligated to oppose such a loan in the interest of my government which I had thought would never give aid to any nation committing aggression, and shortly thereafter my 'resignation,' which I had not tendered, was accepted by cablegram from Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells, a top 'career' officer.

"Ambassador Hurley is on the right track about the confusion of our foreign policy as a result of the tactics of professional 'career' officers in the lower brackets of the service. Under the existing system neither an ambassador nor a minister has any real control over his own mission, since the 'career' officers are assigned from the department and in many cases have 'pipe lines' to powerful fellow 'career' officers in the department. These men can absolutely 'break' a chief of mission and they can ignore and circumvent the established foreign policy of the President and the Secretary of State. The whole system needs to be thoroughly cleansed and reorganized if we are to have constructive policies and the rights and the position of this nation are to be maintained abroad."

Senator BRIDGES. That is all.

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, I received a telegram from the same gentleman, Mr. Hugh G. Grant.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and I have one, also.

General HURLEY. Then it will not be necessary for me to read this.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it, if you like.

General HURLEY. I will not read all of it:

Ready to testify regarding sabotaging tactics of American foreign service by career officers while serving as Minister to Thailand during Japanese preparations for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Senator have a question?

U.S. SUPPORT OF CHIANG

Senator TUNNELL. I would like to ask a question. General, is it your contention that the United States did not back up Chiang Kai-shek?

General HURLEY. I think that the documents that I referred to yesterday will show, sir, that my directive and the policy of the United States was to support Chiang Kai-shek and the Government of the Republic of China.

Senator TUNNELL. I know, but I am asking you whether they did or not.

General HURLEY. They most certainly did, while I was there.

Senator TUNNELL. I have some recollection of a loan of $500 million to the Republic of China. Was that granted?

General HURLEY. Well, of course I would not know how to talk about that. The State Department so far as I am concerned got no advance information on that. That was a part of this hydraheaded administration of foreign relations of which I have been complaining. I think that matters of such grave importance should have the approval of our State Department, and the fact that lend-lease, or money, is being given to another nation should be an instrumentality of the foreign policy of the United States; and what I am complaining about is that our economics, our logistics have never been connected with the foreign policy.

Senator TUNNELL. Well, if you know, I should like to know whether or not.

General HURLEY. Well, Senator, may I ask this: Do you know? You have been here in Washington. I have not been here. This loan was made in Washington, not in Chungking.

Senator TUNNELL. Well, if I am to be a witness, why, I will get on the stand, but I am not advertising myself in this matter, and I am asking you some questions, and I would like to know, if you know, and to get the answers. If you do not know, I would be glad for you to say so.

General HURLEY. Senator, I do know that this Government did make a loan or a gift, or in some form advanced at one time $200 million, and at another, $300 million, to China, but I have no first-hand information on the subject. Again, as Ambassador, all I knew about the transaction was what I read in the paper, until I received a telegram from the Secretary of the Treasury, saying that it had been done, and asking me then to make certain suggestions in connection with the use of the fund.

Senator TUNNELL. Well, I have some recollection of hearing of the road that we were building into China from India. That was built, was it not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; it unquestionably was built. It is a great feat, and I congratulate my country on its tremendous effort to get supplies and support to China.

Senator TUNNELL. Was military assistance given China by the United States?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator TUNNELL. So there is no complaint along those lines?

General HURLEY. No; I think that of course everyone in a serious situation wants more than can be given, but the United States in my opinion gave every atom of strength it could to China.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA

Senator TUNNELL. You spoke about several organizations. I remember in particular you mentioned the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS is entirely a military organization, is it not?

General HURLEY. It is, now. It has been closed in, I think, to the G-2 of the War Department, but part of it has also been transferred—and, understand, you, here in Washington, would know more about this than I do—has been transferred to the State Department. A part of the Office of Strategic Information, I think, has come to the State Department, and the OWI, I think, is now being closed into the State Department.

Senator TUNNELL. I meant during the war, the Strategic Service was entirely a military organization, was it not?

General HURLEY. It was not in the beginning, sir; it was put in G-2—oh, I am not certain of the time, but even General Donovan, the very able head of the service, was a civilian until say 18 months ago; I am not certain of the time, sir, because that was not in my jurisdiction.

Senator TUNNELL. How many of those 13 organizations, to which you referred, were military organizations at the time of which you were speaking?

General HURLEY. I would say, off-handed, possibly five.

Senator TUNNELL. Which ones were not, that you can remember? I do not expect you to remember all of them.

General HURLEY. All right. The first organization was a setup to clear information of all the intelligence agencies. I just cannot remember the name of that, but it was an over-all organization and was supposed to coordinate the intelligence services. The next was OWI, the name of which indicates what it is—Office of War Information. The next, in the beginning, of course, was OSS, but as you say, that finally became a military organization. The next was the WPB; that is War Production Board. The next was FEA; that is Foreign Economic Administration.

Now, there were certain agencies of our Treasury Department, there, and so forth, but, Senator, I think possibly from memory I have given you about all I can, although we could list them for you if you wish.

Senator TUNNELL. I thought you could. I think you have done very well on them, but what I was getting at was this: The functions of those organizations that you mentioned, particularly the OSS and the OWI, were entirely different, weren't they?

General HURLEY. I would not say entirely different. I think they coordinated their efforts to some extent. They covered, in places, the same field.

Senator TUNNELL. The OSS was in many instances a spy organization, was it not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; but it was also a very, very potent propaganda organization, and that is what the OWI was covering.

Senator TUNNELL. Undoubtedly the OWI was, but I was not connecting the OSS with propaganda.

General HURLEY. I think they were at times very efficient on getting the proper slant, especially to the enemy.

Senator TUNNELL. What do you mean by saying "to the enemy"?

General HURLEY. I mean that where they were behind our operating lines, the OSS conveyed to the enemy information that was damaging to the enemy morale and helpful to the cause of the United Nations.

Senator TUNNELL. You consider that both those organizations were helpful organizations, do you not, in the war?

STATE DEPARTMENT RELEGATED TO SECOND PLACE

General HURLEY. Unquestionably. I would not be one to condemn any effort that contributed to the victory, and I think both of these organizations did. What I am saying, Senator, or trying to say—you have picked the two fine, excellent organizations, and I think I can say it without personal criticism—was that where the State Department lost out was that it failed to have the grasp of the situation to take in the services, that these other organizations came into existence because of the failure of the State Department to exercise its prerogatives.

Senator TUNNELL. You mean that the OWI came in for that reason?

General HURLEY. Unquestionably. If the State Department had had an Office of War Information, I think this Congress would have supplied that instead of having created a new organization to do an international service.

Senator TUNNELL. When you say "the State Department lost out," you mean the Government of the United States lost out?

General HURLEY. I think that when the constituted foreign-relations agency of our Government is relegated to a second place in any foreign-relation field, it is hurtful to the Government of the United States.

Senator TUNNELL. In what respect was it relegated? What do you mean by that?

General HURLEY. I mean that the State Department did not control the conditions under which our Government would furnish in a foreign field, money, munitions, lend-lease equipment, or control the intelligence service; and when the State Department lost control of all these features, you had a hydraheaded direction of the foreign service from Washington, that made impossible the coordination, complete coordination, of all these elements in a foreign land.

Senator TUNNELL. But from a governmental standpoint was not the United States successful?

General HURLEY. You mean you ask me whether we won the war or not? I say "Yes."

Senator TUNNELL. I am trying to find out whether we did.

General HURLEY. Yes. Yes, we won the war, sir. But it was a very, very expensive operation and a very disconcerting one, to have so

many agencies not responsible to our foreign-relations service, all doing foreign relations, in a manner that at times was in complete conflict with each other.

Senator TUNNELL. Do you think that all of the war activities of the U.S. Government should have been passed through you, as agent of either the President or of the State Department?

General HURLEY. Senator, I know of course that that question is not intended to be facetious.

Senator TUNNELL. No. I mean, I am trying to find out where you think the actual failure was, and what the failure resulted in.

General HURLEY. I think the foreign relations of this Nation should have been vested in the Secretary of State.

Senator TUNNELL. Do you think the war should have been?

General HURLEY. Senator, I would not like to answer that question. I have been in two wars, and I do not think that I have said anything here that would indicate to any man that I believe that the direction of a war should be vested in the Secretary of State. I believe that the Secretary of State announces the policy of the United States, and when war is declared the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Corps are the instrumentalities by which that policy is made effective; and I do not think that I have said anything here that would indicate that the Secretary of State should command the armies or the Secretary of War.

Senator TUNNELL. There was a war condition in China, was there not? It was a war-torn country?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator TUNNELL. And there was a good deal of work which had to be done by some other agency than the Secretary of State?

General HURLEY. Yes. The Army had to fight, and the Air Corps had to fight the war.

Senator TUNNELL. Yes.

General HURLEY. And that is not diplomatic.

REASONS FOR GENERAL HURLEY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

Senator TUNNELL. Now, I do not know. I have not been here all of the time when you have been testifying, General, but I would like to get down to what was accomplished to which you objected—what was accomplished by these people who, you claim, were of a different school or had a different purpose than yours. Now, what was accomplished? You have told us about letters and telegrams and so on, but what was accomplished by all this?

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, I hope you understand that, having been out on the perimeter of our work for 4 years, I came home sick. I am very tired. If the Senator wishes me now go over my testimony for the last 2 days, I wish you would give me a rest, and I will go over it again. This to me seems that it is unusual for the Senator to come in at the last minute and in my present condition try to put me over all the hurdles again. Now, let me add that if the committee wants me to do it, I will do it, but I am going to have to have a little respite. I cannot continue taking on new ones and going over the same thing again, because to me it seems an unnecessary incumbrance of the record, and

it certainly is a drain on my physical stamina that I think I should be sparing of.

Senator TUNNELL. Now, Mr. Chairman, let me say in reply to that statement that I have not come in at the last minute. I was here not only a good portion of the session yesterday, but all of the session today, and I have not heard you answer those questions. But if you do not want to answer, don't you do it.

General HURLEY. Now, I tell the Senator this, that I have answered the questions, and I do not like this way, "If you don't want to answer, don't do it." I am doing my best to give the committee everything that I have, and I have answered the questions that he is asking again.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General.

Senator TUNNELL. I will withdraw the question, in view of his attitude.

General HURLEY. Well, you do not need to withdraw it in view of my attitude.

The CHAIRMAN (rapping for order). Just a minute, General.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has no disposition to continue you on the stand if you feel that you need a rest. I am sure the committee does not. I had two or three other questions that I wanted to ask, but I will not ask them.

General HURLEY. Senator, I would be delighted, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley wants to ask a question.

General HURLEY. I would be delighted.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try to relieve you in a very few minutes.

Senator WILEY. My questions will be very brief. I have listened with interest to your testimony the last 2 days. As I understand your position it is briefly this—that the State Department failed (1) in that it did not, while you were in China, issue a public declaration of policy, which would have aided you tremendously in carrying out that policy. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. That is true, sir.

Senator WILEY. (2) That there were in the Department certain individuals that you mentioned; that these individuals were cognizant of the policy laid down by the State Department and by two Presidents, but they apparently did not cooperate with you in carrying out that policy; is that correct?

General HURLEY. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. (3) Were these individuals motivated in your judgment by simply a disagreement as to the validity of the policy, or do you think there was back of their motives something else? And if you have any information or facts that would clarify the answer, I would like to have it.

General HURLEY. I think, Senator, your first question, that these men disagreed with the American policy, is correct, but my contention with them—and understand I assembled them and talked to them and stated the policy. I have asked for the record of my statement of policy, early, after the President appointed me Ambassador, and inasmuch as we were in an active war theater—it was my contention that when the "die is cast," when the decision is made, when the policy is announced by duly constituted authority, it becomes the duty of every

one of us to make that policy effective; and I charge that these gentlemen did not do that. They continued to snipe the policy and tried to defeat it.

Senator WILEY. In other words, your position is that the chief had called the signals, "play ball;" and you were playing ball but they were not?

General HURLEY. That is correct.

REASON FOR SUBORDINATES ATTITUDES

Senator WILEY. All right. Now, I do not think you answered the other part of my question. Was there anything back of this "inability," to put it that way, on their part, to play ball with you as the American representative, to carry out the President's foreign policy? Was there anything back of it except simply their own stubbornness, their inability to see that it was their obligation to play ball, or were they disloyal, or were they conniving with the Communists, or what was the picture?

General HURLEY. They were disloyal to the American policy. I would not say they were disloyal to the U.S. Government. I think possibly that some of them were imbued with the crusader spirit, that they believed it would be best for China to destroy the national government and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but I tried to tell them that I could not argue, while I could recommend to Chiang Kai-shek and the government the changes that I thought should take place—which I did, and a lot of changes did take place—that while I might agree with them on a lot of their criticism, our directive, mine and theirs, was to prevent the collapse of the government and to uphold the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and whether I believed in it or not, as soon as the policy was made by my superior it became my duty to make it effective, whatever my own opinion regarding it might have been; and it is only that attitude that we have followed quite largely throughout our national life that has made this a successful nation, especially in war.

WORK OF POLICY COORDINATION IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Now, your fourth criticism was that a number of government agencies in China failed to cooperate or clear through you, the representative of this Government, our Ambasador. I understand that that is basic, in your judgment. There should have been real cooperation or clearance through you as an Ambassador, to effectuate the foreign policy of this Nation.

General HURLEY. I mean, Senator, that it should have had one directive from Washington.

Senator WILEY. And that was not forthcoming?

General HURLEY. And that did not come, and there wasn't any coordination among these various American agencies, except what I tried to bring about by having the heads meet with me; and I assure you there wasn't any acrimony between us.

Senator WILEY. No, I know.

General HURLEY. We tried to cooperate together, and tried to bring out a unication of America's effort in China.

Senator WILEY. Did you and Henry Wallace cooperate when he went to China?

General HURLEY. Unfortunately, I was not in China when Henry Wallace went there.

Senator WILEY. You were not the Ambassador?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I did not become the Ambassador until all of this controversy broke out. The Ambassador who was there had resigned, and the general who was there had been relieved and another general put in; and all of these grave changes that I am charged with having made transpired prior to the time President Roosevelt made me Ambassador; and I take it that if my conduct up to that time had not met with his approval he would not have made me Ambassador, and this Senate would not have unanimously confirmed me as such.

EFFECT OF PERSONNEL SHIFTS

Senator WILEY. Now, may I trouble you with point 6. These men were not playing ball with you; you were the Ambassador of the United States; you complained to the State Department that they were not playing ball with you. Now, in your judgment should there not be some remedy in the hands of an ambassador when his subordinates do not play ball—just simply send them home? I am asking for a constructive suggestion.

General HURLEY. Well, Senator, you were probably not in here yesterday. I did send them home, but I notice in the press this morning they tell us about these gentlemen being assigned as advisers to General MacArthur. That is a little remote, because he is only commander of Asia, and therefore above myself, the one who has relieved these gentlemen; but that is not the real gravamen of this situation. When I relieved these gentlemen in Chungking they were brought back to Washington and placed in the State Department in positions where they became my supervisors, and there they attempted to hamstring everything that I did in carrying into effect my directive; and the directive, let me say, in the papers that I have asked the Senate to procure from the State Department, my directive was outlined in my report to Secretary Stettinius when he became Secretary of State, with a full statement of all of it, and a request, so that if this directive did not conform, now that I was leaving the Executive Department, the Army, and going into the State Department—if it did not conform with the State Department, I have placed myself where the entire record was before the State Department, where they could change the directive, and I was amenable. I did not care—I might remonstrate about a directive that I thought was wrong, but whenever it was made official, I would make it effective. I have done that all through the war.

Senator WILEY. Can you place your fingers on the individuals whom you hold responsible for doing what has been done here? After you had called attention to the State Department that these men were not playing ball with you, that they were sabotaging the American policy in China, and then they were brought back and promoted. Who was responsible for that promotion?

General HURLEY. Well, of course, I do not think they could be promoted without the approval of the Secretary of State.

Senator WILEY. Do you know who recommended it to him?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I have been saying, and I hope it will not grow hackneyed, that I was 13,000 miles away from here, with rather a full hand, and I just could not keep up with what was happening in the State Department; but I did feel that I did not have the support that the "tops" of the service had always given me in the missions that they gave me to perform.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, just one thing more, in the nature of a statement. I am very happy to get your statement, because I think it should help to clarify the situation between Russia and ourselves in the Far East. It is your judgment—from what you testified this morning I gained it—that America and Russia are both playing on the level in the Far East?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. Now, I would like to add to that, for the benefit of the committee, that we have two points of immediate contact with Russia. One is in Iran. Your Government saw the possibility of that situation some time ago, and the Iran Declaration which I have read in the record covers it, and, if implemented and understood in our State Department, is still the answer to the situation in Iran. Our Government saw some time ago the possibility of a victory in Europe before a victory over Japan. Consequently it was the purpose of our Government to try to find an amicable basis, in our next point of contact with Russia, which is Manchuria; and that amicable basis was worked out I think satisfactorily in the Sino-Soviet agreement and in the exchange of letters that accompanied it; so, Mr. Chairman, you have already in the two vital points of contact with Russia rather clear, explicit definitions of the rights of the parties.

Senator AUSTIN. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Austin.

Senator TUNNELL. Mr. Chairman, could I just say this? I am going to have to leave. I am going to examine the record to see if this witness has answered the things which I was trying to get from him, or not. Will you state whether he can be back?

General HURLEY. Before the Senator leaves, I want to tell him if he finds anything in the record that I have not answered, I am at his service, and I will be delighted to reply to his questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Austin.

DISCUSSION OF PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION

Senator AUSTIN. Mr. Ambassador, if the countries that now have troops in Iran withdraw those troops according to the previous agreement, by the time limited for their withdrawal, will that in your opinion conform to the Declaration of Iran which you have read, there?

General HURLEY. I, of course, am not intimately familiar with the situation that now confronts Iran. It might be that the Iranian Army, the Iranian gendarmerie, is not sufficient to maintain peace in Iran, but if that situation does prevail—and I do not know whether it does or not, because I have not been there recently enough to determine—

but if that does prevail, Senator, then you have the basis of the Iranian Declaration on which to again confer with the officials of Iran, the officials of Soviet Russia, the officials of Great Britain, and the United States.

In other words, I say the instrumentality for such a composition of bad conditions at our point of contact with Russia does exist, and I still believe that if America, not attempting to have any special privileges in Iran, because America neither seeks nor would she accept any monopoly or special rights; all we seek is the fulfillment of the instrument that was signed by all three of the powers, and while it was not signed by the Shah, the King of Iran, as soon as it was passed I did take it to the Prime Minister, and he did initial the copy; so it was the act of Iran, also.

Senator AUSTIN. My question is raised by the consciousness of the refusal of Russia to withdraw forthwith from Iran, on suggestion of our Secretary of State that it would be well for Iran and for the peace of the world, if all these armies representing great powers in Iran should get out of Iran, now. Now, that is apparently something that cannot be done; and assuming that it cannot be done, then what I wanted to know was whether the withdrawing according to the previous agreement, by a date fixed—I cannot remember it, but I think it is March 3; I am not sure about that—my question is whether the withdrawal according to the previous agreement will be within the spirit and letter of the Iran Declaration which you have already put in?

General HURLEY. I think that you have raised a very realistic problem, and that an expression of my opinion on the subject might be hurtful to the Secretary of State in his negotiations.

Senator AUSTIN. Very Good.

General HURLEY. In other words, I am trying to cooperate with him.

Senator AUSTIN. I would not ask for anything prejudicial to the conduct of our foreign relations.

General HURLEY. That is right.

Senator AUSTIN. Thank you.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did the Chinese Communists fight the Japanese in good faith?

General HURLEY. My own opinion is that in most instances they did.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. What was the cause of the difference between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists? Was it ideological or political?

General HURLEY. Of course, there were ideological differences between Chiang Kai-shek and the leaders of the Chinese and Communist armed party. But the ideological differences were supplemented also by the fact that the Communists are quite a formidable political party, who are seeking through political means, while maintaining the status of an armed belligerent, to get control of the Government. Now, from our standpoint, if it is political means, there isn't any objection to any party seeking control of the government under which it

lives. Our position was that there can be no unification of China as long as there are armed war lords, bands, or political parties who are strong enough to challenge the action of the government, itself; and on that basis we have declined to arm belligerents against the government which we have been upholding.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Chiang Kai-shek was the first man to fight the Japanese, was he—that is, the first government?

General HURLEY. There is a big debate about that. The Communists claim that they wanted Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Japs before he did, and Chiang Kai-shek's party claimed that they led in opening the war on Japan; and I would not be able, Senator, to judge between those two contentions.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You referred to China as republican. In what sense is China republican? The Government of China you referred to as a republic?

General HURLEY. The name of the Chiang Kai-shek government is the National Government of the Republic of China.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Has it a constitution?

General HURLEY. No, sir; it has not adopted finally its constitution. It has been adopting the constitution for 30 years.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. And they have had an election?

General HURLEY. They had an election before the war with Japan, and they are setting up the machinery for another election now, but one of the complaints of the Communists is that the men who are to pass on the constitution and the transformation from the present form of government to a government based on democratic processes were elected so long ago that they no longer represent the will of the Chinese people.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in view of your statement that you are so tired, I hesitate to go on any further with the examination. You will be available, will you, if recalled, at any time?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; but would you, Senator, permit me, before we leave to put a short statement in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. And I do this only if I am not recalled, because I would not like to leave the record incomplete.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are not recalled?

General HURLEY. If I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we may recall you, though.

General HURLEY. I know, but if you do not recall me, the record is incomplete.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh. All right. Go ahead. Put it in.

WHO IS GUILTY OF LEAKS FROM STATE DEPARTMENT?

General HURLEY. The committee asked me to advise them who are the men who are guilty of the leaks from the State Department, which leaks are designed to defeat the foreign policy of the United States. Personally I have been on the perimeter of America's influence since we entered the war. I therefore could not have intimate or personal knowledge of what has been transpiring in Washington. I do recall

that certain career men were arrested on information supplied by the FBI. Usually, the FBI does not cause arrests on suspicions. They usually base their arrests on fact.

In addition to the FBI, I call attention to the investigations made by the intelligence services of both the Army and the Navy, the records of which are available to this committee. If the committee would like me to give them confidentially a list of witnesses that they might call upon from the Army service I would be glad to supply it.

I also call attention to the fact that this Congress and this committee have in control sources through which they can ascertain far better than an individual like myself the facts in regard to the inside opposition, whether by career men or others, that is intended to defeat the policy announced by the top echelon of the policymaking authority of the Nation. My one endeavor in this hearing is to bring the attention of this committee to the fact that the announced American policy is being defeated, and has been defeated, all over the world, not alone in China.

NO ALLIANCE WITH PREDATORY IDEOLOGY

The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that the defeat of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the defeat of the principles of the Iran Declaration, the use of America's power to uphold predatory ideologies contrary to the announced policy of our government, is an inside job.

The moral support and the productive strength of the United States should not be allied with any predatory ideology. By that is meant that America's strength should not be used to promote conquest by either imperialism or communism. Our leaders told the men who fought that we were fighting for democracy. Our fighting men were told that we were fighting for the right of all the nations to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that we demanded that all people have equal rights to the raw materials of the world. We fought and won the war for liberty, democracy, and free enterprise. We have not established the principles for which we fought. It is not enough for America to be pro- or antiimperialist or pro- or anticommunist. America may not be able to procure for the people of the world liberty or free enterprise, but we do not have to join the predatory ideologies that oppose these principles.

The American people do not full realize that strength of America's principles and idealism, long before the impact of our productivity and our fighting men, had registered in full force on the battlefronts of the world. The promises we made, the principles we promulgated rallied the freedom-loving people every place to resist, to fight until our material aid actually arrived. The principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration are no less moving, no less forceful today than they were in the dark days when they were first published to the world. The principles and the idealism of America are still the most effective weapons on earth for the preservation of peace.

VIEWS ON THE FOREIGN SERVICE

It has been said that my remarks about our foreign representatives is hurtful to our Foreign Service. They were intended to be helpful. Our purpose should be to increase and improve the caliber of the

Foreign Service. We should improve the housing and the prerogatives of Foreign Service men in every capital of the world. The people should be given all the information necessary to enable them to evolve a just foreign policy. When a policy is properly decided upon and promulgated by constituted authority, it should be the duty of the Foreign Service to make that policy effective. Each Foreign Service man should not be permitted to attempt to carry into effect his own idea of a foreign policy that is in conflict with the policy and the commitments of the Nation. Foreign service men should of course be permitted to criticize the policy to their own Government, but they should not remain in the Service if they attempt to use organizations or citizens of other nations to undermine the official policy of America. Foreign Service men should not be permitted to assist other nations in defeating the objectives of the American foreign policy. Foreign Service men should be trained for their work, as officers are trained for the Army and the Navy.

I wish specifically to call attention again to the statement in my original release that the charge against the Foreign Service personnel is not all-inclusive. Many Foreign Service men have fought for American ideals and American rights both at home and abroad. We have shown in two wars that America does not seek territorial aggrandizement or special privileges. We seek no monopoly any place. We want a free world, with equal opportunity for all people. There is little point in talking about isolationism. We can never be isolated again. We must take our place internationally among the nations of the world. If we ever fight another war, we should know why we are getting into it, instead of having it started by others and then backing into it. Our international economics and diplomacy have not been integrated. The United States should not give or lend to any nation or bloc of nations for predatory purposes. Be assured that the United States still has greater prestige than any other nation in the world. We weaken our prestige when we fail to use our strength for the attainment of the principles and the ideals for which we committed ourselves to a war all over the world. We agree with those who claim that there is something rotten in a civilization that must periodically wet itself down in the blood of the best specimens of the race. But I remind my fellow citizens that it is in that kind of civilization that we live. If we are not prepared to live in that kind of civilizaton we must change the cvilization or perish.

UNITED NATIONS

It should be our purpose to make the United Nations Charter a living democratic organism with legal and moral authority and physical strength to insure peace. We hear many say that this internationalism will get us into war. Perhaps it will. It did not get us into the last two wars, but we got in, just the same. But at least if it does not keep us out of war, we shall know why we are getting into war. Heretofore we have entered wars on the judgment of others and for the cause of others, and we have ended without having brought a permanent peace, unless we can find it in united action through the United Nations.

The alternative of the United Nations is international power politics, blocs, and alignments; and that is no alternative, because it inevitably leads to war. The consequence of power politics has always been war. It may be true that the time has not yet arrived when a world organization can be made to work, but let it not be said again of America that we have not tried to make it work.

We should evolve a foreign policy that will henceforth give the United States a voice in determining the time and the place and the conditions under which we will send our men and materials into combat. If we must fight wars, let us determine the cause for which we will fight. America neither hates nor fears. Our Government is the government of the people, and rules only our own people, and does that by their consent and direction. We seek no special privileges in any other nation. We do not wish to rule any other people. We do not want nor would we accept any trade monopoly. There is no reason for timidity in determining the course or administration of our foreign policy. We must have the vitality of our convictions and pursue our legitimate objectives with vigor, intelligence, and courage. Only thus can we make the victory we have won become the victory for which we fought.

NEUTRALITY ACTS AND U.S. ENTRANCE INTO WORLD WAR II

The CHAIRMAN. General, just one question, at the moment. You used the expression in your statement, "backing us into war." Do you regard that we were backed into this war that is just coming to an end, now?

General HURLEY. I would say unquestionably we had the Neutrality Act which prevented us from turning about, face forward, and going into it and taking our place among the nations of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. All right—we were backed into the war. After Pearl Harbor, when we were attacked, what would you have done about it?

General HURLEY. Oh, I would say, personally, I called the Neutrality Act the most cowardly piece of legislation ever enacted by this Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all right.

General HURLEY. And I believe we were committed to war, but when Pearl Harbor was attacked there was not any question, we faced about, and we went into it; but we were already fighting in the Atlantic without a declaration.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the Neutrality Act had been repealed a considerable time before Pearl Harbor. Since you bring up the Neutrality Act, it has been repealed before Pearl Harbor. You think, though, that notwithstanding that, we were backed into the war; and do you mean to imply that you were against our being backed into the war, or getting into the war?

General HURLEY. On the contrary, sir; I believed long before Pearl Harbor that we would have to fight Japan, but in place of getting ready to fight Japan, we were supplying Japan; and we were backed into the war, and we did not fight until we were attacked most cowardly.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. And we should have been prepared, and we should have known where we were going.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have favored our getting into the war earlier than we did?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Without waiting for Pearl Harbor?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations of that kind to the State Department in your official communications?

General HURLEY. My official communications?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HURLEY. When do you think I became an official, sir? I became an official when we were attacked.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not in the service before the war?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I withdraw the question.

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were.

General HURLEY. I was just a private citizen.

RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. You served in so many places that I did not see how you could do it unless you had started before the war. Now, as I understand it, there is a popular theory going around over the country that Russia is supporting so-called Communists in China. Your view is that that is not true?

General HURLEY. I would say this, in answer to that question, Senator—that I have the word of both Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov that they are not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want your view.

General HURLEY. And that there is a treaty. I have read in the paper since I left there that they are; but while I was there, it is my opinion that Russia did not support the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is it your view that they are not supporting them now, or that they are supporting them, now?

General HURLEY. I would not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not know. You have no beliefs on that?

General HURLEY. Well, I read all the newspapers, but you will notice that I have not been very careless in my statement of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. You have expressed your beliefs on many occasions. That is what I was calling for. Anyway, so far as you know, the Russians are not cooperating with the so-called Communists in China—as far as you know?

General HURLEY. That is as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, as far as you know.

FOREIGN SERVICE CONTACTS WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Now, summing up very briefly, my understanding is that when you went to China your objective was to prevent the fall of the Chiang government; that was your instruction from President Roosevelt, is that right? You were successful in that?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your other objective was to try to get the Communists and the Chiang forces to unite and both fight the Japanese?

General HURLEY. No, the next objective, sir, was to keep the Chinese Army in the field, definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. You succeeded in that?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you made some efforts along the line of unification, too, did you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I worked assiduously for it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. And I did try to bring about a unification of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said in your statement the other day in the press that these subordinates, these foreign-service men, had been continually advising the Communists that your views did not represent the views of the Government. How did they advise them—in writing, or by personal contact?

General HURLEY. Well, I asked this committee to get a certain document.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know, but you are testifying. I want to know what you know about it. You make the statement that they communicated with them. Now, how did they communicate with them?

General HURLEY. By writing and by talking and by being with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say what officials of the Communists they contacted and talked with?

General HURLEY. Well, I would not know exactly. I do not think they all contacted the top officials, but they did contact, and I have told you that it is contained in Public Document No. 30.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I know.

General HURLEY. Signed by John Service, and dated October 10; and you can get it, in writing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was addressed to the Secretary of State; that was not addressed to the Communists?

General HURLEY. No, sir; it was addressed to Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not a member of the armed Communists, he was our officer, was he not—Stilwell?

General HURLEY. That is right, but I say this document that proves that is addressed to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I know.

General HURLEY. And I have told you where you can get the facts, sir, in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I want to know. You have made the charge, yourself, and I want to know what you have to say about your statement that they were continuously advising the Communists. Now, they would not advise the Communists through the State Department; they would advise them directly, either in writing or personally. Now, which was it? Do you still adhere to the statement that they were advising them continuously that your views did not represent the Government's views?

General HURLEY. I most certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you mind telling us whom they saw?

General HURLEY. All right; I will begin again. I will repeat. A telegram sent by George Atcheson on the 28th of last February, in which he said——

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

General HURLEY. To the Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well, I want to know.

General HURLEY. Well, you know, it is in writing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why, certainly.

General HURLEY. And you ask me to prove what is in that, and I have given you a writing.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I was asking what communication they had had, not with the State Department but with the Communists. All right, we will not pursue that any further. We have got to go and find it out, ourselves.

SUCCESS OF HURLEY'S CHINA MISSION

Now, you say, though, you finally wind up with—

Despite these handicaps, in spite of this sabotaging that these men were carrying on, and despite their continuous contacting the Communists, despite these handicaps we did make progress towards unification of the armed forces of China. We did prevent civil war between the rival factions, at least until after I had left China.

Now, your whole program, then, was, up to the time you left China, completed. You kept the Chinese Government, you kept the Chinese Army in the field, you were on the way to the unification of the two forces, and you had the leaders of the two parties together in peaceful discussions. That all transpired before you left, so that up to the time you left, everything that you had gone out there to accomplish had been accomplished, had it not?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I had not made effective the long-range American policy which Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin had agreed with: namely, to make or put in operation in China the forces that would enable China to establish for herelf a strong, united, democratic China Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was long range?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But so far as your immediate objectives, you accomplished them all?

General HURLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of these handicaps?

General HURLEY. Now, Senator, you have me in a position where they will begin to debate about. You see one of my objectives was a unification of the armed forces of China.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and you said you had it improved, and you were progressing, you had not accomplished it.

General HURLEY. Oh, I was progressing.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HURLEY. But do not make me say that I had achieved something that I had not achieved.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I quoted the language, myself, from your statement, so that is all. Now, isn't that true, as a matter of fact? You say, "Give help to Chiang Kai-shek"—did we not send over the Hump a constant stream of arms and ammunition, with aviators

flying 19,000 or 20,000 feet, to aid the Chinese armies, carrying supplies to them?

General HURLEY. Unquestionably that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we not have General Chennault out there in the Air Corps? And did we not have General Stilwell?

General HURLEY. And they did brilliant work. They both did fine work.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not General Stilwell aiding the Chinese by organizing their armies?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. That was all in aid of the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it not?

General HURLEY. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. We loaned them $500 million, did we not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we shipped them all the supplies and equipment that we could get over the Hump?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition, we undertook the reconstruction of the Burma Road, did we not?

General HURLEY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The Ledo Road?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you would not say, with those things, that we failed to support the China Government, would you?

General HURLEY. Oh, no; on the contrary, that is what I was in favor of; but what I am saying is that these men who wanted to arm an armed belligerent against that Government were not aiding the Chiang Kai-shek government but were for its downfall.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your position is that these men were not trying to arm the Communist to fight Japan in connection with Chiang Kai-shek, but were working for the purpose of fighting Chiang Kai-shek and destroying his government; is that correct?

General HURLEY. Well, that is a little strained, Senator, I would not like to just admit, yes or no, on that question; but I will say that the effect of arming a belligerent of China, where you had a government that was on the verge of collapse, would have caused the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had succeeded in your unification program, you would have been willing to arm the Communists, then, would you not?

General HURLEY. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If they were going to fight with you?

General HURLEY. Oh, yes, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HURLEY. Through their own government.

The CHAIRMAN. Why, certainly, certainly.

General HURLEY. I certainly was willing to arm them through their own government. Any time the national government wished to arm the Communists I would have been in favor of it, but I was not in favor of arming a belligerent against the government that we were committed to uphold.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General. There are no others here to ask questions. The committee will recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30, and will you hold yourself in readiness? We might want to recall you, General. Tomorrow morning at 10:30 we will have the testimony of Secretary of State Byrnes, if any of you are interested in that.

General HURLEY. I have three requests, sir, for additional documents, that I would like to present.

The CHAIRMAN. All right

(The three requests were presented to the chairman by General Hurley.)

(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock, the committee recessed until tomorrow, Friday, December 7, 1945, at 10:30 o'clock, in the same room.)

INVESTIGATION OF FAR EASTERN POLICY

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1945

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:30 o'clock, pursuant to adjournment, in room 335, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Green, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, Austin, Bridges, Wiley, and Gurney.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is Secretary James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, who is appearing here at the invitation of the Committee on Foreign Relations to testify in the matter now pending.

WHERRY RESOLUTION

Mr. Secretary, you probably have seen in the press the fact that this committee has been in session a couple of days and that the session was called by reason of the introduction into the Senate of a resolution by Senator Wherry, of Nebraska. I would like to put this resolution in the record at this time. This is a resolution by Senator Wherry:

S. Res. 197

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That a special committee to be composed of five Senators to be appointed by the President of the Senate is authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to the policies, operations, administration, and personnel of the Department of State, with particular emphasis on (1) any variance between the policies now being pursued and those expressed in the Atlantic Charter, the Potsdam Agreement, and the various agreements entered into in recent years by the American Republics; (2) any intervention by personnel of the Department of State in the domestic policies or affairs of the Latin-American Republics or other action by such personnel tending to destroy or militate against the good-neighbor policy in the Western Hemisphere; (3) whether any of the personnel of the Department of State have shaped or influenced or have attempted to shape or influence our foreign policies or our operations in any foreign nations with a view toward the establishment of a Communist form of government in such nations; (4) any actions taken in any foreign nation by any personnel of the Department of State which were known by them to be contrary to the foreign policy of the United States or the instructions of our ambassadors or ministers to such nations; (5) the extent to which personnel of the Department of State are in sympathy with Communist ideology; and (6) any conflict between the policies being pursued by the Department of State and those being pursued by our Army or Navy in any territory now occupied by our military or naval forces. The committee shall

report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of its study and investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

In view of that resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the committee has been having sessions to determine whether we will reject or report that resolution. General Hurley has been before us on two occasions, in view of his statement in the press—you probably saw it—of several days ago, in which he resigned as Ambassador to China.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So we invite you here, Mr. Secretary, to discuss these matters and to discuss this resolution, and discuss the transactions that have been touched upon by General Hurley.

I presume you would like to go ahead with an opening statement. Would you, or not?

Secretary BYRNES. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BYRNES, SECRETARY OF STATE

(Secretary Byrnes was accompanied by Mr. James E. Doyle, Assistant to the Counselor, Department of State.)

Secretary BYRNES. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I have not had an opportunity to read the testimony taken by the committee during the last few days. I have followed it in the press. This morning I dictated a statement. The copies I have not received, but will, I am sure, in a few minutes, and will then have them handed to the committee. But I have this typewritten statement which I wish to read first.

U.S. GOALS IN CHINA

During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

To achieve this longer range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China.

This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience, and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions.

If I understand correctly what Ambassador Hurley has stated to me, and subsequently to the press and to this committee, he entertains no disagreement with this conception of our policy. Moreover, he has indicated to me and to this committee that he has been unfailingly supported by two Presidents and three Secretaries of State in his efforts to execute this policy.

He does object, however, to what he asserts has been a failure or refusal to make this policy public.

I wish to make it clear now, because of its bearing upon this point and upon other matters which I shall come to in a moment, that I am not familiar with every speech and press release and letter of my immediate predecessors as Secretary of State, nor with every incident that has occurred in recent years among officers of the State Department in China or elsewhere. I have not had the opportunity to examine these records, nor am I likely to have it in the near future.

BROAD OUTLINES OF U.S. POLICY

Nevertheless, I submit that the broad outlines of our policy in China have never been hidden or difficult to recognize. The phase of that policy upon which Ambassador Hurley has placed the greatest emphasis is our support of the National Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Of all the phases of our policy in the Far East, this seems to have been the clearest and most obvious. We formally recognize only the National Government. Our war supplies and financial assistance have been delivered only to the National Government. At the Cairo Conference it was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who represented China. At San Francisco it was the Foreign Minister of the National Government who signed the Charter of the United Nations. It was the National Government which ratified the Charter. It is the Foreign Minister of the National Government who sits in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In recent weeks, the necessary presence of our troops in China has been a source of understandable concern to the American people. As a result, the subject has been raised frequently at my meetings with the press. I have made it very clear that our troops are in China for the sole purpose of facilitating the surrender of large numbers of Japanese troops to the armies of the National Government in compliance with the order of the Supreme Military Commander.

ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENT OF U.S.-CHINA POLICY

These are a few among many public evidences of our recognition of the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate government of China. In the face of them, and in the light of the admittedly consistent support of this policy by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and Secretaries Hull, Stettinius and myself, it is difficult to understand Ambassador Hurley's intimation that his failure to achieve a satisfactory settlement of China's internal division resulted from the absence of a public expression of our policy.

General Hurley's statements before this committee require me to

add a few words concerning what he has indicated to be a refusal by me and by the President to grant his request for such a public statement. The pressure of time has been so great that I am unable to make a categorical statement at the moment, but I can tell you that I have not been informed of any written document in the possession of the Department of State in which the Ambassador has made such a request.

I can state categorically that he has never made such a request in conversation with me. Moreover, I was present at one of the two conversations he has had with the President since his return in September. I did not hear him make such a request at that time. Since the Ambassador's testimony here, I have asked the President whether, in his recollection, Ambassador Hurley has ever requested him, orally or in writing, to issue a public statement of our policy in China. He does not recall such a request.

My recent letter to Representative Anderson of California, to which Ambassador Hurley has referred with approval, was in response to a letter of inquiry from the Congressman. When a member of Congress requests an explanation of some aspect of our foreign policy, I take it as a matter of course that the request should be answered. But in the absence of such specific inquiries, I have thought it necessary to give public expression to our foreign policy only as occasion may demand.

As I have indicated, it is not my intention to attempt to interpret and explain every event of large or small importance in the administration of our foreign policy in China and other parts of the world in recent years.

FOREIGN SERVICE DEFENDED

I feel, however, that in fairness to the loyal, intelligent and hard-working men of our Foreign Service, and in fairness to the employees of the Department of State generally, I am compelled to discuss briefly certain charges which Ambassador Hurley has made.

The Foreign Service officers are nonpolitical Government employees, selected through competitive examinations. They have long labored earnestly and with too little public recognition to uphold abroad our national interests. My own experience with them has given me a high regard for their ability, integrity, and loyalty.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ATCHESON'S FEBRUARY 28, 1945, TELEGRAM

I do not know George Atcheson or John Service. But because of the special criticism to which they have been subjected by the Ambassador, I have obtained and read Mr. Atcheson's telegram of February 28, 1945, and Mr. Service's memorandum of October 10, 1944. These are the documents upon which the Ambassador appears to rely most strongly for support of his charge that these two officers sought to prevent the accomplishment of the objectives of United States policy in China.

The propriety of Mr. Atcheson's telegram can be determined only against the background of the events in China which preceded it. Like Ambassador Gauss before him, Ambassador Hurley had been making

strenuous efforts to achieve unity not only between the Central Government and the so-called Communists, but between the Central Government and the other dissident elements in China as well. At the time Ambassador Hurley left Chungking for a visit to Washington on February 19, 1945, I am advised that the negotiations between the Central Government and the Communists appeared to have broken down.

When Ambassador Hurley departed from the Embassy at Chungking, Mr. Atcheson, as counselor, automatically assumed charge of the Embassy's affairs. On February 28, 9 days after the Ambassador's departure from Chungking and 3 days before his arrival in Washington, according to the records of the Department, Mr. Atcheson sent his telegram. It contained a broad and thoughtful analysis of the situation in China as it appeared to him in the light of the shifting circumstances of the moment. It concluded with the recommendation that these shifting circumstances required a readjustment of our immediate strategy.

In his telegram, Mr. Atcheson distinctly stated that "a favorable opportunity for discussion of this subject should be given by the presence of General Wedemeyer as well as General Hurley in Washington."

The officer in charge of an American mission in a foreign country bears the responsibility for full and accurate reporting of the factors and events which are necessary to the intelligent formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. He is further responsible for the submission from time to time of recommendations with respect to this policy. If his reports and recommendations are to be useful, it is clear that they must reflect his free and honest judgment.

In the case of an ambassador, these considerations have always been taken for granted. They have been taken equally for granted in the case of the officer who assumes charge during the absence of the Ambassador from the Embassy. Since September, for example, we have relied upon the reports of the ranking official of the Embassy in China.

It is difficult to understand how Mr. Atcheson failed in any way to observe the letter or the spirit of these rules and traditions. His telegram of February 28 was a full and free report of the current situation in China as he saw it. His recommendation was an honest effort to assist the Department of State in the formulation of its future policy in China. There is nothing to indicate that he sought to circumvent his superior in making this report and recommendation. On the contrary the telegram expressly suggested that this was a matter upon which the views of Ambassador Hurley should be sought by the Department in Washington.

SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 10, 1944

The specific action of John Service to which Ambassador Hurley referred in his conversation with me was the preparation of a memorandum on October 10, 1944. I have also read this memorandum.

Before I turn to its contents, I wish to call attention to a few facts, as they have been presented to me. At the time this memorandum was

prepared by Mr. Service, he was not attached to the Embassy at Chungking. Although he retained his status as a Foreign Service officer, he was attached to the staff of General Stilwell as a political observer in Yenan. He was at the time administratively responsible to General Stilwell and not to the Embassy.

Ambassador Hurley, as of that date, was in China as the personal representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador. But he was not the U.S. Ambassador to China. He was not in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Chungking.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me, it cannot be said that anything Mr. Service wrote constituted insubordination to Ambassador Hurley.

The memorandum itself embodied recommendations for a basic change in U.S. policy toward the Central Government of China. It was written in forceful language and the conclusions which it drew were rather drastic.

Senator WILEY. May I interrupt there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WILEY. I want to get that clear. You say General Hurley was the representative of the President, but was not the American Ambassador at Chungking. Who was the Ambassador representing this Government?

Secretary BYRNES. As of that date, I would not be certain. His predecessor was Gauss. As of that date, from the record I would not be able to answer whether Gauss had returned or whether any ambassador was in charge. He was not.

Senator WILEY. Could you briefly tell me the line of demarcation between the activities of the two?

One was a residential ambassador, and one was the President's ambassador?

Secretary BYRNES. Mr. Hurley was serving as a special envoy of the President with the rank of Ambassador, to be assigned to duty anywhere, and was assigned to duty by President Roosevelt in several countries, but he was not regularly appointed and commissioned as Ambassador to China. He later was.

Senator WILEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BYRNES. The Service report was addressed to General Stilwell. It was also routed to the Embassy in Chungking. The Embassy forwarded it to the Department without endorsing its conclusions, but with a noncommittal covering memorandum indicating that it represented the views of a single political observer.

When the memorandum reached the Department of State it was sent to the Division of Chinese Affairs. Before it was circulated further, the Division of Chinese Affairs attached another covering memorandum stating decisively that although its contents were informative, many of its conclusions, which were specifically enumerated, were regarded as incorrect.

HONEST REPORTS DEMANDED OF FOREIGN SERVICE

It is not my purpose to dwell at greater length upon the two documents. In my opinion, based upon the information which has thus far been presented to me, there is nothing in them to support the charge

that either Mr. Atcheson or Mr. Service was guilty of the slightest disloyalty to his superior officers.

What it amounts to is that within proper channels they expressed to those under whom they served certain views which differed to a greater or less degree from the policies of the Government as then defined. Of course, it is the duty of every officer of the United States to abide by and to administer the declared policy of his Government. But conditions change, and often change quickly in the affairs of governments. Whenever an official honestly believes that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views to his superior officers.

I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through proper channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending me or anyone else in the Department. If that day should arrive, I will have lost the very essence of the assistance and guidance I require for the successful discharge of the heavy responsibilities of my office.

The other complaint of Ambassador Hurley is that some official or employee did not merely express a different view to his superior officer, but advised someone associated with the Communist forces that the Ambassador did not accurately represent U.S. policy. For such action there would be no excuse. I would be the first to condemn it and to dismiss the person guilty of it. But Ambassador Hurley has not furnished me, nor do I understand that he has furnished this committee, any specific evidence to prove that any employee was guilty of such conduct. Men who have rendered loyal service to the Government can not be dismissed and their reputations ought not to be destroyed on the basis of suspicions entertained by any individual.

That, Gentlemen, is the statement I desire to make to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I will ask you a few questions and then I will invite the other members. I will not go into great detail.

NO PUBLIC STATEMENT OF U.S.-CHINA POLICY REQUESTED

Mr. Secretary, General Hurley, in his testimony, made reference to his request or demand that the Department, you or somebody, or the President, make a public statement of the fact that the Department and the President were endorsing and sustaining the policies he outlined. Did I understand you to say that General Hurley in his conversations with you did not make such a request?

Secretary BYRNES. You are correct. The General did not make that request of me.

You are correct in your understanding that I did make the statement that Ambassador Hurley did not make a request of me that I make a public statement, nor did he make such a request of the President in the conversation we had with the President in my presence. I am told, though I did not read the testimony, that the Ambassador said that his recollection was that he made such a request, but he did not recall that I replied to it. If my understanding is correct, it is simply clear that it is a difference in recollection between the Ambassador and myself, and if he does not recall that I made any answer and I do not recall that he made any request, the chances are that my recollection is right.

CHRONOLOGY OF GENERAL HURLEY'S DECISION TO RESIGN

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I will ask you a few questions about the conversations with Ambassador Hurley. I do not know whether you have the dates there or not, but quite recently he returned from China.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. As to matters that happened before July 3 or 4—I have forgotten the date when I became Secretary—I have to rely upon the records to know what occurred during the administration of my predecessor. As to things that happened more recently, I can readily answer it.

I can tell you about the date that he returned. When I was in London I was advised that Ambassador Hurley desired to return and desired to confer with me. He did return. I did not get back until October 2 or 3, and my recollection is that within the week I saw the Ambassador, and we had a long conference, for an hour, anyway. It was about October 2.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he indicate at that time his desire to resign?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. Mr. Hurley stated that he was not well, that he was seriously bothered with sinus troubles and that he felt that after his service in China he should not return to the post, that his health would not permit it. I expressed my regret, and the hope that he would wait until he had taken a rest and then talked to me about it, and as the Ambassador returned about 2 weeks later——

The CHAIRMAN. Before you get off of that, in that conversation those were the reasons that he gave for wanting to resign, his health and the rest?

Secretary BYRNES. That he was sick.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he give in that conversation as a reason for his desire to resign the fact that these subordinates, Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service, had blocked his efforts and were disloyal?

APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT

Secretary BYRNES. No. Mr. Hurley went to the hospital to be checked up, and when he returned he told me that as a result of penicillin and other treatments he had greatly improved, and if I still wished him to return to China that he would return, and I expressed my great pleasure at his decision, and he stated then and had on a previous occasion that he wished to talk to the President, and I made an engagement and the Ambassador and I went to see the President, and told the President that he was returning, and the President expressed his pleasure that his health had improved and he felt he could return to China. But in the discussion he referred, for the first time, to the fact that he had not been supported by employees of the State Department in the Embassy. I recall very clearly the occasion, because I told him that so long as he was Ambassador, if in the Embassy there there was any employee who was not supporting him, or who was interfering in any way with his administration, if he would give me the name, by cable that employee or official would be removed. It was my policy, whenever a man was in charge of an office and was responsible, to back him in his administration of that office, and not permit any interference with him.

The President said, "I join heartily in that statement," and Mr. Hurley said, "Well, no man could ask for more."

Senator WILEY. How soon after you were appointed did this happen?

Secretary BYRNES. It was some time in the middle of October, I should say—about the 12th or so. Those two occasions were my first conversations with General Hurley. I was appointed in July. You will recall I had to go away amost immediately with the President to Potsdam, and remained away until about the second week in August. We came back, and in about 2 weeks I had to go to London. When I returned it was October 2, and I saw Mr. Hurley immediately afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. In order not to get confused, you are referring now to your first conversations with him. In the meantime he went away for a rest and to the hospital.

Secretary BYRNES. He went to I do not know what hospital here, but it was somewhere near Washington, as I recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. These other conversations in which you saw the President were quite recently, were they not?

Secretary BYRNES. No. When he returned and announced that he was well and could return, it was October 7 or 8, and the two of us went to see the President. We had a long talk about affairs in China, and we left with the clear understanding that the Ambassador was returning to his post in China.

SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL HURLEY

I did not hear from the Ambassador again until I heard over the telephone, and he told me he was in Santa Fe and he saw from the press the news about the situation in China, and that he still did not feel able to return, and that if I felt it was necessary to send somebody else, to feel entirely free to do it.

I told him no, that I was hoping that he would soon be well and be able to return to his duties, and I was not going to accept his offer to appoint somebody else.

That was about a month ago now. Do you wish me to go on?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I want you to go on to the next time, and the final culmination.

Secretary BYRNES. Mr. Hurley returned——

The CHAIRMAN. That was after he had told you and the President that he would go back? He went away because of his vacation and illness and so on. Now, come on down to the next time he talked to you.

Secretary BYRNES. In the telephone conversation from Santa Fe he said he could not go back then, and to feel free to appoint somebody in his place. I told him no, and the conversation ended with the understanding that no one was to be appointed and he was to return.

When he came to see me about 10 days ago he handed me an envelope addressed to the President and which he said contained his resignation. I told him I was not going to hand it to the President and did not want to accept it, that I wanted him to return to China; that he looked to me like he was all right and, with the situation as disturbing as it is in all of that area, that I did not want to appoint a new man unfamiliar with the conditions. I told him that I much preferred that, because of his service there.

He and I discussed his return for about 30 minutes. He then did say to me that in addition to the fact that he was not well, he was tired of not being supported by some of the people in the Foreign

Service office, and when I asked him who, he named these two officials or employees, Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service.

I asked him when these matters had occurred, and he said, "I want you to read the report, a report from Atcheson," the report I have just described to you, "and a report from Service." He gave me the dates, and I told him I would when I got time, but I urged him to forget Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service and what they wrote back in 1944 in October and in February of 1945, and to go back to China and help the Government in the serious situation that now existed.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time, were either of these men in China or connected with the staff? Had they not been transferred to other posts for something like a year?

Secretary BYRNES. Not a year, but they had been transferred.

As I have described, Mr. Service had come back some time in the spring, I think the records show, and had stayed until September. I do not get clearly from the records the reason for his coming back. It seems, in the hurried investigation I have made, that Stilwell no longer needed a political observer. Mr. Hurley, I understand, states that he recommended that he be brought back, and I could not say that that is not correct. He may have. But I told Mr. Hurley that Atcheson had been recommended and approved by me to go to Siam: that he was over in Japan, and that he could not go to China and he could not interfere with him, and that I would see that he did not go to China.

I recognize, of course, the difference in personalities at times in every Department and every office, and I assured him neither one of them would be permitted to go to China, and again urged him to help us out in the situation, and he agreed. He said that if I was insistent, he would return. I told him I was, and asked him to forget these two employees and to take the several reports I had on my desk from China that day, picturing a serious problem, and requested of him if he would not go to an office my secretary would give him and read those reports and give me the benefit of his judgment. He very kindly immediately agreed to do it.

I had to leave. I told him I had an engagement to go to the White House to see the President and that I was going to tell the President that he had brought me a letter of resignation, but then had agreed that he would go back. I did so advise the President in 15 minutes or so afterwards, during the conversation that I had with him on an entirely different matter.

Then, at 2:30 that afternoon, Mr. Hurley came back into my office and discussed with me a most helpful way the reports that I had submitted to him, asking for his suggestions, and he agreed as to our policy and was very certain that he would return. He said that if I insisted he would return that afternoon but that he had an engagement to speak at the Press Club on Wednesday—this was Monday afternoon—and I told him he certainly should not break his engagement, but if he would leave Wednesday afternoon I would be very happy about it.

MEMORANDUM ON CHINA VIEWS REQUESTED

In that conversation, Mr. Hurley did make a request of me that I think accounts for his mistaken recollection about asking for a public statement. After his conversation with me, when we were in full

accord as to his returning the next day, he said, "I wish you would give me a memorandum of your views as you have expressed them to me."

I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, there is no change; there has been no change in policy, but if you wish it, I will."

I know how all of us are apt to be mistaken in our recollections, and I think it is that request that Mr. Hurley had reference to, because he did ask me to prepare a memorandum for him and because he was going back, as I thought, the next day, I prepared a memorandum, and the next morning at the regular meeting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, held every Tuesday, I presented an outline that I had dictated, discussed it with the two Secretaries, and told them that I was to see Mr. Hurley again, and I wanted any suggestions they might have.

NEWS OF RESIGNATION

That was about 12:30, and when I left them I walked out into the hall and was then advised that Mr. Hurley had resigned and that his release had been on the ticker.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that release the public statement that appeared in the press?

Secretary BYRNES. I would not know. I did not check it, but as I read it, it was substantially what was in his letter of resignation.

The CHAIRMAN. After your conversation with General Hurley, the last of the series that you have mentioned, in which he said that he would go back to China, except for the fact that he wanted to make this speech to the press club, did he ever after that see you again and tell you that he had changed his mind and that he did not want to go back to China, and would resign?

Secretary BYRNES. No; but I did talk to Mr. Hurley over the telephone.

As I say, I have not read the testimony. I do not know whether he referred to that or not. When I read of the resignation of Mr. Hurley, as I stated, I was on my way to the White House, where I was to take lunch. I discussed the matter with the President, but I told the President that I thought it was a mistake, that the release had been prepared before his conversation with me and, by mistake, had been released, and I would not hand him the resignation until I had checked it.

I went back to the Department of State and telephoned the General and told him that I had seen this release, and that I just did not believe he had authorized it, in view of his statements to me, and he said that he had. He said that notwithstanding his affection for me, he felt that he had to resign. He said that he was sick, that he was at home, that he had a temperature; that he felt that in view of the fact that people were shooting at him and he thought they were getting information from the State Department he would not return.

He said, "I owe it to you to say that since talking to you I have changed my mind, and I changed my mind because of the speeches which were made in the House yesterday." He asked if I had read them, and I told him I had not. I really had not even read the story in

the newspapers, but he mentioned particularly a speech by a Congressman De Lacy, and that he felt that those Congressmen must have gotten information from somebody in the State Department about the matters that they had discussed. He said that he had decided it was more than he wanted to continue having to meet, and therefore he had quit. He said then, though, "Jim, if you say so, I'll go back."

The CHAIRMAN. That was after the speech by the Congressmen?

Secretary BYRNES. That was after the resignation, after the release. I told him that I would hand the letter to the President, and I did do so immediately. I advised the President that he had confirmed it and I had no request for him to hold it up, and sent the letter over by messenger.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell the President in the conversation in which he said he would go back, but wanted to stay over to make his address, that he had agreed to go back?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After that, and between that time and the handing out of this press release, did he ever see the President again, to your knowledge, and tell him that he had changed his mind?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know. I do not think so, but I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not see you any more and tell you that he had changed his mind?

Secretary BYRNES. No. I must say for him, though, when I talked to him and asked whether he had released it, he said he was at home and sick and running a temperature. At least that is the fact. I should say that he so advised me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper, any questions?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

ATCHESON TELEGRAM

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Secretary, you have referred to Mr. Atcheson's telegram of February 28, 1945, which seems to be the crux of the Atcheson case. Are you prepared to make that available to the committee?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. I say that I have brought the several letters and documents that were named by Mr. Hurley, and I want to make them available to the committee, but I must ask that I do it in executive session, and then you can discuss whether or not there is anything in the letters which should not be used.

Senator VANDENBERG. Can I ask you in a general way, then, whether the telegram did represent a recommendation of a sharp and distinct change in our Chinese policy?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. As I have stated, while it analyzed the conditions, it made a recommendation that would have involved a change. And as I say, when I called for it, investigating it, I was impressed by

the fact that it was written 9 days after the Ambassador's departure, and that in the message Mr. Atcheson said that he felt that it should be called to the attention of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who were in Washingon, so that the matter could be discussed by the Department in the light of their views.

Senator VANDENBERG. Was this sharp change in policy which was recommended the result of anything that had happened since Ambassador Hurley had left?

Secretary BYRNES. Evidently that was the opinion of Atcheson, who was then in charge of the Embassy.

Senator VANDENBERG. You mean it did not refer to the situation prior to Hurley's departure from China?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, it referred to the situation existing at that time as to our efforts to have unity among the Chinese factions and how we could best bring all of the manpower of China into the war against the Japanese.

Senator VANDENBERG. That was the general problem that General Hurley had been dealing with.

Secretary BYRNES. Exactly. It impressed me, when I called for it, that here are two men who have been considering a question of how to bring about unity between the factions in China, the objective being to secure unified action by all Chinese forces against the Japanese, and there was a difference of opinion as to the methods to be pursued. That is the impression that it made upon my mind.

Senator VANDENBERG. Of course, all this happened before your regime.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, yes. I came in only in July, and that was back in February. The service report was October 10, in Hull's administration; the other when Mr. Stettinius was Secretary.

Senator VANDENBERG. Then it would be fair to say, would it not, that Mr. Atcheson took advantage of the very first opportunity he could find in Mr. Hurley's absence to register his dissent with the State Department from General Hurley's attitude and policy?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know. That might be said if the official had not expressly stated in his letter that in his opinion the general, being in Washington, and General Wedemeyer, also being in Washington, an excellent opportunity was afforded to discuss the matter with them, to discuss his suggestions, so it did not impress me as if he were acting to report to the Department without the knowledge of the Ambassador. That would have made a different impression on me.

Senator VANDENBERG. I quite agree that the suggestion that General Hurley would be available to discuss the matter is an evidence of fair play, but I wonder if you would disagree that you would feel it a rather strange situation if, 9 days after you had left Washington for Potsdam, the Under Secretary of State had proceeded to tell the President that you were all wrong.

Secretary BYRNES. You would have to read the letter in order to determine whether even that conclusion would be justified, because a situation existed there. The effort was being made to bring about a settlement of the differences between these two factions. They had not been completed, and with that background of the efforts being made to bring them together, with conditions changing, I would not say that

the fact that 9 days after his departure, when this gentleman communicated with the Department, that it was deliberately taking advantage to do something that he could not have done otherwise.

Senator VANDENBERG. The policy which General Hurley had been pursuing in China was the policy of the Government and the State Department, was it not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. And may I say this. I am glad that you asked it. I thought of it when the general was talking to me, and told him on every occasion, he would readily admit, that if there was any difference in the views of any official and General Hurley, the Department has stood by Hurley.

Senator VANDENBERG. And the views submitted by Atcheson in his wire were contrary to the American policy?

Secretary BYRNES. It was providing a change.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is what I mean.

Secretary BYRNES. It was suggesting a change in policy; not that something had been done that was contrary to the policy.

Senator VANDENBERG. And you think it was perfectly appropriate for Mr. Atcheson, in his temporary assumption of top authority, to take advantage of the opportunity to send this report to the Department?

Secretary BYRNES. I think that the man in charge of an Embassy owes it to the Department, if he believes there is a change in conditions that should be brought to the attention of the Department, to send it.

I think of it this way. Since September the general has not been back, and the official in charge must be free to send to the Department his views with reference to conditions.

RETURN AND REASSIGNMENT OF ATCHESON

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Atcheson subsequently was withdrawn from China, was he not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. How long after the telegram; do you recall?

Secretary BYRNES. That telegram was——

The CHAIRMAN. February 28.

Senator VANDENBERG. The telegram was February 28, 1945.

Secretary BYRNES. As I said a moment ago, I was not Secretary at that time, and because of that fact I have to look at the record.

On April 9 he was returned.

Senator VANDENBERG. Why was he withdrawn?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know. In my investigation, which I admit is hurried in the last day or two, I do not find anything in the files to show why he was withdrawn.

Senator VANDENBERG. What assignment was he given?

Secretary BYRNES. He was made a special assistant to the official who was in charge of that office in the Department.

Senator VANDENBERG. In charge of what office?

Secretary BYRNES. Far Eastern affairs.

Senator VANDENBERG. In that position was he superior to the Ambassador in respect to the Department's routine?

Secretary BYRNES. No. I have seen that statement made, but I dis-

agree with it. An Ambasssador can report even over the Secretary of State to the President, and he is not subordinate to anybody in that office except the Secretary of State. No one has supervision over an Ambassador, unless it is the President and the Secretary of State.

Senator VANDENBERG. What was Mr. Atcheson's next assignment?

Secretary BYRNES. Atcheson remained there until September, when he was assigned to Tokyo, on September 4.

Senator VANDENBERG. Who made that assignment?

Secretary BYRNES. I am responsible for the assignment, regardless of who in the office. I was then in office. He was assigned to Tokyo. General MacArthur had asked for the assignment of a political observer. The Department officials, in my absence, and I am talking from the record, submitted to Secretary Stimson for submission to General MacArthur the name of Mr. Atcheson, and Secretary Stimson and General MacArthur approved the name of Atcheson, and he departed for Tokyo from Washington on September 14.

Senator VANDENBERG. I was interested in knowing whether you had anything to do with his designation.

Secretary BYRNES. No. As a matter of fact, I approved it, so I assume the responsibility for it.

Senator VANDENBERG. Were you familiar with the fact when you did it that he had expressed in this message of February 28 a divergent viewpoint from American public policy as established by the Department for China?

Secretary BYRNES. No, I was not. I, of course, as you would readily appreciate, had at that time spent about 3 weeks in the Department, and it was utterly impossible for me to know what had been done throughout the last few years.

Senator VANDENBERG. I quite understand that.

Would you feel, in view of the knowledge that you now have, that it was appropriate to send him back into that area?

Secretary BYRNES. I would have no objection at all to sending him as adviser to General MacArthur, on the assignment that he was given. I do make the distinction. There is a difference between sending him to General MacArthur. I would not have sent him to China in the office of General Hurley if General Hurley had made known any objective to it.

EFFECT OF ATCHESON REASSIGNMENT

Senator VANDENBERG. I quite understand that, but I was wondering whether there was not something more fundamental involved. If it is true that Mr. Atcheson is not in harmony with the official State Department attitude in China, I would wonder why he should be sent to Japan.

Secretary BYRNES. I go back to it. He was in accord with the objective of the policy of the State Department and the Government to bring about unity in China. He was suggesting a change in the method by which that could be accomplished.

Senator VANDENBERG. Your statement emphatically agrees with Ambassador Hurley, that if any officer of your Department advised the Communist Armed Party that Mr. Hurley did not represent the

American point of view, it would be a very grave situation and would require summary action?

Secretary BYRNES. I heartily agree, and I mean just what I stated, that I would immediately dismiss any employee who was guilty of such conduct.

Senator VANDENBERG. Would you be interested in making a Department investigation to see whether or not it can be determined whether this thing did happen?

Secretary BYRNES. I have thought of that the last day or two. I would be glad to do it, but I have thought about it and wondered how in the world it could be done. The complaint, as I understand it, is that Mr. Atcheson—or I presume this is the complaint—communicated to the Communist leaders the statement that Mr. Hurley did not correctly represent the policy of this Government, and that it affected the action of the Communists in their efforts to bring about unity.

I do not know how I could find out, without knowing the individuals that Atcheson is suposed to have communicated with, whether or not the statement is correct. I did give some thought to it yesterday afternoon. Of course I realized that that would be a matter that would probably be discussed. I found this, that the appointment of Atcheson was made and announced September 4; that Atcheson, naming this subordinate employee, Service, as an assistant, left for the assignment on September 15.

On September 18, which was 2 weeks after the public announcement of the appointment of Atcheson, General Hurley wired the Department that favorable developments in Government and Communist negotiations were indicated, and he wished to delay his departure from China until September 23 and did delay. So that 2 weeks after the public announcement that this man had been appointed adviser to MacArthur in response to his request, the negotiations between the Central Government and the Communists had improved and looked so favorable that the general, who was doing his best to bring about compromises by both sides, and concessions, determined that he wanted to stay there. So I concluded that the announcement of Atcheson's appointment could not have hurt those negotiations. Just judging from the record, they improved instead of deteriorated.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you know anything about any intercepted messages between any of these gentlemen and the leaders of the Communist Armed Party?

Secretary BYRNES. No. I have not heard it even discussed.

Senator VANDENBERG. Were you disturbed at all by the suggestion that the speech in the House to which you referred was the result of leaks from the State Department?

Secretary BYRNES. I cannot say that I was, because I know there are leaks from every Department and from every committee room, almost, up here. I never have found any way in my experience up here to stop leaks, and I assumed that it might be so. But I saw in the newspaper that the Congressman said it was untrue, and that he had not talked to anybody in the State Department, and in the absence of any proof I have to accept that Congressman's statement as the fact.

I did think, though I did not say it to my good friend the Ambassador, that if every Senator and Congressman and Cabinet Member who is criticized resigns, we will have wholesale resignations around

here. If every Cabinet Member who is criticized by a Senator or Congressman resigns, we will have a lot of appointments to make.

Senator VANDENBERG. If the speech made by Congresswoman Luce in response to Congressman De Lacy is correct, it would scarcely be complimentary to the State Department to say that the Congressman's speech was based on information from the State Department.

SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 1944

Now, Mr. Secretary, how about John Service? You referred to his memorandum of October 10, 1944. I assume that is also available for the committee.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. He was withdrawn from China. Do you know why?

Secretary BYRNES. In my statement I said that he was assigned as aide to General Stilwell, and his service with Stilwell had expired. It is undoubtedly true, though, from my investigation, that General Hurley had made known his displeasure so far as John Service was concerned. Whether he would have been brought back here or whether he would have stayed in China it is impossible for me to find from the record. At any rate, he was brought back when his military service with Stilwell ended. He was not assigned to the Embassy in Chungking, but was brought back here.

Senator VANDENBERG. What was his assignment here?

Secretary BYRNES. He was in an administrative job, with no title, is my information.

Senator VANDENBERG. In the Far Eastern Division?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. He was assigned to the Personnel Office of Foreign Service Administration.

Senator VANDENBERG. Looking back upon the situation, would you not agree it was rather a curious way to support Ambassador Hurley, to remove officers to whom he objected and then immediately assign them to service in the precise theater where Ambassador Hurley served?

Secretary BYRNES. This man, as I say, was in the Administrative Section, and was not assigned to any theater. But we must remember, now, that these two men had been at work in that area. That was the reason that they were suggested when MacArthur asked for the assignment. They were familiar with affairs in the Far East, and there are not so many men in the Department who have such familiarity.

Senator VANDENBERG. Where is Service now?

Secretary BYRNES. He is still in Tokyo, with Atcheson, on assignment. Mr. Atcheson took Mr. Service with him to Tokyo on the assignment to MacArthur. He is still there.

Senator VANDENBERG. Were you responsible for that designation?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I do not recall, but it was done during my administration, therefore I assume responsibility for it. When anybody in the Department does that, I assume responsibility.

DEAN ACHESON AND IRAN POLICY

Senator VANDENBERG. The only other question, Mr. Chairman, that interests me, is the unexplored suggestion yesterday that your Under

Secretary dynamited your policy in Iran. Have you anything to say about that?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I must say that the newspaper statement yesterday afternoon was the first time I heard it had been dynamited by anybody. I have not had time to inquire about it since.

Senator VANDERBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Acheson will be available, will he not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dean Acheson will be available to the committee?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, yes; Dean is available to the committee at any time.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you one other question, then I will desist and turn you over to the other members of the committee. Mr. Secretary, in these conversations which General Hurley had with you just preceding his resignation, did he at any time tell you that Atcheson or Service had made direct communication with the Communists?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he do that in any way, by writing, or orally?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I am sure that he did not; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he ever at any time make that charge to you, that they had had improper communications with the so-called Communist forces?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. One other question. As I understand from your testimony and from our general knowledge of this subject, there was no divergence between the objectives that the Government's policy contemplated, as between Mr. Atcheson and General Hurley; the objective was to try to unite the Communist forces with the Central Government's Chinese forces, so that they would all fight the Japanese, is that correct?

Secretary BYRNES. There is no question about that; the objective was the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The objective was the same; the only divergence then was, as I understand you, a difference as to the manner in which that could be brought about, is that right?

Secretary BYRNES. That is right. There is a serious difference as to the method to be pursued.

The CHAIRMAN. But the objective of both parties remained the same?

Secretary BYRNES. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. No; I haven't any questions, now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead? Senator Austin?

RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO PUBLIC BY STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator AUSTIN. Mr. Secretary, what organ or persons within the Department of State are responsible for releases to the press and public?

Secretary BYRNES. The Press Division—and Mr. McDermott is the

head of it—makes the releases. It is possible for a release to be authorized either by the Secretary or the Under Secretary or in some instances the Assistant Secretaries. The Assistant Secretaries generally submit them to me, though.

Senator AUSTIN. Who makes the decision on what is restricted?

Secretary BYRNES. On what is restricted?

Senator AUSTIN. Yes; regarded as confidential, or secret, or top secret.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, if there is any question at all as to that, it is submitted to the Secretary, or, in his absence, to the Under Secretary.

Senator AUSTIN. In the regular course of business in the Department of State—that is, barring theft—are there many or few persons who might do the "leaking" that is spoken of, here?

Secretary BYRNES. It is very difficult to answer that, Senator, because in the handling of a matter in any office necessarily a number of people in the office would know about the subject under discussion and it would not be possible to restrict the number of people in an office. It is just the same as it is here in a committee room when the Senate is acting; the number of people who hear the discussions know pretty well what is going on. If they were so disposed they could advise newspaper friends or other friends.

Senator AUSTIN. Is it safe to say the number is not a small number?

Secretary BYRNES. No; it is not small; and there is this, too—I have thought about it in considering the question—that in the State Department we have to bear in mind that it is a policymaking Department, that when men are employed and they discuss policies as distinguished from operations and they feel strongly about it, there is a great temptation to the gentleman whose views are not accepted to talk outside about it or to talk to his friends, and the next thing you know you are on the radio or in the newspapers. I do not know of those instances, but my commonsense tells me that they will be very apt to happen.

Senator AUSTIN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. In handling these releases, of course, a number of people are involved—the men who draft the release, the men through whose hands it passes, the stenographers who take it down, the person that cuts the stencils, and all sorts of people who work on it?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

NATURE OF FOREIGN SERVICE REPORTING

Senator GREEN. Mr. Secretary, you, in answer to a question of Senator Connally, said that the difference between Mr. Atcheson's views which he sent you as part of his duty as charge d'affaires in the absence of the Ambassador differed with those of Ambassador Hurley, not in the objective but in the means of carrying it out, did you not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes; that is my interpretation of his letter.

Senator GREEN. Could you not go a step farther? Would you not be willing to say that the charge d'affaires did not suggest taking any action different from what Ambassador Hurley would have taken, without the approval of the State Department?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, of course! He was submitting it through regular channels.

Senator GREEN. In other words, he is what you call a "career man," is he not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes: right.

Senator GREEN. And the duty of a career man is to act as a tool for carrying out the policy that is determined by the State Department, is that right?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator GREEN. Was there any suggestion on the part of either of these two men that they would act in any way contrary to the policy of the State Department until and unless that policy were changed?

Secretary BYRNES. No; your statement is exactly right. That is what they were doing—submitting, making a suggestion to the Department based upon their views, but in the one case with the express request that it be called to the attention of the Ambassador.

Senator GREEN. Do I understand the justification for that is that they simply represented their views, submitted them to the Department for the Department's approval, but were ready to carry out any policy that the Department instructed them?

Secretary BYRNES. There was nothing to indicate that they were not willing to carry out any policy of the Department. To me it is important that if from our representatives abroad we are to receive full and free expression, the best judgment that a man has, we cannot say to him, "You have got to be entirely a 'yes-man' to the policy of the Secretary of State," but we should say to him, rather, "If conditions have changed and you believe that that policy should be modified, it is your duty to make the suggestion." The suggestion may not be accepted—it was not, in the case either of Mr. Atcheson or Mr. Service—but nevertheless I would dislike greatly to think the foreign officers whose duty it is to advise us to the best of their ability of conditions and make recommendations would be prevented from doing so by any fear of offending me. Why, they do it constantly, and I read the reports that come to me. They come to me with recommendations, as in one of these cases, from the head of the office. About half a dozen of the things suggested by Mr. Service were wrong and should not be adopted. I must read the suggestion, I must read the recommendation, and in light of all the information which I have, reach my own conclusion.

Senator GREEN. It seems to me that is the correct policy. I am very glad to have this enunciation of it.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will the Senator yield for one question at that point?

Senator GREEN. Certainly.

Senator VANDENBERG. You are not overlooking, however, Mr. Secretary, that the real gravamen of General Hurley's charge is that these gentlemen were indicating to the Communist armed party that Mr. Hurley did not speak for the United States?

Secretary BYRNES. I have said that there is no disagreement between us on that statement. Mr. Hurley has stated that, but he has offered no evidence to me of that fact. If any evidence should be offered to me that convinced me that was true, I would feel about it

as I judge from your question you feel about it; and I agree, that is an entirely different thing.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, I have in mind of course that you only recently assumed the secretaryship of State, and therefore in my questions affecting the Department of State prior to your assumption I know that you are not personally, directly responsible for those things, only in so far as you may not have taken action on them when they came to your notice after you assumed the Secretaryship.

ALLEGED INTERCEPTED MESSAGES TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Now, I want to ask you—Senator Vandenberg has asked you, twice—if you know or have ever heard of any intercepted messages between either Service or Atcheson and the Communists. Your answer was no. Now, would it be possible for some intercepted messages to be referred to the State Department or to the President without your knowledge?

Secretary BYRNES. There might be, to the President; and furthermore, if you are asking about something that occurred in the past, of course, if it was sent to the President and the President did not send it to the State Department, there would be nothing in the files. In the files of the State Department there is nothing to show such an occurrence, so far as I have been able to find out in the last few days as a result of this inquiry.

Senator BRIDGES. And if such should come to your attention subsequently, you would "fire" summarily those people involved, with no hesitation?

Secretary BYRNES. If any man was communicating with anybody in violation of the policy, not communicating with the officials, I certainly would take action.

AMBASSADOR RESPONSIBLE TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, you stated in answer to a question from Senator Vandenberg that an ambassador does not have to take orders from a division of the State Department supervising his country. For instance, if the Far Eastern Division of the State Department should send an order or directive or memorandum to an ambassador, the ambassador has full right to ignore it, does he?

Secretary BYRNES. Unless the Secretary of State were approving it, he would have full right. An ambassador has a right to go to the President over the head of the Secretary of State. He could bring to the attention of the President anything that was sent to him to which he objected.

Senator BRIDGES. If one of these gentlemen in charge of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had issued an order, memorandum, or directive to General Hurley, and it had been approved by the Secretary of State, he could not have ignored it, could he?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I do not think so. I agree.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, Mr. Secretary, at Yalta was there any deal made involving China?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know what you refer to, Senator, as a "deal."

Senator BRIDGES. Was there any agreement reached relative to China, at Yalta?

Secretary BYRNES. I would have to search my mind. A communique was issued which carried a statement as to the various agreements arrived at. If you would indicate what you have in mind, it would bring it back to my mind.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean, I was not there, Mr. Secretary, and I understood that you were.

Secretary BYRNES. I was there; not——

Senator BRIDGES. At least, you were accompanying President Roosevelt, at the time.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes; yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And I would assume that if there was something as important as an agreement made involving China, you would be aware of it.

Secretary BYRNES. Without having the communique, I would not like to make a statement. I will get a copy of the communique, which gave all of the agreements arrived at by the three heads of government, and see that a copy is submitted to you.

Senator BRIDGES. I think that, involved here in the case, the question this committee has under consideration, it is very important to know whether there was an agreement made at Yalta relative to China, and whether that agreement was made at Yalta between the heads of the three great Governments, the strong, large Governments, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, without the knowledge of China, at that time, until later.

Secretary BYRNES. Any agreement arrived at at Yalta was made by the three heads of Government. China was not represented there, that is certainly true, and any agreement was arrived at in the absence of a representative of China.

Senator BRIDGES. Would it not be rather peculiar that you should make some agreement involving the life or death or seriously affecting China without a representative of the Chinese Government being present?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know of any agreement of the character that you refer to that was made, and unless you specify, Senator, what you have in mind, I would not know; and even if that were done——

Senator BRIDGES. I think that is a fair question, Mr. Secretary, as to whether or not there was any agreement made at Yalta involving China. Now, if you do not want to answer it, that is perfectly all right.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, I have answered it, that I do not recall the various agreements. It is entirely possible that some of the agreements arrived at at Yalta affected China in some way or other, and I have told you that I would gladly furnish you the communique and then you can determine whether or not they affected China. If they were made they certainly were made by the heads of Government, and certainly only the three Governments were represented there.

DISMISSALS FOR DISLOYALTY

Senator BRIDGES. Since you have been Secretary of State, have you fired anyone in the State Department for disloyalty to the United States?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

Senator BRIDGES. Have you investigated, or have you ordered an investigation?

Secretary BYRNES. I am not aware. Of course, I would say that I am not aware of its being done, though, again, the time that I have been Secretary and have been out of the country about 50 percent of the time, it is entirely possible that you might show some instance that I had not been advised of.

Senator BRIDGES. I realize that. I am not trying to embarrass you.

Secretary BYRNES. I just say I am not aware of it, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. I realize that since you have been Secretary you have been obliged to be out of the country more or less.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And perhaps some of these things you have not had time to act on, and I am not pressing you.

Secretary BYRNES. I am not aware, but if you will tell me the case, I will find out and advise you.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, I would like to go back to Mr. Service for a minute.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in answer to the question of Senator Bridges, if you knew of anyone in the State Department who was disloyal to the State Department, you would dismiss him?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, of course! Immediately!

The CHAIRMAN. And if Senator Bridges or anyone else should file with you a statement as to some individual claiming and charging that he was disloyal, you would investigate; would you not?

Secretary BYRNES. I would immediately investigate it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary BYRNES. I understand they are under the same law as civil service employees. They are entitled to ask for a hearing. I would give them a hearing, and if I found they were disloyal I would dismiss them.

AMERASIA INDICTMENTS

Senator BRIDGES. Now, Mr. Secretary, before you became Secretary of State, there was a scandal which appeared publicly, which involved among others two in the State Department. I have before me, for instance, the copy from the New York Times of June 7, 1945. The heading is—

FBI SEIZES SIX AS SPIES, TWO IN STATE DEPARTMENT, SECRETS STOLEN

And then I go down further, and I find this statement made:

Six persons, including a Naval Reserve lieutenant, two employes of the Department of State and the co-editors of the New York magazine Amerasia, have been arrested on espionage charges by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the Justice Department announced tonight. The arrests were in connection with the theft of "highly confidential documents."

I also have in my possession, here, the State Department bulletin on June 10, which was also before you became Secretary of State, in which then Acting Secretary of State Grew said:

Officers of the Department of State have for some time been giving special attention to the security of secret and confidential information. A few months ago it became apparent that information of a secret character was reaching unauthorized persons not only from the Department of State but from the Department of the Navy as well. After a consultation with the Department and the Navy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was requested to conduct a thorough investigation of the matter. For the past 2½ years the three Departments have worked together to determine how this official secret data was obtained by unauthorized persons. Investigation has resulted in the arrest by special Agents of the FBI of six persons, who were taken before U.S. Commissioners in Washington and in New York on charges of conspiracy to violate section 1, title 50, of the U.S.C.A., which covers the unauthorized possession or transmittal of national-defense data. Particulars concerning these persons will be released to the press by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Two of those arrested are Emmanuel S. Larsen, an employee of the Department of State, and John S. Service, a Foreign Service officer. The matter is now in the hands of the Department of Justice for prosecution.

JOHN SERVICE'S CONNECTIONS WITH AMERASIA CASE

Then I also have in my hands the Statement Department bulletin, published after you became Secretary of State, under date of August 26, 1945, in which it publishes a letter of August 14, from you, addressed to Mr. Service, which is a very amazing document, to me; and you are familiar with that letter?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. Can you by any stretch of imagination justify such a letter as that?

Secretary BYRNES. Well, I do not have to stretch the imagination; I justify it in other ways. If you wish me to—I suppose you do—I will tell you my connection with it.

Senator BRIDGES. Let me say before you start, Mr. Secretary, I understand that the incidents occurred before you became Secretary.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And I am just wondering, knowing you as I have known you for years, if you could have been fully informed about the facts, and what occurred, to have written such a letter.

Secretary BYRNES. Well, yes. When I became Secretary, or shortly afterward, I heard a statement by some person, I remember, over the radio, about the injustice done to a gentleman named Service, and I read an editorial in the Washington Post insisting that the State Department had done this gentleman a great injustice. I now forget the time, but it was some time in August, after I returned from abroad. General Holmes, who was then the Assistant Secretary in charge of personnel, and who was Assistant Secretary during the administration of Mr. Stettinius, talked to me about the case. He said that the grand jury had had submitted to them the testimony of the Department of Justice with reference to these individuals whose names you have called, and that the grand jury found no justification for indicting Mr. Service. I asked, about that time, and I am pretty sure that I asked Mr. Grew, about it.

Of course his name had been mentioned: and then I asked Mr. Dean Acheson, and Mr. Acheson advised me that the official of the Department of Justice, who was the prosecutor, had stated that Mr. Service had gone before the grand jury for personal examination by the grand jury, and after that examination the grand jury had been greatly impressed by his statement and did not indict him. Therefore, the question presented was, here, a man who was charged by a department of Government—the Department of Justice—and when he was called before a grand jury, which is a process in our system of Government, the grand jury concluded that he was innocent and would not indict him.

Senator BRIDGES. May I ask you, right there——

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish.

Secretary BYRNES. Let me finish.

Senator BRIDGES. All right.

Secretary BYRNES. Then the question was whether this man who by the courts of the country had been declared to be innocent of wrongdoing should be reinstated in his job. His reputation certainly had been hurt, and there is common decency and justice in this world, that unless there is some evidence outside of that grand jury to combat that grand jury decision, I felt the man should be reinstated; but I asked that question, and was told the prosecutor had submitted everything he had against him to the grand jury, and in the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General there was no reason why that man should not be reinstated in the service. And then I further was advised that General Wedemeyer, who is certainly in the opinion of General Hurley as well as of myself a splendid officer and whose judgment is worth something, had written a letter, and that in the file of this gentleman, Mr. Service, there was a letter from General Wedemeyer in which he paid tribute to the service he had rendered him.

Therefore, there was no excuse in my opinion for me to refuse to reinstate this man; and that is why I wrote this letter; and I stand by that letter, the letter as first written. It was written with the change of language, and I changed it to suit the facts, that—

> I am advised that the grand jury after hearing the testimony has found nothing to warrant an indictment against you. One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is investigation by a grand jury of criminal charges, and by that process you have been cleared.

If your Government makes a charge against you and the grand jury says there is no justification for the charge, and the prosecutor says there is no justification for the charge, if your constituents did not reinstate you I would not have much confidence in their judgment.

ALLEGED INTERVENTION IN SERVICE CASE

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, are you aware of any secret telephone call from a very-high-up in this Nation to a Department of Justice official telling him to lay off Service?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

Senator BRIDGES. Before, or on presenting the case to the grand jury?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

Senator BRIDGES. Would you be very surprised if one occurred?

Secretary BYRNES. I certainly would. I think it would be very improper. I think you ought to state who it was, though.

Senator BRIDGES. I am asking you the questions.

Secretary BYRNES. No. I say, of course, I do not know it.

Senator BRIDGES. I cannot prove anything, but I have been told on very good authority.

Secretary BYRNES. Well, then, Senator, if you cannot prove it, I do not think I would say that. Really, I mean, that is charging a high official of the Government.

Senator BRIDGES. I have not charged anybody, because I have mentioned no names.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh! That charges all by implication!

Senator BRIDGES. Well, I get it down, Mr. Secretary. I do not know whether you thoroughly investigated these things, and I am not condemning you for it. I am just wondering if you have gone into it as thoroughly as perhaps you should.

Secretary BYRNES. No, but if you have the name of any high official of this Government who interfered with the Department of Justice in the prosecution of a case, I would like to have it, and I think everybody ought to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have it, also. The committee would like to have it.

SMOKE AND FIRE

Senator BRIDGES. Now, in case that did occur. I remember once of hearing you make the statement, Mr. Secretary, and it is an old statement which I have heard you make many time—not many times, but two or three times, and I recall the instances: "Well, you know, where there's a lot of smoke there's generally some fire." I heard you on the Appropriations Committee make that one day.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes, but I would not say that, if the general statement were made about you; I would resent it. No matter how much smoke there was around, I would contend that unless they could prove it, I would feel you were entirely innocent.

Senator BRIDGES. I am not trying to in any way embarrass you. What I am trying to get at is whether there has been a proper investigation of Service.

Secretary BYRNES. Well, I can only say that I accepted the grand jury, the statement of the prosecutor; and there was no statement in his file, no complaint from Stilwell, to whom he had been assigned; and from General Wedemeyer there was an endorsement; and that is the extent of the investigation. I acted on that.

Senator BRIDGES. But you think that even though it occurred, with the background of his arrest and serious charges made against him by the Department of Justice, and the FBI after long investigation at the request of the Department of Justice, that it is fully proper to pick that man out again and make him the advisor to General MacArthur on the whole Far Eastern situation?

Secretary BYRNES. I think undoubtedly when the grand jury found he was not guilty of the statements made against him of the charges

and the prosecutor said he was not guilty, that we owed it to him to do what was proper under the circumstances to remedy the wrong that had been done him.

POSITION OF A PERSONAL ENVOY AND AN AMBASSADOR

Senator BRIDGES. Now, Mr. Secretary, you made the statement that General Hurley was there, in China, as a personal envoy of the President, or with the rank of Ambassador, and you did not recall whether we had a regular ambassador there at the time, or not. Now, supposing that they were both there at the same time, who would be superior?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, as to those—I do not know what the instructions from the President to General Hurley were. He was there solely as the special envoy of the President. President Roosevelt, you know, several times had special envoys. The Ambassador in that area is in charge of that Embassy and of everything in it.

Senator BRIDGES. And he would be superior to a roving ambassador or a personal envoy of the President?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes, that would be my decision, unless there was some evidence of superior instructions from the President; but I do not see, anyway, Senator, what question there could be that the Ambassador at Chungking would be superior in his position to any special envoy. He was a special envoy with rank of Ambassador, but he had not been appointed and confirmed by the Senate. We had a number of special envoys, during the last few years.

"HYDRAHEADED FOREIGN POLICY"

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, take for example the Chinese situation for a moment, and there were 13 different agencies out there operating as far as American policy was concerned—and that was the testimony of General Hurley—was there ever any effort that you know of in the Department, prior to your arrival, there, or endeavor to coordinate or to correlate those general activities in China which he described as a "hydraheaded foreign policy" we were following in China?

Secretary BYRNES. I am not familiar with it. Of course, it is true that, abroad, we have had several departments represented. I suppose that is what the general had reference to. It is my opinion there would always be better organization if they could be concentrated in one department; it would be much better.

LOYALTY INVESTIGATIONS

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, in the State Department, now, do you have any department set up so that any person taken into the State Department now is investigated thoroughly before he is hired?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes; I am told there is in the personnel office an investigation of every person.

Senator BRIDGES. And that includes their loyalty to the United States.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, yes; more than anything else!

Senator BRIDGES. When employees from OWI and other offices were

recently "frozen" into the State Department, if that is a correct term, were they checked, or rechecked?

Secretary BYRNES. No. While I am not certain, I am pretty sure that it was not done, because it was done by executive order. It was done while I was away. Had I been home, I certainly would have had some representations to make, but only as a matter of organization; but so far as the personnel is concerned I assume that whenever they were employed in OSS for instance, research and review division, which was transferred the other way, an investigation before they were ever placed on the Government payrolls was made; but a duty assigned to the State Department now is to go through that personnel to determine how many of them shall be kept, and who shall be kept. That will give an opportunity for another investigation.

Senator BRIDGES. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you as Secretary will order an investigation of the personnel, because it is inferred from your testimony here that there are unduly large numbers of people who are now employed by the State Department that have never been checked by the State Department, due to the fact that they were "frozen" or transferred.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, not checked by the State Department.

Senator BRIDGES. No.

Secretary BYRNES. If they were covered in by a blanket order and checked by OSS when they were employed.

Senator BRIDGES. They are now your responsibility?

Secretary BYRNES. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. You may find that some of your trouble is coming from that source, if there is any trouble.

Secretary BYRNES. Well, as to the first part, I agree with you, it would be a good thing for the State Department, in screening the employees, to make some investigation; but I must say that thus far I have not heard of any trouble from those employees who have been covered into the service.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you get all the complaints that come to the State Department?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh!

The CHAIRMAN. He could not get them all!

Secretary BYRNES. I cannot say to that. I suppose—I hope that somebody else intercepts them. It is a good thing for my assistants to intercept.

Senator BRIDGES. But you will get any serious charges?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. Oh, I do.

Senator BRIDGES. And how do you handle a serious charge when it comes?

Secretary BYRNES. Well, I am very glad to say—I am delighted to say that I cannot recall for the moment any serious charge made against an employee of the State Department since I have been there, with the exception of this one case that you have referred to, the Service case.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you have in the process of setting up a so-called intelligence system now?

Secretary BYRNES. By that transfer to which you have referred, there was transferred a part of OSS. There is a discussion as to a coordination of intelligence activities.

Senator BRIDGES. But is there a General McCormick in charge of that?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes. Not in charge of that; he is in the State Department, but, so far, it is the consideration on the part of the State, War, and Navy, determining whether it should be done, and, if so, how. He is one of the two men from the State Department.

Senator BRIDGES. Are you personally acquainted with him?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And by whom was he recommended to the State Department, do you recall?

Secretary BYRNES. I think, General Marshall; but I am not certain. While I was in London the recommendation was made by Col. Frank McCarthy, who was then the Assistant Secretary in charge of personnel. He sent me a message recommending his appointment, which was concurred in by the Under Secretary, and I told them to go ahead; but I think he was the head of the military intelligence of the War Department during the war.

Senator BRIDGES. Is it true that the President of the United States has received communications questioning the appointment of General McCormick and raising very serious doubts about him?

Secretary BYRNES. I could not say that. The President has not mentioned it to me.

Senator BRIDGES. What are Colonel McCormick's qualifications, do you know?

Secretary BYRNES. He was the head of Military Intelligence, U.S. Army.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Near East?

Senator BRIDGES. You may be correct, but I certainly did not know that he was.

Secretary BYRNES. He was assistant to the officer who was in charge of it, anyway.

Senator BRIDGES. He may have been one of the assistants.

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. But what was he in private life, before he went in, do you know?

Secretary BYRNES. I was told that he was a lawyer with the Cravath firm, in New York.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes—one of the so-called law firms with Wall Street, there?

Secretary BYRNES. Well, I never heard anybody refer to them as a so-called law firm. That is some law firm. I mean, that is one of the great law firms of the country. You agree to that.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes, but I mean I do not know about all the members of it.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh! I do not, either!

Senator BRIDGES. Now, Mr. Secretary, are you acquainted with a General Nelson, who is now in the State Department?

Secretary BYRNES. I met him, yes.

Senator BRIDGES. What job does he have in the State Department?

Secretary BYRNES. I do not know what title he has. He has accepted

an appointment, there, with Mr. Russell, in the Administration Department.

Senator BRIDGES. Who recommended him, are you aware?

Secretary BYRNES. He is really only on detail from the Army. He hasn't gotten out of the Army, yet, but he is going to get out. He is still an Army officer.

Senator BRIDGES. I hope that you will not take it by my questions with reference to these two gentlemen that I am reflecting on them; I am not. I am just trying to find out how they got there, because of the stories.

Secretary BYRNES. I have been trying to get from the Army and the Navy whenever I can men who have shown efficiency during the war. I have encouraged my assistants to look to that source, the Army and the Navy, to select men.

DIRECTIVES TO GENERAL MARSHALL AS NEW AMBASSADOR

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, is it true, in line with the rumor which is being circulated around, that General Marshall, our new Ambassador to China, is being given a new directive to Chiang Kai-shek, instructing him to make certain concessions to the Communists, and holding out possible reprisals of credits or military aid or use of surplus property? That rumor is very prevalent, and——

Secretary BYRNES. And what?

Senator BRIDGES. Would you care to answer it?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, I have no objection, at all. No directive has been given to General Marshall. In fact, since the day after he accepted the appointment, I have not had a chance to discuss the matter with him, for the reason that he advised me that he was summoned by the Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee and, having to look back over the files for the several years, that he wanted to devote his time to that. Just as soon as the Senate committee is finished with him, he and I will meet to discuss this matter. He has not been given any directive, but we will, of course, agree before he leaves on a memorandum as to his instructions; but he has not been given anything, and I have not discussed it with him, for the reason I have stated.

Senator BRIDGES. And is the policy regarding which General Hurley was instructed, still to be carried forward? That was, to uphold the National Republic of China Government, which is headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Secretary BYRNES. So far as I know there is no change in the policy, and the date that General Hurley talked to me, and when he asked that I prepare, that I give to him a memorandum, I prepared a memorandum which I expected to deliver to him, which makes no change in the policy that Mr. Hurley had been enforcing.

PUBLIC STATEMENT ON CHINA POLICY

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, one other question, please. Why was there never a public statement issued, until you issued one at the request of a Congressman, the other day, relative to our policy in China? Was there any good reason for that?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes; the best one was, that I had never been asked to do so. As I said in my statement, if there is anything that has been a settled policy, it seems to me it is the policy to which there is no difference between General Hurley and the State Department. That has been a settled policy. He stated in his letter and in his newspaper release that there is no difference between him and the President and the Secretary of State about that policy. For the reasons I have set forth, that it has been made clear by actions as well as by words, there was no occasion for me to give out statements as to the policy as to any particular country.

In a press conference once or twice I have been asked about the reason for our Marines being in China, and I have stated frankly what the reason was. I have done it several times, and nothing has ever been said to indicate any change in that policy. This Congressman Anderson wrote me a letter, and I answered it, just as I would answer one if you wrote me, but if you did not write me, I would never think of writing it, having too many other things to do; but there isn't any reason for that.

Senator BRIDGES. You think that probably is the same reason your predecessors in office had for not issuing one, that they had never been asked?

Secretary BYRNES. Well, that, of course, I would not know; but I did look back since this thing occurred, and as far back as 2 years ago there is a message signed by the President and Cordell Hull, stating the same policy, and there is nothing in the files of the State Department from that day to this to show any change in it. In the absence of any reason or any request, I imagine those gentlemen would feel about it just as I do, that I would not go out and state what our policy today is as to any given country, but whenever requested to do so, I would gladly do it.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. Do you feel that this country has had through the war some very definite moral or ethical obligation to Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China, inasmuch as they are a very loyal ally of ours?

Secretary BYRNES. And as I have said in that statement, our Government has shown that that was its attitude, by its continued recognition of that Government, and its recognition at San Francisco, the Council of Foreign Ministers, in every appointment that has been made. It was designated to sign the surrender. It was designated by the Supreme Commander to implement that surrender. Actions speak much louder than any words do.

Senator BRIDGES. And if there had been any intimation as to arming the Communists and thereby bringing about a civil war in China, which would break down, it would not have been in line with your views or policies?

Secretary BYRNES. No; not unless they had been able to get both factions together; and the objective was to have them get together, and arm them to fight the Japanese. That is the policy of the United States; and, now that the war is over, the sincere hope of the United States is that there will be an end to this strife. That is the greatest favor we

could do to China, if we could contribute in any way to bring about the unity. We do not want a divided China, we want a unified China.

Senator BRIDGES. And when General Hurley was there you considered he carried out the policies of the U.S. Government?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And as far as you know he never made any appeals to the armed Communists along the line of arming them or extending aid to them, that would be any embarrassment?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I do not know exactly what he did. I do know that he worked as hard as he could to bring about unity between the two factions, and the facts show that he was engaged in an effort in accordance with the policy, and which is a policy today, to unite them; and that is what I asked him to go back and do, because I wanted him to continue, in the hope that we could do it. There is no question that he did.

PERSONNEL INVESTIGATION

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, I hope that you do take steps for an investigation of your personnel—some of your personnel, down there. In closing, from any question I have asked—and there are only two people I want to mention, and I have mentioned them in my remarks about Colonel McCormick and General Nelson—I do not want you to take it that I am accusing them of anything; I am just asking questions about that, and I do not want at this time to reflect on them in any way.

Secretary BYRNES. I am glad that you said that, because it is the easiest thing in the world to ask about men, and have their names carried in the newspapers as being inquired about; and I must say as to both of them that they were both in the service of this country as long as the fight was on, and the Army of the United States has found no reason to question.

Senator BRIDGES. Some question was raised about them personally, or something; but I have no reason to reflect on them in any way.

Secretary BYRNES. I am glad.

Senator BRIDGES. And I do not want my questions to reflect that.

Secretary BYRNES. All right.

HUGH GRANT'S ACTIVITIES

Senator BRIDGES. I want to ask you one more question. Do you know a Mr. Hugh Grant, whom I might identify as being a minister at one time to Albania and to Thailand?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I do not, Senator. I know that he was in the service.

Senator BRIDGES. I had a communication from Mr. Grant, and I assume others have, from remarks that have been made, making the same charges against the State Department that General Hurley made, of being undermined while they were performing their duty, by underlings in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject, right there? That is the Mr. Grant that lost his job.

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, I do know. I do not know him, but I have gotten requests from half a dozen Senators or Congressmen asking me

to give him some job, and I had forgotten the name, but that is it, since the chairman mentions it. I inquired, and as a result of the inquiry I came to the conclusion that he should not be employed, but there was nothing reflecting upon loyalty or character, but solely that at this time we did not think it wise to give him a job.

The CHAIRMAN. "Temperamentally not suited to the service"—was that the idea?

Secretary BYRNES. Well, in other words, the decision was that he could not get the job. But, Senator, you know there are lots of people like that, who write letters, and when I was in the Senate I got lots of them, and I know that you have. A man who does not get an office may find some complaint; the complaint might be right, but still there is little reason for an investigation of the charges.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject, there, that Mr. Grant, as I remember it, was a former Secretary to Mr. Justice Black, when he was a Senator. He served for a time in Albania, and then was sent over to Thailand. He lost his job. They discharged him for some reason, and I think nearly every Senator here has not only had a letter from him but has had personal calls, in which he was blasting the State Department, because he did not have his job.

Secretary BYRNES. I have received calls from half a dozen Senators. Of course, they were asking me to give him a job, so they did not tell me about his blasting the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Senator Bridges among the number?

Secretary BYRNES. No.

Senator BRIDGES. Just to keep the record straight, I have not called you about Mr. Grant?

Secretary BYRNES. No; you certainly did not; you certainly did not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Austin has a question.

MAKING PUBLIC ATCHESON'S FEBRUARY 28, 1945, TELEGRAM

Senator AUSTIN. I am not indicating in this question the substance or form of the communication of February 28, by Mr. Atcheson, because you may as Secretary of State regard it as not wise to have that become public, but are you willing and free to state on the record that the publication of that communication, if it had occurred, probably would have interfered with the service of General Hurley very greatly?

Secretary BYRNES. The publication of it?

Senator AUSTIN. Yes; if it had been made.

Secretary BYRNES. The publication I think of any communication from an official of an embassy, who was asking for a change in policy, would undoubtedly be seized upon by many people as showing his lack of accord in the U.S. Government. It could not; I do not think that it should be done. The impression it would make upon different minds I do not know. I could see reason for a man believing that it showed great disunity in our own Department. That will occur whenever there is a difference of views about things. I conclude that it cannot be done. We must rely upon the free and frank reports from men who are out in the field; if they present different views we must weigh them and determine which is right and which is wrong.

Senator AUSTIN. Now, it goes without saying, I think, on the record, here, that you have not authorized the publication of that document, or any part of it; but I would like to have you state, so that the record will be perfectly sound on it, that so far as you know, nobody in the State Department has authorized the publication, by speech or printed matter, of that communication, either in whole or in part.

Secretary BYRNES. That is true.

Senator AUSTIN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in the communication which you are going to submit to the committee, in private session——

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). It is stated, however, by Mr. Atcheson that the matters covered in this request should be discussed with General Hurley and with General Wedemeyer?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were then in Washington?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

WORKING THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in the statement to indicate any desire to keep its contents a secret from General Hurley in anywise?

Secretary BYRNES. Oh, no. That was the proper channel, to the State Department, and making plain upon its face that it should be shown to the Ambassador, who was then there. That made a good impression on me.

Senator VANDENBERG. But may I ask just one question in that connection?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. Still, Mr. Secretary—and that is the one point at which I am unable to follow your logic—for instance, when you went to the London Conference, you left Mr. Dunne in charge, did you not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes; as a deputy.

Senator VANDENBERG. When you got home 9 days later and discovered that Mr. Dunne had filed a message totally disagreeing with everything you had done in London, even if it is suggested that it would be nice to show it to you, you would not have felt very well about it, would you?

Secretary BYRNES. If he had sent a communication disagreeing with everything I had done, I would agree with you—I would not. But this letter of Mr. Atcheson was not to that effect. It did make a suggested change in a policy. If Mr. Dunne, after I had left, had come to the conclusion that there should be a change in policy and he had failed to recommend it to the Department and to call it to my attention, I would have resented his failure to do it. That is what I want him for. I do not want him to be in possession of facts and then fail to bring them to my attention, and, when we do not act in accordance with a changed condition, have Mr. Dunne say, "I knew that should be done, but I was afraid to advise it, because I was afraid that it would offend you." The man at the top has got to assume responsibility for the decision, and I have no objection to the gentlemen occupying that position frankly and freely presenting their views to me. I agree to that.

Senator VANDENBERG. I quite agree that they should present their views to you, but not to your superiors.

Secretary BYRNES. Well, what he was doing, he was sending it to the only channel, Senator, that that man should send it. As the man in charge of the Embassy, in the absence of the Ambassador, his communications should be addressed to the Department; but he went out of his way to do what I thought was the proper thing to do, in reading his message, and I must say that every message of that kind is routed to the Secretary, so that the Secretary sees it.

The CHAIRMAN. When an ambassador is temporarily absent from his post, of course, the chargé d'affaires, or whoever is designated to take his place, is in fact the acting ambassador, is he not?

Secretary BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if things were moving—out in that area they were moving pretty rapidly, were they not, in February?

Secretary BYRNES. Very. Very.

The CHAIRMAN. The war was progressing, and the attitude of the Communist Army and the Communist forces was of the highest importance; we were approaching the climax of the war?

Secretary BYRNES. If our minds go back to that time, your statement is certainly correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If things were happening out there, so that somebody—the acting ambassador—suggested a modification not of the objectives but of the methods of achieving the objectives, was it not appropriate for him to indicate that to the Department, to the Secretary, especially when he advised him to consult General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who was the military commander there?

Secretary BYRNES. I thought so; I think so, now.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S SUPPORT OF HURLEY MISSION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it has been testified here in the record by General Hurley that he had been supported by President Roosevelt, by President Truman, by Secretary of State Hull, by Secretary Stettinius, and by you, in all this foreign policy, and that you told him so, in his conferences with you a day or two before he resigned, when he agreed to go back to China. It has also been testified over here that the foreign policy of the United States in China, in effect—I do not know, I am not quoting words, because I do not know exactly the words—but, in other words, that the foreign policy out there had been circumvented or paralyzed by reason of the activities of these men, Atcheson and Service. Now, was any change in the foreign policy brought about by these men, in any wise?

Secretary BYRNES. No; no change in the foreign policy. As a matter of fact, I must say that after that, in calling for information, as late as December 30, after the receipt of the Service cable—after that there, was a statement from General Hurley in December, about December 24, a very fine statement according to my views, of the policy, and it was after the receipt of Service's message in October. And there was a message signed by Mr. Stettinius written, the initials of Mr. Vincent in the corner, stating that the position of Mr. Hurley was sound. It never changed, and there has been no difference in the policy.

Senator AUSTIN. Now, that is the important telegram. What is the date of it?

Secretary BYRNES. December 30. December 24, from Mr. Hurley, and January 2, I am told, is the date; but it was shown that then, after this report of Mr. Service, the Department was stating that the position of Mr. Hurley was entirely sound.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the telegram that General Hurley testified about as having been purportedly signed by Mr. Stittinius, but which was not authorized by him and was not signed by him, and not seen by him?

Secretary BYRNES. No; I saw that telegram. It is signed by Stettinius. Well, it looks like his signature, to me. I have no reason to question it, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in the matter of giving out public statements with regard to our policy with any foreign nation, as I recall it, the letter that you wrote to the Congressman stated the policy just as it had been and just as it continues to be?

Secretary BYRNES. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were simply replying to the letter of the Congressman, and giving it out to the press?

Secretary BYRNES. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, would it be wise, or would it be practicable for the State Department from time to time to give out public statements with regard to our particular policies toward all the different governments of the earth? They always have interrelationships, and it might make some of them angry, and all that sort of business. Would it not be wholly impracticable to do a thing like that?

Secretary BYRNES. I am satisfied it is utterly impractical and unwise to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. It might interfere with our negotiations in the future. We might want to change some of the policies.

Is there anything else? Well, Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much indeed for your presence here, and we congratuate you upon your testimony.

As I understand it, this communication of Mr. Atcheson's, along with the others, will be considered by the committee in executive session. You would not want to authorize its publication, at this time?

Secretary BYRNES. I certainly do not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary BYRNES. But I will gladly present all of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 o'clock, the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

INVESTIGATION OF FAR EASTERN POLICY

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1945

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Connally (chairman), Wagner, Guffey, Tunnell, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Austin, and Wiley.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning we have present, Mr. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State. Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Acheson?

BACKGROUND FOR APPEARANCE OF DEAN ACHESON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Acheson, a few days ago, in the hearing on this resolution which occurred on December 6, when Ambassador Hurley was testifying, the following transpired:

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking for any documents at all. You say you have an idea that somebody in the State Department interfered with your policy in Iran. I want to know who it was.

General HURLEY. All right; Dean Acheson.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want you to tell. I am glad to get that. Make a note of that, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Dean Acheson—what did he do?

General HURLEY. Now, Senator, I would prefer to submit the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you are testifying here. I have not seen the document. We will see it, probably, but a document, after all, is only evidence of a fact. It is a repetition of a fact. If you know, your word is just as good as the document. If you know, your testimony is just as good as the document, probably better. Do you know what he did?

General HURLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not tell us, then?

General HURLEY. All right. Give me the Iran papers.

Senator, I do not want to do this, but I can not resist it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you do not need to do it.

General HURLEY. I will do it, and I am not bluffing. I can show you, but I think you do not want that in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think any such thing. I offered to put it in or not, as you saw fit.

General HURLEY. All right; in she goes, my friend. Square yourself, because here it comes.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, General. This is a committee here trying to conduct this. I mentioned that, and wanted to know what Mr. Atcheson did. You said you did not want to put it in the record. I tried to be courteous, and said "All right; don't." Then you said, "I will put it in." Now go ahead and do as you like. Put it in or leave it out.

General HURLEY. Senator, have you not insisted that I put this in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I have not.

General HURLEY. You have not?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I said you need not put it in if you do not want to. You said you did not want to do it. I said, "All right, leave it out." Then you said, "I'll put it in."

The audience will please be quiet. If there are any outbursts of approval or disapproval, either one, the policemen will put those demonstrating out of the chamber.

General HURLEY. Mr. Chairman, the incident to which you have referred leaked from the State Department to the press in a garbled form beginning on May 20, 1944. The question which the Senator has put me in makes it essential that I show now what really transpired.

I prepared, at the direction of President Roosevelt, what is known as the Declaration of the Three Powers in regard to Iran. This is a photostatic copy of the Iran Declaration. I might say that nearly all of the elements of this declaration were submitted originally to the Moscow Conference, under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. When it came to me, I conferred with Anthony Eden, Minister of Foreign Relations for Great Britain, and he had worked also on the Declaration, and he and I agreed on a form that had been prepared by me with the assistance of Mr. Jernegan, of the Foreign Service in Iran.

I just wanted to introduce enough of this to give Mr. Acheson a background.

Senator VANDENBERG. I wish you would give us a summary so that I would know what it is all about. General Hurley did not testify on the details, and the document was not submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try to get at some of it.

ACHESON'S RELATION TO IRAN POLICY

I have read that to you, Mr. Secretary, in order to give you some idea as to what we had in mind. We want you to testify in answer to these statements of General Hurley. What, if anything, did you do to wreck the policy in Iran?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I think the answer, the direct answer, to the Senator's question is that I did nothing to wreck the policy of the United States in Iran.

The reference of the General to the newspaper story of May 20, 1944, makes it clear that he is referring to an incident which took place in the early months of 1944, principally in my office. The story of that incident is as follows:

In December of 1943, General Hurley wrote a letter to the President. The President received this some time in January and sent it over to the State Department with a memorandum, the memorandum stating that the President was attracted by certain of the ideas and recommendations made. He saw certain practical difficulties in the way of carrying it out, and he asked for comments of the State Department and a recommendation as to what reply should be made.

That memorandum was then circulated by the Office of the Secretary to his principal assistants in the Department for their views upon it. One of the views expressed was that this memorandum should be sent to other departments of the Government as a guide to their

conduct. The memorandum in general expressed in one part certain general principles and methods which should be followed by the United States in the Middle East, and in another part it made a recommendation that a British governmental corporation which had been used to a certain extent in the distribution of lend-lease goods should no longer be used, et cetera.

When the memorandum came to me, I wrote a note to the Secretary stating my views.

Senator VANDENBERG. What was your position at the time?

Secretary ACHESON. I was Assistant Secretary of State, in charge of the economic work of the State Department.

My views were in part critical of the memorandum in its general phases, and in the course of that criticism I used an expression which later came to the attention of the general and caused resentment on his part. I shall return to that in a moment, if I may.

ISSUE OF LEND-LEASE TO IRAN

So far as the recommendation about lend-lease was concerned, I pointed out that there was no difference in principle between what had been done, what was being done, and what General Hurley thought should be done; that the difficulties were wholly of a practical nature, and that those were being worked out and would be worked out.

That memorandum, with the other papers, went to my superiors in the Department, who then directed what action should be taken. That action consisted of a letter from the President to General Hurley again expressing sympathy and approval of many of the ideas in the memorandum, referring to the practical difficulties also.

The part relating to lend-lease was sent to the Foreign Economic Administration, which had been working with us on the solution of this problem in regard to the distribution of lend-lease supplies. We were at that time pretty well on the way to a solution of the problem. We were also well on the way to the liquidation of lend-lease supplies for the Middle East, and in a few months all shipments from this country were returned to private trade sources so that that whole matter was taken care of.

That seemed to me to be the end of the matter so far as I was concerned. However, a few weeks after that, General Hurley, who was on his way back from the Middle East, came to my office and asked for a meeting on the subject. We had a meeting of several officers of the Department, including a young assistant of mine. The meeting progressed amicably for a while, when General Hurley referred to this phrase used in my memorandum in terms of some heat. He attributed this phrase to the young assistant, who was present. I pointed out to the general that how I conducted the internal affairs of my office was not of any concern outside of the office, and that all memoranda which bore my name were my responsibility, and this one in particular was. The general brushed that aside as a somewhat quixotic attitude on my part, and continued to attack the assistant.

The matter became heated. Temperature rose, and with it the voices of the contestants, until finally the general asked my assistant why he was not in uniform, fighting with the forces of this country.

That seemed to me a particularly undesirable and unfortunate observation, because the young man not only had tried very hard to get in the Army, but he had been in the Army and had been discharged because he had a serious ailment of the back, for which he was then preparing for a major operation. He shortly afterwards had that operation and was laid up for the better part of a year.

I intervened in the debate at this point and drew the general's attention to the undesirability of his remark. The general temperature seemed to cool a bit. We got everyone seated and withdrew appeals which had been made to trial by combat, and finally we worked out an agreement by which the general withdrew this unhappy remark and I apologized to the general for any observations in my memorandum which he might regard as personally offensive.

That seemed to solve the matter and we went on and had a very amicable discussion, and I never heard the thing from that day until the thing was printed in Mr. Pearson's newspaper column on May 20, and I never heard of it again until the general brought it up in his testimony.

We have met several times. We have had several discussions of this subject of lend-lease supplies, and I had not realized that I was supposed to have wrecked any policy.

That, Senator, is the story as I know it.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICA POLICY IN IRAN

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see in the press a few days ago the President's statement at his press conference?

Secretary ACHESON. I saw that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That nobody had wrecked the policy in Iran?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that testimony cover what you know about this incident?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the row as I know it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to see the document that is involved at the base of the row, to use the Secretary's words.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary indicated to me that he was perfectly willing for the committee to see the document, but he did not want to have it published for reasons with which you are familiar, about the code and all that sort of thing.

Senator VANDENBERG. Is the document available?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; it is available.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you pass it up here, Mr. Secretary?

Senator Wagner, have you any questions?

Senator WAGNER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Austin?

Senator AUSTIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tunnell?

Senator TUNNELL. I would like to to know if any change was made in

General Hurley's policy in Iran. Was he interfered with in Iran in any way by reason of the matters that you have spoken of, or the conversations?

Secretary ACHESON. General Hurley had left Iran at the time these matters occurred. He was not in Iran at all. He left Iran in December or January—December of 1943 or January of 1944—so that all of this discussion that I have been talking about occurred after he had left Iran.

Senator TUNNELL. That was already a sort of post mortem? There was no wrecking of policy as a result of your activity?

Secretary ACHESON. Not so far as I know, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When General Hurley was there, was he the Ambassador there, or the personal representative of the President?

Secretary ACHESON. He was the personal representative of the President?

The CHAIRMAN. There was a Minister there at the time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. Dr. Dreyfus was the Minister of Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was the official representative of the Government in Persia?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will take a few minutes recess.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, do you care to ask Mr. Acheson some questions?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No. Unfortunately I could not get here during his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Is there any other matter that you care to submit, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. That is all I have, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a Service report referred to in the testimony.

Secretary ACHESON. You would like that made available to you?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. We will see that that is done.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions, you are excused, Mr. Acheson. You might remain a few minutes, if you can spare the time.

Senator Vandenberg requests that General Hurley be put back on the stand.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I made the request for the following reasons: I just dislike to leave the record in the form in which it is, because it seems to be incomplete both from General Hurley's point of view and from Secretary Acheson's point of view.

General Hurley's charge, reading from the record, is that they (referring to gentlemen in the State Department) interfered and destroyed the American policy in Iran.

The episode to which Secretary Acheson has testified would scarcely seem to refer to anything that happened to American policy in Iran. The General has referred to documents. The documents are not available for publication, for obvious reasons, I think, and justified reasons, but I am wondering whether General Hurley cannot at least in a paraphrase of the documents state what he means when he says "they interfered and destroyed the American policy in Iran."

Now, General, can you amplify that statement?

First let me ask you whether the episode to which Dean Acheson testified is the thing you had in mind when you made the statement.

FURTHER STATEMENT BY GENERAL PATRICK C. HURLEY

(General Hurley was accompanied by his Secretary, Mr. Francis J. Smith.)

General HURLEY. It is, generally. But of course I am unable to agree with Mr. Acheson's version of what transpired, or what happened.

I have, Mr. Chairman, before me at this time three letters that are not secret documents that I think will give the committee certain information that they should have regarding Iran.

Senator VANDENBERG. All right. So far as I am concerned I want to know (1) what the American policy was in Iran to which you referred; and (2), how it was destroyed.

General HURLEY. That is very good. These will bear on what the American policy was.

I am reading now——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, General. From whom are these letters, and what do they prove? They are not witnesses here, but you are. You testified the other day that "they," referring, as Senator Vandenberg said, to the State Department, "wrecked the policy in Iran."

General HURLEY. No, sir. I said the heads of the State Department and the President were in favor of the policy, but it was wrecked by the organization in the State Department against the announced policy of the President and the Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want to know: how it was wrecked, and who wrecked it.

General HURLEY. All right. I am prepared to tell you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

LETTERS FROM SECRETARY STETTINIUS AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ON IRAN POLICY

General HURLEY. I am reading now from a letter from Secretary Stettinius to me dated March 2, 1944:

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: During your recent conversation in my office, you referred to the fact that you had received no acknowledgment of various communications addressed by you to the President, the War Department, and the Department of State. Well, that is correct only insofar as it pertains to the Department of State. Subsequently Major Henry was good enough to furnish us a list of the various communications which you sent and received during your visit to the Middle East between October 1943 and February 1944.

This list is most helpful to us, and will enable us to assemble a clear summary of your various views and recommendations. I can fully appreciate your interest in learning of the reaction here to your recommendations and I am glad that we have been able to inform you, since your return, of several active measures which have been taken in line with your recommendations. The four specific recommendations made originally in your report to the President of May 13, 1943 have all now been accomplished and active steps are being taken to implement your excellent and full report of December 21, 1943.

Now, gentlemen, the document that has just been handed to you you should read in light of the fact that the Secretary of State had

told me "steps are being taken to implement your excellent and full report of December 21, 1943." Now look at the document you are reading.

Senator VANDENBERG. May I interrupt you, General? Your letter of December 21, 1943, was not a statement of American foreign policy in Iran. It was a statement of your recommendations as to the American policy in Iran; is that correct?

General HURLEY. That is correct. But here is a letter from the Secretary of State saying that steps are being taken to implement that policy.

In particular, the broadening of General Connolly's directives which you suggested has already been accomplished with immediate favorable results in Iran, and progress is being made on your important proposal, which received the President's full endorsement, that we take over the distribution of our Lend-Lease supplies in the Near and Middle East.

I wish to take this occasion to express the Department's fullest appreciation for the splendid assistance you have rendered us during your two assignments to the Middle East during the past year. We appreciate particularly the effective assistance you rendered in connection with the Tehran Declaration of December 1, 1943.

That letter is signed,

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.

I am reading now, Mr. Chairman, a letter dated March 7, 1944, also signed E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Acting Secretary of State, as follows:

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: Major Henry has brought to my attention your telegrams to the Department of December 20, 1943, from Tehran, which referred particularly to the desire of the Iranians for closer commercial relations with the United States.

This is rather tedious, and I will leave the letter—I do not mean tedious: I mean it is departmental detail, and I will leave that and give you the conclusion of this letter:

The broader question of aid to Iran and our general relations with that country, referred to in your telegram, were discussed in detail in your report to the President of December 21, 1943. This report is being studied in the Department. Meanwhile, active measures are being taken to distribute our own lend-lease supplies in the area and the American advisory program in Iran is being supported fully.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.

Now, Mr. Chairman, remember that that is the 2d and the 7th of March, in which there is still some question about further study in the State Department regarding the implementation of the recommendations I made to the President under date of December 21, 1943.

Now I have a letter that is not confidential, is not secret, and is dated March 25, 1944, signed by President Roosevelt. The letter is as follows:

DEAR PAT: Your letter of December 21, 1943 concerning Iran contains suggestions of very great interest. I am thrilled with the idea of using our efforts in Iran as an example of what can be done by an unselfish American policy. If we can get the right kind of American experts who will remain loyal to their ideals I feel certain that our policy of aiding Iran will succeed.

You are right. The distribution of Lend-Lease supplies. . .

The CHAIRMAN. You left out the word "that," did you not?

General HURLEY. Have you the letter, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you. Did you not leave out the word "that"?

General HURLEY. You are right that the distribution of Lend-Lease supplies throughout the Middle East should be taken over by our own people and I have let the Secretary of State know my views in this regard.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

That answers the Senator's question concerning the approval of my suggestions in regard to Iran and the entire Middle East, my recommendations. That is proof that I did have the approval of the President of the United States and the Secretary.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am willing to give to the committee and to the public my recommendations, but that document is marked "Secret" and up to this time in all of these controversies that these gentlemen have described, in my opinion not correctly, I have never yet been charged even by my most critical adversary with ever having given a secret, even when the same secret had been leaked by the State Department to the press for the purpose of defeating the very principles that we were trying to uphold.

REASON FOR BELIEF THAT AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD IRAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT

I want to say with all candor to the committee that I have before me not only my report to the President and my recommendations in regard to Iran and the entire Middle East; I have my comments on the defeat of that policy and how it was defeated and by whom defeated, and that letter is dated September 17, 1944, and addressed to the President of the United States. I regret that under the rules and regulations I am unable to submit these documents without permission from the constituted authority. It was to get permission to give the American people the facts that I appealed on the day I resigned, and I am still appealing.

Senator VANDENBERG. As I understand it, then, the American policy in Iran which was destroyed, using your words, is the policy related to the handling of lend-lease and the use of lend-lease to establish, let us say, American ideals in that area. The American policy to which you refer is that policy in respect to lend-lease which you recommended in your letter of December 21, 1943, and which you identify as "the American policy" because of President Roosevelt's letter to you approving it, is that correct?

General HURLEY. And Secretary Stettinius' letter.

Senator VANDENBERG. And Secretary Stettinius' letter.

General HURLEY. That is my reason for believing it was the American policy.

Senator VANDENBERG. And that particular recommendation in respect to lend-lease was not carried out, and that is your meaning when you say the American policy in Iran was destroyed?

General HURLEY. That is only one of them. What you have said is true. It was not made effective, but that is only one of the suggestions

I made, and the President approved, that were defeated under the leadership of Mr. Dean Acheson.

Senator VANDENBERG. I understand from your statement and from the correspondence that most of your recommendations in your letter of December 21, 1943, were carried out. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. No, sir; not the 1943 letter. Most of my recommendations in regard to Iran, such as the recommendation that Iran be invited to declare war on the Axis—my secretary has reminded me that that is also contained in a secret document, but nevertheless everyone knows that Iran did declare war on the Axis, and there were four recommendations I made in letters previous to this recommendation that were made effective.

Of course, I was in Iran and the President and many Army officers came to the Teheran Conference, and the program up to that time was made effective.

CHRONOLOGY OF IRAN RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you base your identification of Secretary Acheson in this connection upon the contents of the memorandum which we have here, which has not been given out, which he provided the Department in commenting upon your letter?

General HURLEY. Yes; but you will find that that comment is prior to the President's letter, and let us concede that they may not only argue against the recommendations I made. You know that I concede the right to do that. Let us concede they have the right to stigmatize the plan submitted by me and approved by the President and the Secretary of State in the language contained in that. At the same time, I do not see anything that is really unreasonable in my remonstrance against such an attack on a policy that has the approval of the President and the Secretary of State.

Senator VANDENBERG. It did not have the approval of the President at that time; did it?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; it had verbally, but later he wrote this letter. I had seen him, and he had read in my presence the recommendation I made not only in regard to Iran, but the whole Middle East.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you have any information as to whether the President communicated his point of view to the State Department in regard to this matter?

General HURLEY. I know he did; and I have seen in the State Department the memorandum from the President of the United States dated January 12, in which he did communicate his attitude on the recommendations to the State Department.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is January 12, 1944?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator VANDENBERG. In which he approved all of the recommendations in your letter of December 21, 1943?

General HURLEY. I think he approved the plan that I suggested for American participation not only in Iran but in all of the Middle East territory. I have not the January 12 memorandum of the President to the State Department, but I have read it, and I would not trust my memory to tell you completely what is in it, but it was an approval and it did ask to make the plan operative.

DISAGREEMENT WITH ACHESON ON IRAN FOLICY

Senator VANDENBERG. Is your charge against Secretary Acheson based exclusively on the memorandum which was furnished by him in comment upon your original letter?

General HURLEY. Oh, no, Senator. That does not encompass Secretary Acheson's opposition. The basic reason, the basic thing in Secretary Acheson's opposition was that I—and this is outside of all record because it is public; it has been in the newspapers—contended that the United Kingdom Commercial Corp., a profitmaking organization owned by Great Britain, should not be allowed to handle and sell lend-lease supplies not only to Iran, but in 17 other nations, for the purpose of building up a trade monopoly and excluding the United States from those territories.

I contended also, and this is public, that instead of creating imperialistic monopolies among weaker or less favored nations we should supply these nations with expert advisers on all the major elements of industry and production; that the advisers furnished should be the employees of the Government to which they were assigned, and that the pay to these advisers should come from the Government which they were serving; that the cost of this service should not become a burden on the American taxpayer; and that in this way the United States could assist less favored nations in developing their own resources for the raising of the standard of living of the nation which owned the resources. That, in contrast with a monopoly instituted for the purpose of making profit out of the nations for someone other than the people who owned the resources, and that is the plan that Mr. Acheson discarded in favor of monopoly and imperialism, and it was carried on until I went to Iran on a quick trip from Russia, and on September 17, 1944, I sent a full report to President Roosevelt telling him in detail and naming the persons who had destroyed his plan in Iran.

At that time some of the so-called experts, and even the Ambassador who was there, were removed. That made two regular Service men who had been removed from Iran, not because of my opposition, Mr. Chairman, but because they were not making effective the American policy.

Senator VANDENBERG. Who were they?

General HURLEY. The first Minister who was recalled was a very good man, and on lots of these things he was right, but he was recalled, and that was Louis Dreyfus. The second Ambassador whose resignation was accepted was Leland Morris.

Now, to say that these gentlemen were withdrawn from Iran because of whims of mine is just merely absurd. They were withdrawn because there was an overall American policy that the lower strata of the State Department was defeating against the will of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, and that is the point, Mr. Chairman, that I have been endeavoring to make quietly to this committee.

We can continue this, and I can be specific if the State Department will release from secrecy—remember, I am not asking anything from the White House; these two reports that will prove this case on Iran and all the states of the Middle East are in the State Department, and both of them have leaked in a derogatory and distorted form to the press.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will you identify again the two specific documents to which you refer?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. I am referring primarily to my report to the President dated at Tehran, Iran, on December 21, 1943, and the second report is my secret report to the President of the United States dated either at Delhi, India, or Chungking—I am corrected on that; it is Chungking, China—after I have been in Tehran again, but had been relieved from duty there and was on duty in China, but I took time out to tell the President how his policy in Iran had, in my opinion, been destroyed.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will you give me that date, General?

General HURLEY. That is September 17, 1944. I also have a letter from Secretary of State Stettinius in which he said that that report had been referred to the State Department for action.

Senator VANDENBERG. What is the date of the President's letter to you that you read?

General HURLEY. The President's letter to me is dated March 25, 1944.

Senator VANDENBERG. Why do you particularly identify Mr. Acheson in connection with your analysis of this situation?

General HURLEY. Because it was Mr. Acheson who to me, personally, in the very stormy session which I did not think was stormy, which he describes—it may be stormy for him, sir, but for me it was a mild zephyr. I was merely trying to state the fact, and I am referring not to the documentary evidence but to Mr. Acheson's open condemnation of anything other than monopoly and imperialism in the weaker nations, and he was opposed to democracy and to the American plan of building governments in the weaker nations that would develop the resources of those nations for the raising of the standard of living of the people who lived there.

Senator VANDENBERG. What was the date of your interview with Acheson?

General HURLEY. Well, I do not know. I think Mr. Acheson, whose memory is good on some subjects, would possibly be able to say what that date was. I do not believe I kept the date.

Senator VANDENBURG. I was interested only in knowing whether it was before or after the President's letter. That would be before March 25, 1944.

General HURLEY. I think it was before, sir.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you know of any indication that the President gave prior to his letter to you that this was the American policy in Iran?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. The first intimation I had that it was the American policy in Iran came from a memorandum from the President to the State Department on January 12, 1944.

Senator VANDENBERG. Could you indicate in a general way what that memorandum was, just paraphrasing it?

General HURLEY. That memorandum told the Secretary of State approximately what is told in the President's letter to me of March 25. It is longer and more in detail, but it is to the same effect: The

indications are that we will have to get experts to do this; he mentioned again that the weakness would be in getting Americans who would be idealistic enough to put the policy in effect, and he also was very proud of the recommendation that indicated a manner in which we would not pay by lend-lease or make a charge against the American taxpayer for supporting such an effort; that it was to be financed by the nations to whom the service was given, and that the experts who would go as advisers would be under the control of the government to which they were assigned.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think that defines the issue, Mr. Chairman. It had not been defined here before.

The CHAIRMAN. General Hurley, you made these recommendations and you base your statement that they were all adopted by the President on his letter to you of March 25, 1944, is that right?

General HURLEY. It is March 25, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, you base your statement that the Government adopted all of your recommendations and made them the policy of the United States on the strength of this letter?

General HURLEY. No, I did not say that the Government adopted all of my recommendations. I said that they did adopt the recommendations to which the President's memorandum, the President's letter, and the Secretary of State's two letters specified. I am not going to, Senator, if you will forgive me, begin to testify what is in that document that is not in evidence, because that is the best evidence, and I wish you would submit it.

Senator WILEY. May I see that document, Mr. Chairman?

LEND-LEASE SITUATION IN IRAN

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the lend-lease recommendation that they be distributed through Government representatives was carried out by the Army, was it not? They turned over all of it, except a small amount of civilian lend-lease. Did not the Army thereafter handle all of the military lend-lease in that whole area?

General HURLEY. Not before I got through with it. It may have when I finally called attention to it. I have not been back recently, sir, but when I was there, American lend-lease was being distributed by a commercial corporation, and the commercial corporation was selling American lend-lease goods and keeping the money. I objected to that, and I had some of the money for tires, automobile tires——

The CHAIRMAN. Is that mentioned in your memorandum to the President, the details of that, about selling it?

General HURLEY. The details are in the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about your letter to the President.

General HURLEY. You would have to read that, sir, to find out what is in it. I cannot carry it all in my memory, but I am saying that they did, and I did report that this commercial organization was selling American automobile tires, and I required them to put money in the bank to pay, which money was afterward released, I was told, at the direction of Mr. Acheson, and given back to the company.

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you that?

General HURLEY. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you Mr. Acheson was approving this tire deal?

General HURLEY. I think Mr. Acheson told me that himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Acheson told you that himself?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General HURLEY. Also, on my criticism of the selling of American lend-lease by the United Kingdom Commercial Corp. the company made a deal, or made a compromise, with that very spendid administrator and Minister. Dean James Landis, in which they agreed to pay $15 million and put in an expense account in London, to pay for the lend-lease goods which I alleged had been sold.

The CHAIRMAN. That is another Dean.

General HURLEY. That is right on the ball, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did Dean Acheson have to do with that?

General HURLEY. I said Dean Landis.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to find out about Mr. Acheson now.

General HURLEY. Yes; but I am telling you that he reported this, so that you can get corroboration for it if you wish it.

ROLE OF ACHESON IN IRAN POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. Of course Mr. Acheson, at the time that you submitted your recommendation or report to the President, which is here before the committee, was an Assistant Secretary of State?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your recommendations were, in the course of the administration of the State Department, referred to Mr. Acheson; were they not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They referred that to him for his comments and recommendations; did they not?

General HURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And he made them; is that correct?

General HURLEY. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. He made certain recommendations?

General HURLEY. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you construe the fact that he may not have agreed with all of your recommendations as being in effect "wrecking" the American policy in Iran?

General HURLEY. Oh, no, Mr. Chairman; not at all!

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what else did he do to wreck it?

General HURLEY. After the policy was agreed upon, he did not make it effective, after the policy had gone through the State Department; and it has not been made effective, yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he in charge of the whole policy?

General HURLEY. I would not say that, sir, because I am not familiar with the organization of the State Department, because it is very hard to trace any responsibility in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. And it has been ever since you have been in office? Was that true under Secretary Hull and Secretary Stettinius and Secretary Byrnes?

General HURLEY. I have stated that I always had the support of Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, and, so far as I know, Secretary Byrnes; but I do not think they even had the support of the rest of the State Department; and what I complained about, sir, is the great discrepancy between the policy made by the higher echelon of our Government and the way it is administered by those in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. When Mr. Hull was Secretary, he, in his policy, controlled the Department; did he not? You say you had no difficulty with him?

General HURLEY. I repeat, I have had no difficulty with the President, or with any Secretary of State, until the other day when I finally decided that I had to bring some of this substance to the surface.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, when you made your report, there, to which Mr. Acheson made some comment, that was in January 1944, was it not?

General HURLEY. No; I made my report in December 1943.

The CHAIRMAN. But I mean, the comment in the Department was in January 1944, is that right?

General HURLEY. I know that the President's letter went over, but I do not know. I have told you that I would rely on Mr. Acheson's memory or his comments as to when the meeting was.

The CHAIRMAN. You made the report in December, then, you say?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. December 1943?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hull was still Secretary of State at that time, was he not?

General HURLEY. But Mr. Stettinius was acting.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hull was still Secretary of State, was he not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was responsible for what transpired in the State Department, was he not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And so as a result of all of your recommendations and the recommendations of other people, whatever policy was pursued after that was Mr. Hull's policy, was it not?

General HURLEY. No, sir; I am telling you that it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want you to tell us how some subordinate in the Department can overrule the Secretary of State and overrule the President of the United States and run a foreign policy that is contrary to the views of both the Secretary of State and of the President. Now, how can that be done?

General HURLEY. What I would like to know, Senator, is why that is permitted; but it is done.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to answer me, how it can be done.

General HURLEY. Well, I could not do that, sir. That is beyond me. I do not know. I know it is done, but I have been 13,000 miles away from here most of the time. I do not know how it is done.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Did you regard anybody's divergence from or disagreement with anything you recommended as being an overthrow of the American Government's policy?

General HURLEY. Indeed not! Many recommendations made by me did not meet approval, and whenever the order is given me in wartime by constituted authority, whenever the decision is made, it is my decision, and I have given everything in me to make the decisions of constituted authority effective; and to some extent I have succeeded.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all. Are there any other questions?

LIST OF CHINA DOCUMENTS REQUESTED

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I would like to ask the general one question. I find that the committee does not have a copy, General, or does not have the original paper that you submitted in your first appearance, listing the documents which you requested be made available to the committee, or that paraphrases be made available. Do you have a copy of that with you?

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the book.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I am informed by the clerk that it is not, it was sent down to the State Department, no copy was retained. I just wanted to ask you if you had one with you, because I wanted to ask a few questions about it.

General HURLEY. We have given, Senator, the copy in regard to Iran, to the Secretary, this morning.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I am talking about the one that you made in your original appearance.

General HURLEY. With respect to China? No; we haven't a copy with us, but we will supply you with one.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I may not have an opportunity to ask you afterward. I would prefer to have seen the list; but I want to ask you, General, whether in that original list furnished in your first appearance before the committee, all documents that you desired the committee to obtain, or if they did not obtain the originals to obtain paraphrases of them, are included. Does that list contain all of the important documents which you had in your possession or knew of, that formed, as I understand it, the basis for the final decision that you would resign?

General HURLEY. No, Senator; it does not contain all of them, because I considered that would be voluminous, and I thought I would submit only a few basic documents that I believed proved my contention.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Does it contain all of the documents which you considered vitally important?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; it contains sufficient to prove the case that I stated.

Senator VANDENBERG. Excuse me. Does your answer mean that the list included the Iranian matter?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No; we are referring to the documents that he asked for originally.

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. They pertained to China.

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes; they do not include the documents involved in your discussion of Iran?

General HURLEY. No: but I have submitted a list this morning, Senator, asking for these documents.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I understood that, but I just wanted it absolutely clear on the record that his original list on China contained all of the documents which he considered to be of importance; and he says that it does.

Genera HURLEY. Senator, let me say this in response to Senator La Follette, so that there can be no misunderstanding about that. The documents I have submitted or asked for are sufficient to prove the case which I stated. They do not contain all the important elements of a year's correspondence; that would be too voluminous. They are important elements, but they do prove the contention that I have made, namely, that American policy in China was to uphold the Government of the Republic of China; that the career men were opposed to that, and were supporting the attempts of the armed political Communist party in China to overthrow the government; and they will sustain that contention.

Senator TUNNELL. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tunnel.

Senator TUNNELL. I would like to ask the general this: Was your resignation in any way the result of the failure of the Government to carry out what you conceived to be the policy of the United States in Iran?

General HURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions, that is all, General. All right, you are excused, General.

Mr. Acheson, will you come around.

FURTHER STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have heard the testimony of General Hurley on the Iranian matter. Would you mind telling us whether or not you in any wise defeated or blocked our policy in Iran. You heard his testimony that after the policy had been adopted, you had not carried it out, and you had blocked and defeated it. Will you tell us about that.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator; as I stated at the outset, there is no policy ever put into effect by this Government in Iran or elsewhere which I have blocked or destroyed or in any way interfered with; on the contrary, I have always attempted to carry out to the best of my ability the instructions which I have received.

OPPOSITION TO GENERAL HURLEY'S MIDDLE EAST RECOMMENDATIONS

I should like to say that I think there has been some confusion introduced into the matter of this memorandum. There are two things which have been discussed this morning which are quite separate. One is the early part of the general's memorandum, in which he recommended certain general principles and undertakings which this country should assume in the Middle East. In the latter part of it, he made some recommendations about lend-lease. Now, those things are separate and distinct. The first one, I criticized, as I thought it was my duty to do, and I did it vigorously. I thought that what the general recommended was going to get us into commitments which were beyond

the capacity or the desire of this Government or of this people, and would get us into trouble. That view was submitted, and that is all I had to do with it.

In so far as the President's letter constitutes an approval of that part of the memorandum, it constitutes an overruling of my point of view. There were missions in Iran, there are missions in Iran today. There is a financial mission which is there, employed by the Iranian Government, made up of Americans who advise that Government on finance, taxation, budget, and so forth. There is a police mission, an American mission which is there advising and helping the Government with its police forces. There is a military mission there of American soldiers who are advising the Iranian Government on the organization of its Army. There is a public-health mission there under Doctor Avery, made up of Americans who are advising Iran on public-health matters.

There was established at Cairo an agricultural mission, members of which were sent up to Tehran to advise that Government on its agricultural problems, and from time to time other American experts were attached to the office in Cairo who went to Iran and to other countries and advised those governments. Now, that policy has never been interfered with at all. In so far as any part of it fell within my duties, I helped it.

The idea expressed by the general that I am in favor of monopoly and imperialism and against democracy it utterly fantastic. No action of mine, no word of mine has ever furnished any basis whatsoever for such a statement.

LEND-LEASE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IRAN DISCUSSED

Now we come to the second thing, which is the lend-lease part of the general's statement. The general did not understand, when he wrote his report, and has never understood the facts about lend-lease in Iran. He was under the impression that all the American lend-lease goods were being distributed by a British corporation. That was not the case. There has never, I said, been any question of principle between the views which the general expressed in his letter and what was done and attempted to be done. There has been great difference between the general and all people dealing with this in an understanding of what the facts were.

Before his report came in and afterward. American military lend-lease goods destined for the Iranian Government were handled by the U.S. Army forces. Also, lend-lease goods destined for the Iranian Government were handled by American officials. There was a small portion of the lend-lease goods to Iran which had to be put into commercial channels of distribution—consumer's goods imported for the Iranian public; and how that was to be done was not a problem of the State Department, which is not an operating agency, but a problem of the Federal Economic Administration; and people were sent to Iran to determine how it should be done.

It was discovered that in order to handle this comparatively small amount of goods it would require a very large force of Americans, transported to Iran. There were great difficulties in the way of recruiting such a force; there were even greater difficulties in the way of

transporting such a force to Iran. Therefore, the services of a British Government-owned corporation, the United Kingdom Corp., were employed. That corporation received the goods, distributed them to the commercial distributors, received the proceeds, and turned the proceeds over to the United States. All the proceeds for those goods have been turned over and are in the possession of the United States.

When the general's memorandum came along it was desired to cut down the use of the United Kingdom Corporation, to use Americans as much as possible; but even more than any of those things, what we wished to do was to stop using lend-lease as the method for sending these goods to Iran for commercial distribution. That had to be done during the taut days of the war when the only thing which could be introduced into the Middle East was through government shipments on account of the need of transport for war purposes; so we immediately began returning all of this trade to private channels; and a few months after this memorandum came along, that was accomplished; and it is now going forward.

The discussion on lend-lease was never a discussion of principle, it was never a discussion about matters which were within the control of the State Department. It was a practical matter of administration and operation—how could you take these goods which finally found their way to one of the ports in the Red Sea? How could you take those goods and send them to commercial distributors? If you could have done it by Americans, if they had been there, of course that was the way to do it. Nobody had any other idea than that that was the way to do it, but there were not sufficient Americans. This other corporation was used, its use was cut down, and finally the whole operation was discontinued.

I think that is all I have to say.

Senator AUSTIN. May I ask him a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Austin.

Senator AUSTIN. At the time of the arrangement with this British-owned corporation was there also in Iran an American corporation called the U.S. Commercial Corp., managed by a certain Philip Kidd?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator. There were as I recall it about three or four people in Iran who represented that corporation, and they were used at all times to supervise what this British corporation did; but the job of taking these goods and of seeing that they were transported on trucks, that they were warehoused, that they were delivered to consumers or to distributors, was something that three or four people could not do, you had to have an operating commercial organization to do it; and use was made of this British corporation for that purpose.

Senator AUSTIN. Then, on the question of whether you should employ a British corporation or an American corporation, the decision turned on the basis of its capacity in manpower, did it?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator. It was a practical question, and the decision of that question was in the hands of the Foreign Economic Administration.

Senator TUNNELL. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator TUNNELL. As I understood you, Mr. Secretary, the civilian lend-lease for Iran has been paid for in full?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that part of it which was distributed to consumers through this corporation, they collected the proceeds. Those proceeds were in Iranian currency. That was turned over to the United States and was used by the United States to meet its expenses in Iran.

Senator TUNNELL. Now, that was the portion which was paid for, that which was distributed to civilians?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator TUNNELL. And is that the portion to which the general referred when he said that it was being sold by British agents, or words to that effect?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is what he was referring to, that portion which went to consumers. The tire business, for instance, that he referred to, is this: In addition to General Connelly's operation, the British also had a line, taking goods to the Soviet Union. To do that they employed a lot of Iranian trucks. Those trucks had to have tires. How were you going to distribute the tires to these trucks who were working for this British organization which was transporting some of the lend-lease goods to Russia? Well, you could of course, if we had had the men, send out Americans who would have distributed these tires to those users. It was much simpler to have the British corporation which was employing the trucks take the tires, distribute the tires, and collect the pay for them; and that is what was done.

Senator TUNNELL. But there is now no uncollected balance due from that corporation to the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you one question. As I understand you, the actual transactions with the British corporation were had by the Economic Administration.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time it was not under the State Department, was it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it came under the State Department only a few months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. At a later date?

Secretary ACHESON Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the Foreign Economic Administration made the agreement with the other corporation for the distribution of these supplies?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; and the State Department assisted them in the dealings with the British Government, to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. This American corporation was managed by Philip Kidd?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the U.S. Commercial Corp.

The CHAIRMAN. The U.S. Commercial Corp.? You said we utilized that organization in supervising the operators?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that was a corporation which was under the control of the Foreign Economic Administration, and it was

used for the purpose of supervising what was done in Iran with lend-lease.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? Is there anything else you want to submit, Mr. Acheson?

Secretary ACHESON. No, thank you, sir.

STATUS OF CHINA DOCUMENTS REQUEST

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask whether the State Department has responded to the request for the documents of which General Hurley gave us a list in his first appearance.

The CHAIRMAN I will say, Senator, that the State Department immediately upon our request to them went to work preparing them and getting them ready, copying them, and all that sort of thing, and paraphrasing them. The difficulty in using an original is that it might reveal the code.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand that those documents are ready for submission, or will all be ready tomorrow morning, and the committee can have a secret session, if you desire, to go over all those documents. If there are no other questions, that will be all, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.

Is Mr. White here?

STATEMENT BY THEODORE H. WHITE, WAR CORRESPONDENT AND FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT, FORMERLY STATIONED IN CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. White, give the stenographer your name and occupation.

Mr. WHITE. My name is Theodore White. I have been a war correspondent for the past 3 years. Prior to that I was a foreign correspondent in China. I represented Time Magazine in China for 6 years, since 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you still with Time?

AUTHORITY OF WITNESS

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; but I speak here for myself alone and for the other newspapermen, and not for my organization. I speak for the press, and not for any corporation.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify this letter, here, that was written in by you, Richard Watts, Eric Sevareid, Annalee Jacoby, and Jack Belden?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Eric Sevareid?

Mr. WHITE. Eric Sevareid, of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

The CHAIRMAN. And you identify these telegrams from Watts, Jacoby, and Belden, authorizing you to appear for them?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Put these in the record. May we put these in the record, without objection? All right, there is no objection, so they will go into the record.

(The letter and telegrams referred to are as follows:)

LETTER

NEW YORK CITY, *Dec. 2, 1945.*

SENATOR TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: We realize that it would be presumptuous on our part to stress to you and the members of your commitete the extraordinary gravity of the charges made by former Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley. As American newspapermen, whose collective experience extends over eight years of war in the Far East, we feel it our duty to offer whatever assistance or testimony is within our power concerning Mr. Hurley's charges.

We feel that the gravest danger to the work of your investigation is that it may easily bog down in the clash of personalities which Mr. Hurley highlighted and that by so doing it may lose sight of the larger issues of American policy in the Orient.

We should like, as American newspapermen, to go on record as testifying to the complete integrity and conscientious devotion to American interests of the career diplomats whom Mr. Hurley so indiscriminately attacks. It was our job over a number of years to cover the war in China, and the activities of our representatives; our judgments were not ideological but based upon the simple day-by-day standards of their honesty and ability.

The men accused are unable to speak for themselves. We feel, therefore, that as witnesses sent to China by the American press we should announce our belief that the American Embassy in Chungking, upon Ambassador Hurley's assumption of office, was staffed by a good, honest cross-section of Americans. Some were liberals, others, conservatives. They had in common only one quality—that all were reporting the truth to the American Government as they saw it.

As journalists, we should indeed be interested in seeing the publication of the dispatches of our trained specialists, side by side with Mr. Hurley's official reporting in the past year.

The men whom Mr. Hurley attacks are people who have endured years of hardship in China, in pestilence and bombing, serving America's interests. We have met these men in famine areas, in air-raid shelters, at the war fronts. They served as nobly and disinterestedly in the cause of our Republic as any soldier in uniform.

Mr. Hurley disagreed with them, and he got rid of them. By so doing he deprived himself and the State Department of American sources of information that his predecessors had found both valuable and objective.

In justice not only to the men involved and Mr. Hurley, but also to the American and Chinese people, we hope that both General Stilwell and former Ambassador Gauss will be called to give evidence at what should be, after all, an examination not of defenceless State Department servants, as Hurley would have it, but an examination before Congress, of United States policy in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

THEODORE H. WHITE
RICHARD WATTS, JR.
ERIC SEVAREID
ANNALEE JACOBY
JACK BELDEN

We should be glad to send one of us to Washington to testify before your committee, if you desire it. We may be reached by writing, care of Theodore H. White, 46 E. 29th Street, New York.

TELEGRAMS

NEW YORK, N.Y., *Dec. 9, 1945.*

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

This is to state that Theodore H. White who is appearing before your committee has my full support in his defense of the American diplomats in China who had been attacked by General Hurley.

Respectfully,

RICHARD WATTS, Jr.

LARCHMONT, N.Y., *Dec. 10, 1945.*

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Theodore White, who as president of foreign correspondent club of China, is eminently representative and informed, is fully empowered to testify for me.

ANNALEE JACOBY.

NEW YORK, N.Y., *Dec. 10, 1945.*

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Washington, D.C.:

This is to inform you that Theodore White is qualified to represent my views in any statements he may make before Senate concerning State Department officials accused by Hurley stop having lived ten years China myself would be willing testify on overall China question if needed.

JACK BELDEN.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. White, when did you first go to China?

Mr. WHITE. I first arrived in China in January 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there?

Mr. WHITE. My headquarters were in Chungking, and they have been in Chungking off and on for the past 6½ years. I would travel to various fronts. I have been in India for a few months, Burma, Dutch East Indies, Australia; and I had two trips back to America. I would say that the total of my years in China was 4 years, but basically it has been coming and going to the various fronts in the Far East, out of China.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come back?

Mr. WHITE. Two years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there while General Hurley was there?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; and I was there before he was there, years before he was there, and all the while he was there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. George Atcheson? I believe his name is George.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. He was a Foreign Service officer out there.

Mr. WHITE. I am very proud to know him, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. John Service?

Mr. WHITE. I do.

DEFENSE OF ATCHESON AND SERVICE

The CHAIRMAN. It has been testified here by General Hurley that these two gentlemen, who were career men, were engaged in sabotaging the U.S. policies and efforts in China. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. WHITE. I know of no attempt whatsoever to sabotage General Hurley's policies in China by any career officer of the State Department; and if you will permit me, sir, I would like to say a few words.

The CHAIRMAN. Just go ahead in your own way.

Senator VANDENBERG. How would you know whether they were sabotaging it, or not?

Mr. WHITE. Senator Vandenberg, we newspapermen in Chungking lived in a very rough situation. I met these men in the field. When you

bivouac with people you know what they think. I have had no access to any Embassy documents, but you cannot live with men day and night and be with them in discomfort and danger and not know what they think.

The American policy as laid down by Secretary Byrnes, as I understand it, was for the creation of a united, democratic China; at least that was the testimony given here last week. I know that those men zealously fought to achieve that, just by living with them. I do not think it would be possible for any member of the press in Chungking to be unaware of any conspiracy or of any attempt to sabotage Ambassador Hurley.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, it might not be a conspiracy. It might be a difference, a very fundamental difference of opinion as to whether or not you should or should not, let us say, arm the Communist forces in the north. I do not quite see how you would qualify as a witness to determine whether or not that was their point of view, and whether or not they were encouraging their own point of view.

Mr. WHITE. May I answer you as some length, sir?

Senator VANDENBERG. Oh, surely! Go ahead, because I am not being critical, I am merely being inquisitive.

Mr. WHITE. Yes. I think the basic issue here involved is this—whether or not any officer or any reporting observer of the State Department should temper his reports to agree with the opinions or prejudices of his superiors. Now, I feel that any man who tempered his actual, factual reporting in the field to agree with what his superiors thought would not only be useless to the United States but he would be dangerous. I want to make this point—that the men whom General Hurley I believe has charged so seriously, most of these people were responsible, except for Atcheson, to General Stilwell and General Wedemeyer. They were operating as part of our military intelligence network in China. They were assigned to various specific tasks. Service, for example, went to orders of General Stilwell to Yenan to investigate the situation there. Another officer, Mr. Raymond Ludden, went on orders. They reported the facts. "We want to know of what aid the Communists could be to us." "They will prove to be of great aid politically, no matter how much they were fighting the Japanese." These were military missions; these men did go there, and they reported these things. If their opinions differed with those of General Hurley, that is regrettable; they reported the facts as honestly as it can be done.

I would like to tell you now, there is a very broad classification of people called "career diplomats," and in the American press they usually appear as "cookie-pushers," but these men were out in the field all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder, please, sir.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. Most of these people, except for Atcheson, were out in the field. They were out there in military orders. Service, for example, has a brilliant record in field service for our Government during the war. Service was the first man to go in the northwest to Kansu, to see whether the oil field which had just been discovered could be used for military purposes. Service was the first man to go into Honan Valley to find out what was going on there. He was the

first man to go to Chengtu to do some of the political groundwork necessary for the construction of air bases there, to be used by the B–17 bombers that were later used in bombing Japan. Later he was to go to General Stilwell to investigate just what aid they could be to us.

DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND HONEST REPORTING

Now, I realize that the main difference of opinion between General Hurley and Mr. Service was as to the use, the power, and the value of the Communist arms to the American policy; but it was Mr. Service's duty to report these things. Sir, I do not believe it would be possible in Chungking for a man to attempt to conspire with the "Communist armed party" as General Hurley calls it, in an attempt to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek, without the press corps knowing of it. Having known Service so well, having lived with him in places like that, he would be guilty of monumental duplicity in every hour of his daily life if he were actually conspiring. You cannot talk with a man in the field for so long and not realize what he is doing. I am absolutely sure has not not conspiring with anybody to overthrow our Government. He was reporting the facts as he saw them.

Senator VANDENBERG. Let me ask you a question. You keep using the word "conspiracy." I do not conceive that this is a matter of conspiracy. A man might have a perfectly honest opinion which could be deadly in its impact upon American policy. Would you say that, for instance, if we had furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party, it probably would not have resulted in the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government?

Mr. WHITE. If you are asking for my opinion on the China situation——

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes, I am asking for your answer to the question. Is it your opinion, if we had furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party, that the government of Chiang Kai-shek would not have fallen?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir; I do not believe so. Furthermore, I do not believe that that is the opinion, if I may say so, of General Stilwell or of Ambassador Gauss, who I feel should be called to testify about these men. I do not think it would have fallen.

Senator VANDENBERG. If there are those who thought that it would, then their opinion of those who would recommend such a policy would necessarily be that the opinion was inimical to the American attitude?

Mr. WHITE. I quite see that there would be people who would think that, but any junior officer who would agree with the opinion of a superior when he did not sincerely believe it himself, would be guilty of gross negligence of duty. It is his duty to report on what he has seen and on what he knows of China. An employee's superiors can either accept or reject his recommendations, but he must report, as an intelligence officer, himself, the situation as he sees it.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is the question for the committee to decide, and I do not think you were in a position to say whether or not these gentlemen were or were not loyal to the service when they were doing the thing you say they ought to do. That is for us to decide.

Mr. WHITE. I am not trying to transgress upon your prerogatives,

sir. I am merely saying that to the best of my belief and knowledge these men were serving their country as honorably as they possibly could, that they were reporting the truth, that no one of them ever attempted to sabotage, undermine, or otherthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, I entirely respect your opinion, but I think it is hearsay as far as this hearing is concerned, and that is the only point I am making.

Senator AUSTIN. What you are doing is corroborating or trying to corroborate the opinion of Mr. Service, is it not?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir. There is a charge leveled against these men that they were attempting to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek, and that they were attempting to sabotage American policy; and I am coming here and offering to testify that these men did not do so.

Senator VANDENBERG. Have you seen the papers to which General Hurley refers, upon which he bases his charges?

Mr. WHITE. I have not seen any paper addressed to the State Department by any embassy official. I have been a war correspondent in uniform, and I have seen, as war correspondents do at headquarters, documents on the political situation of China.

Senator VANDENBERG. If the State Department was as secretive out there as it is here at home, I would not have thought you saw very much.

Mr. WHITE. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

VIEWS ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Senator WILEY. No. I want to ask a question. I can agree that a great deal of what you have said would be, in legal parlance, a conclusion, but as you have pointed out, here, you might tell us what these men have actually said to you about American policy. For instance, it has been stated, here, as I recall it, American policy was clearly defined, as laid down by General Hurley, and that these men stated that was not the American policy. Did you ever hear them say that?

Mr. WHITE. Never, once! Never, once!

Senator WILEY. Did you ever hear them say or see them do anything from which anyone might draw the conclusion that Hurley was wrong about the policy and they were right?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir. I think one of the finest expressions of American policy in China is a document written by General Hurley and never published. I would like to see the text of it, because from what I am told it represents their opinions, our opinion, and his opinion at that time. It was a document General Hurley sent to Yenan. A single copy of that document is still there, in which he states his belief that an agreement could be reached in China by the various parties on the basis of a full coalition government, and in which the parties would subordinate their armies. Now, every one of his, I believe, in China, all the newspapermen, if I may speak for them, and these men, whom I have known so well, have always believed that that is the best policy to be applied.

Senator WILEY. Then so far as you know there wasn't any difference between Hurley and Service and Atcheson?

Mr. WHITE. I do not know what the precise nature of their differences was. I do know that Service and Atcheson were reporting the truth at all times. If ever General Hurley found their opinions later on differing from his, he called them an attempt to sabotage his policy. Their opinions—what they wrote to the State Department I do not know, sir. I do know that in private conversation the policy they spoke of and talked of was always the American policy, as I understood it, broadly defined by our Government.

FURNISHING LEND-LEASE TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to ask just one more question. Was it your personal opinion, Mr. White, that we should have furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party?

Mr. WHITE. Never, without qualifying it. I am against furnishing lend-lease to anybody without certain qualifications. I believe if a coalitionist government had been achieved we should have furnished arms to all armies fighting against the Japanese.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, that is not quite my question. My question is whether you thought that it would have been a correct policy to have furnished lend-lease under existing circumstances to the Communist armed forces?

Mr. WHITE. Under the existing circumstances? No.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, was not that the policy that your friends believed in?

Mr. WHITE. I believe that my friends were speaking of future methods, the way the situation was likely to develop. As you know very well—I am sorry. As you know, sir, while part of our military strategy at that time called for an eventual landing on the China coast, a landing on the China coast would have been very important, in the summer of 1944. To achieve that landing you would have needed Communist help, and to have that help for our landing, I would then have been in favor of lend-lease to aid our own troops.

GOAL OF CHINESE UNIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Mr. White. Was it not the policy, or part of the policy of General Hurley to bring about a union of the so-called Communist armed party with Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. WHITE. I believe he tried to do so, and I believe he failed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that the policy of the President and of the Secretary of State?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And of everybody?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That policy was based upon the theory, of course, that they could get them all to unite to fight the Japanese. Now, in that event, would it have been quite appropriate to furnish them lend-lease, so they could fight the Japanese?

Mr. WHITE. Why, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. And were not all of our representatives out there, supposedly, including General Hurley, and the State Department, here—were they not all in favor of that policy?

Mr. WHITE. They were.

The CHAIRMAN. They claimed they were in favor of that policy?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Were you in intimate contact with these two gentlemen?

Mr. WHITE. Not with George Atcheson. With Service, yes; not with George Atcheson.

Senator WILEY. What was his reaction when he was ordered home?

Mr. WHITE. I can tell you that. I went to call on George Atcheson just before he left. He was sick in bed. He had had a hard time of it; and you will find this difficult to believe. At that time, he praised Ambassador Hurley to me.

Senator WILEY. I do not understand.

Mr. WHITE. At that time, he praised Ambassador Hurley. That was the last conversation I had with George Atcheson. My relation with Service was very intimate. We were friends of long standing.

Senator WILEY. What was his reaction when he was ordered home? Is he the man you were talking about, who got sick?

Mr. WHITE. No; that was Atcheson. Service's reaction when he was ordered home—he did not know why he was being ordered home, at the time. Both Hurley and General Wedemeyer were in Washington. He did not know why he was being called by them.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other matters you want to submit, Mr. White? Is there anything else you want to say?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now is your chance. Are there any other questions?

TESTIMONY SUPPORTED BY OTHER CORRESPONDENTS

Senator WILEY. What are those telegrams?

The CHAIRMAN. They were just telegrams from a group of other correspondents, saying that Mr. White was authorized to speak for them—Mr. Sevareid and Mr. Belden and some others.

Senator WILEY. How long is it since you have seen these correspondents?

Mr. WHITE. Perhaps 3 or 4 days, in New York.

Senator WILEY. They were all over there with you?

Mr. WHITE. In New York?

Senator WILEY. Were they all over in China with you?

Mr. WHITE. At various times. We were never all there at any one time, but all of us know the people who are under attack, and we wanted a chance to proclaim in public our faith in their loyalty and in their honesty and in their good service for our Government. That is, we feel that these men who underwent hardship, were really ordered into danger by our Government, should not be hauled up in public and so attacked without somebody speaking in their defense. They did work for our Government, which I believe was finer intelligence work than the organization of any other foreign country. It was magnificent work. Mr. Raymond Ludden, for example, went on a secret mission behind the Japanese lines, into the province of Hopei. It had been 6

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years since any American observer had been there. It was a six-man mission. One of those men was killed, a captain of the Army. The other members of the mission were decorated. Mr. Ludden came back to Chungking, in January or February, I believe. It was, I believe, under the impact of his reportage, and what went on behind the lines and in the Communist areas, that Mr. Atcheson's report, to which Mr. Hurley referred, was drawn up.

We were surprised at these charges against them when we read them in New York, and we felt that we should tell the committee that we, as a nonpartisan group of newspapermen, felt that they had served our country as honorably as possible.

Senator WILEY. That is why you came down?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Representing that group?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. I have an aversion for seeing my friends falsely slandered.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. The committee will recess until tomorrow morning, when we will meet in executive session in the committee room.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock, the committee recessed until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 11, 1945, at 10:30 o'clock, in the committee room.)

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